Slike strani
PDF
ePub

VIEWS OF THE MINORITY.

Hon. James G. Jenkins is, and was at the time of the granting of the injunctions complained of, the U. S. circuit judge for the eastern district of Wisconsin, having been appointed to that office by President Cleveland. On August 15, 1893, receivers were appointed by Judge Jenkins for the Northern Pacific Railroad Company. Later in the month of August, 1893, the receivers ordered a reduction of wages of the employés of the road, and on December 18 applied to Judge Jenkins for authority to make the reduction of wages, and for an order restraining and prohibiting the employés from the commission of all sorts of unlawful acts. The order enjoined the employés―

from combining and conspiring to quit, with or without notice, the service of said receivers, with the object and intent of crippling the property in their custody, or embarassing the operation of said railroad, and from so quitting the service of said receivers, with or without notice, as to cripple the property, or to prevent or hinder the operation of said railroad.

Later, a supplementary injunction was granted by Judge Jenkins enjoining and restraining the chiefs of the labor organizations to which the employés of the railroad belonged from ordering, directing, or encouraging a strike upon said road. No strike did occur, nor has there been any one adjudged to be in contempt for violating the injunctions, nor has any proceeding to punish for contempt been instituted against any person under these orders.

The employés, with the aid of the chiefs of the labor organizations, subsequent to the granting of these injunctions, effected a settlement and adjustment of the scale of wages to be paid the employés, under which they have since continued to perform services for the road. Under a resolution of the House, the Judiciary Committee, by a subcommittee, took testimony at Milwaukee, which has been published for the use of the House.

It appears by the testimony that the employés understood the injunctions to prevent them from leaving the service of the railroad in any manner without the consent of the receivers. A motion was made before Judge Jenkius to modify the terms of his orders, and in an opinion filed, which is published with the testimony in this case, he disclaims any intention by his injunctions to prevent any of the employés from quitting the service of the company in a peaceable, decent, or reasonable way. In his opinion, he says:

None will dispute the general proposition of the right of every one to choose his employer and to determine the times and conditions of service, or his right to abandon such service peaceably and decently.

An appeal to the court of appeals of that district from these injunctions, granted by Judge Jenkins, was taken, where the same is now pending, with the expectation of a decision in the near future. The

committee find what was an undisputed fact in the case, that Judge Jenkins acted in good faith, and they say in their report:

The testimony adduced before us fails to show any corrupt intent on the part of the judge. It is altogether possible that he sincerely believes the orders granted by him were sanctioned by law and a legitimate exercise of his jurisdiction, and, therefore, the errors which your committee believes he has committed, gross as they are, and affecting the very highest rights of citizenship, afford no sufficient grounds for any proceedings against him.

The committee have reported at some length, taking issue with Judge Jenkins solely upon the law of the case, and holding that he committed grave legal errors, and was guilty of an abuse of legal process, and have submitted a resolution for adoption by the House, and also recommended a statute prohibiting the enforcement of specific performance of labor contracts by legal process.

As the minority do not represent the governing power of the House, they do not feel called upon to indulge in any affirmative proposition in relation to the subject-matter of the report. Their recommendations would have no power, and therefore it is not worth while to make them. The labor question, in its relation with railroads, is one full of complication, because of the public interest which intervenes. In ordinary cases between employers and employed, the public have only a remote interest, but here they have a direct one; not only free passage from place to place is prevented, but supplies are cut off and business paralyzed. On the one hand it is for nobody's interest to cripple the railroad owners, for injury to them, when made systematic and general, would be death to all improvements and a hindrance to other railroad building; on the other hand, men are entitled to a fair wage in the settlement of the amount of which they must have a reasonable combined voice. It must be still further said that some method of adjustment must be had which will secure public traffic and the business of all the people from being interrupted by the disputes of those immedi ately interested. It can be seen at a glance that such a question can not be settled by mere language or by bids of partisans, but must be settled by the concurrence of both parties on a common ground.

The basis of settlement will be found when the people interested have had the benefit of many failures on both sides. We have great hopes that a basis will soon be reached, first by finding what the law is, and second by agreeing to what it ought to be. We therefore must decline to follow the majority into any disquisition as to what the law is. That seems to be under control of another branch and already in train to be settled authoritatively.

