26th. It was fought for three consecutive days and nights, and yet the fortune of war remained undecided. On the 29th all the Japanese regiments, determining either to drive off the Russians once for all or be annihilated in the attempt, made a most fierce attack, and despite great losses caused by machine-guns pushed forward and on the following morning at last succeeded in compelling the enemy to

retreat.

After the defeat at Liaoyang the Russians had been gradually concentrating their strength at Mukden, where they assidously prepared defense-works and attempted to check the advance of the Japanese toward the north. In the meantime the Japanese army was also greatly augmented, due to the joining of the Third Army after the capitulation of Port Arthur and that of the Yalu Army under the command of General Kawamura. Marshal Oyama now saw the opportune moment had arrived to take Mukden and ordered a general advance on the enemy's lines centring on Mukden. His general plan was: the central, left and right armies were to essay a frontal attack on the enemy by disposing themselves between Penhsiku in the east and the left bank of the Hunho in the west; the Third Army was to be in the left of the left wing and the Yalu Army in the right of the right wing, so that the one might be between the right bank of the Hunho and its left bank and strike at Mukden from the northwestern direction by taking a roundabout way, while the other might work in conjunction with the right wing from the direction of Hsingshing, attack the enemy in the direction of Hsingshing and capture at one blow both Mukden and Fushun. This plan was faithfully and excellently carried out. The memorable battle was opened 19 February. The extreme right wing of the Japanese armies pushed northward after occupying Chinghocheng, pressed on the left bank of the Hunho and, occupying the entire neighborhood of Fushun by 10 March, drove off the enemy in that region northward. The Russian casualties in this direction were not less than 20,000, while those of the Japanese were only some 3,800. As for the extreme left wing, it commenced operations on 27 February, and advancing from the west toward the northwest emerged in the rear of the enemy, and while the Japanese central, left and right armies were still confronting the Russians along the Shaho, was menacing Mukden itself with the railway line between it and the city. These prompt actions of the Japanese two extreme wings greatly contributed to victory, for the Russians, already hard pressed in front, were thrown into utter confusion, finding themselves attacked from the rear. By 11 March the Russians in the direction of the Shaho retreated to the right bank of the Hunho in disorder, and either by being hotly pursued or being surrounded, lost heavily. So great was the Russians' defeat indeed that in the direction of the Shaho their casualties were over 90,000. On the 15th Marshal Oyama made the formal entry into Mukden, and the office of the TartarGeneral of the city was made the seat of his headquarters. The battle of Mukden was probably one of the greatest battles since history began, its battle line having extended to more than 125 miles, while the armies confronting

each other numbered probably 450,000 on the Russian side and 350,000 on the Japanese side. After that battle the Japanese armies continued the pursuit of the retiring Russians, and Tiehling, Kaiyuan, Changtu and other places fell into their hands one after another.

The Battle of the Japan Sea. When Port Arthur was completely isolated, Russia organized a second Pacific squadron with the purpose of relieving it. Led by Vice-Admiral Rojestvensky, it left Libau for the Far East on 16 Oct. 1904. The squadron was divided into two divisions, one of which voyaged round Africa, while the other passed through the Suez Canal. They joined again at Madagascar on the day on which Port Arthur capitulated. In April 1905 it stopped at different ports in French Annam, one after another, and on 5 May was joined by a third Pacific squadron commanded by Rear-Admiral Nebogatoff. As Port Arthur had already fallen, the Russian fleet steamed northward with the purpose of entering Vladivostock. Admiral Togo, commander-in-chief of the Japanese fleet, anticipated that the enemy's fleet would attempt the passage of the Straits of Tsushima, and calmly waited for its coming, having concentrated all his naval strength at the base of operations. At 5 AM, on 27 May he received a wireless telegram saying that the enemy's fleet was sighted. He at once issued orders to different detachments of warships to sally forth and meet the enemy according to a prearranged plan. At 2 p.M. on the same day the opposing fleets confronted each other to the north of Okinoshima Island. Admiral Togo hoisted on the masthead of his flagship, Mikasa, a signal saying: "The fate of the Empire depends on the issue of this battle. All are expected to do their best." At 2.08 P.M. the enemy opened fire, but the Japanese fleet refrained from responding until the range became less than 6,000 metres. Then it opened fire. It was both fierce and effective, and in a short time, beginning with the Oslabya, which led the enemy's fleet, and the flagship, Kniaz Suvaroff, most of the Russian warships were either sunk or disabled, and when darkness set in the Japanese destroyers and torpedoboats made daring attacks on the still remaining vessels of the enemy. On the following day the Japanese fleet succeeded in intercepting five Russian vessels, which were trying to escape northward. Rear-Admiral Nebogatoff, who commanded this detachment of the Russian fleet, saw the utter futility of resistance and surrendered. As for Vice-Admiral Rojestvensky, he was found on board a captured destroyer in a seriously wounded condition and made a prisoner of war. Of the 38 vessels which had attempted the passage of the Straits of Tsushima 20 were sunk and five were captured by the Japanese, and only four cruisers and a few destroyers and transports made good their escape. Thus it is no exaggeration to say that the Second and Third Russian Pacific squadrons were practically annihilated. In contrast to this overwhelming loss sustained by Russia the Japanese losses consisted of only three torpedoboats.