But the attitude of the majority is one which ought not to pass without animadversion. If, as the committee says, "the testimony adduced before us fails to show any corrupt intent on the part of the judge;" if, also, "it is altogether possible that he sincerely believes the orders granted by him were sanctioned by law," then the question should be left to the appellate tribunal. A Federal judge, in the exercise of his function, having arrived at a conclusion without "any corrupt intent," a conclusion "he sincerely believes in," ought hardly to be harassed by a Congressional committee, since he is quite as likely to be right on a point of law as they.

Individually, we may not believe his law was sound, and may not think it will be so pronounced by the tribunal of appeal, but if he was honest and has given his honest opinion honestly, it would seem as if the correction should come from another source and that the law should be settled by the proper tribunal prior to legislation. It may be that

no legislation is required and the appellate court will afford all the relief the country needs.

If, on the other hand, Judge Jenkins has been, we will not say corrupt, but unduly swayed in. the exercise of his functions by improper influences, or has stated law so badly that it is plain that he has violated his evident duty as a holder of the scales of justice, as an arbiter between rival interests, then he should be impeached.

In a word, if he has been corrupt, or has so wrested the law of the land that injustice has been done, so evident that it carries with it the proof of evil intent, then Congress has a plain duty to perform. But if it be a mere question of law, then the judiciary have the duty to perform, and Congress, by granting a court of appeals, has ended its duty. Of course when the case is finished, if the final appeal should demonstrate that the law is defective, then remedies should be applied, but we ought to know what the law is before we act. If it should be finally determined that Judge Jenkins was wrong, then the law may not need amendment. The committee think he was wrong, and yet they propose to act as if he were right.

So much for the legislation originally proposed. As for the resolution proposed later, we do not see how it could be justified. Were it demanded that we should vote condemnation of any proposition that involuntary servitude should be established by any interpretation of law all sensible men would be agreed, and Republicans first of all, but to propose that a judge who, as the majority declare, had no "corrupt intent" and "who sincerely believes" in his conclusions, shall, without impeachment, be censured by the legislative branch of the Government, is to confound all distinctions between the legislative and the judicial powers and create a side tribunal of appeal where justice would be for sale to the suitor who could poll the largest vote.

WM. A. STONE.
GEO. W. RAY.

H. HENRY POWERS.
THOS. UPDEGROFF.

REPORT OF CASE, ARGUMENTS, AND DECISION OF THE COURT IN COMMONWEALTH v. HUNT (4 METC.)

COMMONWEALTH V. JOHN HUNT AND OTHERS.

The general rules of the common law, making conspiracy an indictable offense, had been used and approved in Massachusetts before the adoption of the constitution of the Commonwealth, and were continued in force by Chapter VI, section 6, of that instrument. Aliter, of the English laws regulating the settlement of paupers, the wages of laborers, and making it penal for anyone to use a trade or handicraft to which he had not served a full apprenticeship. To constitute an indictable conspiracy there must be a combination of two or more persons by some concerted action to accomplish some criminal or unlawful purpose; or to accomplish some purpose, not in itself criminal or unlawful, by criminal or unlawful means.

An association the object of which is to adopt measures that have a tendency to impoverish a person-that is, to diminish his gains and profits-is lawful or unlawful as the means by which that object is to be effected are lawful or unlawful.

An indictment for a conspiracy to compass or promote a criminal or unlawful purpose must set forth that purpose fully and clearly.

An indictment for a conspiracy to compass or promote a purpose not in itself criminal or unlawful, by the use of criminal or unlawful means, must set forth the means intended to be used.

An indictment for a conspiracy which does not directly aver facts sufficient to constitute the offense is not aided by matter which precedes or follows the direct averments, nor by qualifying epithets (as "unlawful, deceitful, pernicious," etc.) attached to the facts averred.