Thus Russia lost on land Liaoyang, Port Arthur and Mukden, while on sea the First, Second and Third Pacific squadrons. The issue of the war was now clearly decided.

The North Korean Army. For some time after the outbreak of the war Japan stationed only small garrisons at different places in Korea, but in view of frequent raids made by the Russians into the northern province of Hamgyong, headquarters of the Japanese troops in the peninsula were established at Seoul in the summer of 1905, with Lieutenant-General Miyoshi as commander-in-chief. The North Korean Army thus organized for the first time occupied the important town of Kyong-syong on 20 June and steadily advancing northward cleared the Pu-ryong and Pu-peuk districts of the enemy by 24 July, and occupying Kyong-heung, a town on the frontier of much strategical importance, was in a position to menace Vladivostock.

The Subjugation of Saghalien.- Not long after the battle of the Japan Sea a Saghalien expeditionary army was organized with military and naval contingents under the command of Lieutenant-General Haraguchi. On 4 July 1905 a squadron commanded by Vice-Admiral Kataoka left Otaru escorting a number of transports with troops on board. On 8 July the Japanese occupied Korsakoff without difficulty and advancing further north occupied Alexandrovski on the 24th, and on the 30th Lieutenant-General Haraguchi proclaimed military administration over the whole island. On the same day the Russian military governor of the island asked for an armistice, and on the following day the Japanese and Russian commissioners met to discuss the terms of surrender. The Russians agreed to Japan's terms, and 3,270 officers and men surrendered. In this way

Saghalien was subjugated in three weeks.

Since the outbreak of the war Japan had won every battle on land and sea. Especially the great victories of the battles of Mukden and of the Japan Sea placed her in a most favorable condition as to the ultimate issue of the war. It was at this time that President Roosevelt of the United States urged the two combatants to lay down their arms. After duly considering different aspects of the situation, the Japanese government concluded that it was wise to listen to the friendly advice of President Roosevelt. On 3 July 1905 Baron Jutaro Komura, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Mr. Kogoro Takahira, Japanese Minister at Washington, were appointed plenipotentiaries for negotiating the terms of peace with Russian plenipotentiaries (M. Witte and Baron Rosen). The peace conferences, held at Portsmouth, U. S. A., in the latter part of August, arrived at a satisfactory conclusion and the treaty was signed by the plenipotentiaries of both parties on 5 September. See PORTSMOUTH, TREATY OF.

TOKIWO YOKOI.

22. DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES. Since the close of the 19th century, Japan, which was introduced to intercourse with the world by the tactful American expedition of 1853-54, and with which the United States has had recently more points of contact than with any other power except Great Britain, has occupied second place in American diplomatic relations. The earlier importance of friendly relations with Japan, which was first visited by an American vessel (the Eliza of New York) at the port of Nagasaki in 1797 and again in 1803 in unsuccessful attempts to open trade, was greatly in

creased by the American discovery of valuable whale fisheries near the Kurile Islands, followed by the imprisonment of ship-wrecked American seamen on the Japanese coasts from which foreigners were excluded by a hermit policy. The importance of closer relations was especially emphasized more strongly by the negotiation of a treaty with China in 1844 and the acquisition of California in 1848, resulting in plans (by 1851) for a trans-Pacific line of steamers. The earliest plans to open trade by an expedition under government auspices, first proposed by Captain Porter in 1815, were never executed. In 1832 President Jackson, recognizing the need of ports in the Far East, sent Edmund Roberts as a confidential agent to several countries of that region, including Japan, with instructions to negotiate treaties to secure the safety of seamen and commerce, but Roberts did not proceed beyond Cochin China. Later hopes of an opportunity to find a way for the beginning of friendly relations were disappointed by the failure of friendly private attempts to return some shipwrecked Japanese in 1837, and again in 1845, and by the later unsuccessful efforts at peaceful negotiations to open trade relations through Commodore Biddle of the American Navy Department in 1846.