An indictment alleged that the defendants, being journeymen bootmakers, unlawfully, etc., confederated and formed themselves into a club, and agreed together not to work for any master bootmaker or other person who should employ any journeyman or other workman who should not be a member of said club, after notice given to such master or other person to discharge such workman. Held, that there was no sufficient averment of any unlawful purpose or means. So of an indictment which alleged that the defendants, being journeymen bootmakers, unlawfully, etc., conspired, confederated, and agreed together not to work for any person who should employ any workman not being a member of a club called the Journeymen Bootmakers' Society, or who should break any of their by-laws, unless such persons should pay to said club such sums as should be agreed upon as a penalty for the breach of such by-laws; and, by means of said conspiracy, did compel one W., a master cordwainer, to turn out of his employ one H., a journeyman bootmaker, because said H. would not pay a sum of money to said club for an alleged penalty of some of said by-laws. So of an indictment which alleged that the defendants intending, unlawfully and by indirect means, to impoverish one H., a journeyman bootmaker, and hinder him from following his trade, did unlawfully conspire, etc., by wrongful and indirect means, to impoverish him and to deprive and hinder him from following his trade of journeyman bootmaker, and from getting his livelihood and support thereby; and, in pursuance of said conspiracy, they did unlawfully, etc., prevent him from following said trade and did greatly impoverish him.

So of an indictment which alleged that the defendants, designing to injure one W. and divers others, all being master bootmakers, employing journeymen, unlawfully, etc., did conspire and agree together by indirect means to prejudice and impoverish one W. and divers others, all being master cordwainers and employing journeymen bootmakers, and to hinder them from employing any journeymen who should not, after notice, become members of a club called the Journeymen Bootmakers' Society, or who should break or violate any of the by-laws of said club, or refuse or neglect to pay any sum of money demanded from them by said club as a penalty for such breach of said by-laws.

This was an indictment against the defendants (seven in number) for a conspiracy. The first count alleged that the defendants, together with divers other persons unknown to the grand jurors, "on the first Monday of September, 1840, at Boston, being workmen and journeymen in the art and manual occupation of bootmakers, unlawfully, perniciously, and deceitfully designing and intending to continue, keep up, form, and unite themselves into an unlawful club, society, and combination, and make unlawful by-laws, rules, and orders among themselves, and thereby govern themselves and other workmen in said art, and unlawfully and unjustly to extort great sums of money by means thereof, did unlawfully assemble and meet together, and, being so assembled, did then and there unjustly and corruptly combine, confederate, and agree together that none of them should thereafter, and that none of them would, work for any master or person whatsoever in the said art, mystery, or occupation who should employ any workman or journeyman or other person in the said art who was not a member of said club, society, or combination, after notice given him to discharge such workman from the employ of such master, to the great damage and oppression, not only of their said masters employing them in said art and occupation, but also of divers other workmen and journeymen in the said art mystery, and occupation, to the evil example of all others in like case offending and against the peace and dignity of the Commonwealth."

The second count charged that the defendants and others unknown, at the time and place mentioned in the first count, "did unlawfully assemble, meet, conspire, confederate, and agree together, not to work for any master or person who should employ any workman not being a member of a club, society, or combination called the Boston Journeymen Bootmakers' Society, in Boston, in Massachusetts, or who should break any of their by-laws, unless such workman should pay to said club and society such sum as should be agreed upon as a penalty for the breach of such unlawful rules, orders, and by-laws; and by means of said conspiracy they did compel one Isaac B. Wait, a master cordwainer in said Boston, to turn out of his employ one Jeremiah Horne, a journeyman bootmaker, because said Horne would not pay a sum of money to said society for an alleged penalty of some of said unjust rules, orders, and by-laws."

The third count averred that the defendants and others unknown, "wickedly and unjustly intending unlawfully and by indirect means to impoverish one Jeremiah Horne, a journeyman bootmaker, and hinder him from following his trade, did" (at the time and place mentioned in the former counts) "unlawfully conspire, combine, confederate, and agree together by wrongful and indirect means to impoverish said Horne, and to deprive and hinder him from following his said art and trade of a journeyman bootmaker, and from getting his livelihood and support thereby; and in pursuance of said conspiracy they did wrongfully, unlawfully, and indirectly prevent him, the said Horne, from following his said art, occupation, trade, and business, and did greatly impoverish him."

In the fourth count it was alleged that the defendants (at the time and place before mentioned), "unjustly intending to injure and impoverish one Jeremiah Horne, and to deprive him of work and employment, and to prevent his earning a livelihood and support by following his trade of a journeyman bootmaker, did unlawfully conspire, comS. Doc. 190-10

« PrejšnjaNaprej »