In the growing trade with China after 1844, the superiority attained by American "clipper" ships by 1845, the development of American interests on the Pacific Coast after 1848, and the increasing importance of accessible harbors for supplies and refuge for American trading and whaling vessels, the American government found new subjects for diplomatic efforts in the Pacific and good reasons for urging the opening of intercourse with Japan. Its purpose after 1848 to guard more vigilantly American interest in the Pacific was indicated by negotiation of the first treaty with Hawaii in 1849 and also a treaty with the Sultan of Bruni in Borneo in 1850; and its determination incidently to resist more strenuously the Japanese policy of strict Oriental isolation and exclusiveness which provoked American enterprise (elsewhere so successful in mastering opposition) was illustrated in 1849 by the peremptory demand of Commander Glynn for the immediate release of 16 American prisoners-a demand to which the Japanese officials acceded after failure to evade it by successive strategic manœuvres, first by threats of offensive operations, then by haughty indifference and finally by evasive diplomacy. In 1851, the American government, influenced by Glynn's enthusiastic suggestions and proposals for conversion of the Japanese policy, decided upon another friendly appeal for access and supplies for trading vessels, through instructions to Commodore Äulick whose powers were transferred (in November 1852) to Commodore M. C. Perry.

Without use of force, but by exhibition of American power through ships and inventions, Perry in March 1854 negotiated the first treaty of Japan with a western power- a treaty which, regarded as a marked American success, provided for peace, amity, trade and supplies at the ports of Shimoda and Hakodate, protection to shipwrecked sailors and ships in distress, consular residence at Shimoda, and mostfavored-nation treatment. From the expedition and the treaty Japan dates its new birth

a fact recently recognized by the erection of a monument to Perry in 1901. For over half a century, with only a brief exception, relations continued mutually friendly.

Townsend Harris, who was commissioned consul general in September 1855 and established his residence on the Bay of Yedo at Shimoda which had been opened to American commerce by Perry's treaty, soon found that the opening to foreigners, accepted as inevitable by the government, was resisted by the people who were unwilling to receive the "western barbarians." In the disorder which resulted in the period of readjustment, while other nations held the weak and tottering Japanese government to the strictest accountability, he refused to sanction harsh and oppressive measures. But, though interested in Japanese welfare and opposed to taking any unfair advantage of Japanese ignorance of international relations, he firmly and skillfully ripped open the laminated deception of the Japanese diplomatists and succeeded in obtaining all the concessions which became the basis of new treaties negotiated at Yedo in the American spirit of justice and tolerance - treaties which secured commercial rights and laid the foundations of diplomatic intercourse. By a treaty negotiated 17 June 1857 he secured rights of permanent residence at the two open ports, the opening of an additional port at Nagasake, residence of a vice-consul at Hakodate, and extraterritoriality. On 29 July 1858, having secured right of audience, he negotiated the third important American treaty providing for mutual diplomatic representation at the national capitals, three new ports, extension of the jurisdiction of consular courts, full religious freedom and privileges to Americans, and regulation of customs (subject to revision after five years if desired by Japan). Ratifications were changed at Washington with appropriate ceremonies in 1860 by a special Japanese embassy which aroused public interest. In recognition of his services, in January 1859 Mr. Harris was commissioned minister resident, a position which he held until April 1862.

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The American policy of separate action and respect for Japanese sovereignty - a policy consistently maintained except in emergencies created for a brief period by Japanese foreign agitation and internal disorders - increased Japanese confidence and facilitated diplomatic relations.

Unfortunately Japan, under the influences of the misfortunes which had overwhelmed China, and against the prudent policy counselled by the American representative, sought to temporize in the face of apprehended dangers, but gradually yielded to foreign demands. Thus it was forced to grant extraterritoriality, under which foreign consuls set up miniature courts involving the unfortunate natives in technical violations of their edicts, and to submit to foreign demands for tariff concessions, for various exemptions (from land taxes, tonnage and lighthouse dues, and bridge tolls) and for monopoly of coastwise trade. The tariff concessions later involved the country in financial distress, resulting from the burden of taxes on agricultural interests which produced detestation for the government and disdain for foreigners.

Even while Harris was serving as American

minister conservative opposition to the treaty concessions produced an anti-foreign agitation, incidentally resulting in the assassination of Harris' secretary, the burning of the American legation and the compulsory withdrawal of American representatives from Yedo.

After 1863, as a result of the necessity of chastening the reactionary feudatory Japanese prince of Choshiu who in defiance of the Tycoon had closed the Shimonoseki straits, the American government adopted a new rule of practice in regard to international relations. Harris' successor, R. H. Pruyn, in concert with representatives of other governments demanded the observance of treaties and in January 1864 negotiated a treaty reducing duties. In his period as minister, occurred the revolt against the Shogun, who represented the legal government. It culminated in the attempt by the rebellious daimio of Nogato to close the straits of Shimonoseki, an act which resulted in an expedition of allied fleets in which vessels of the United States participated. Following the action of the reactionary lord of Choshiu in firing on American and other foreign ships in Shimonoseki Strait, the United States government acted in connection with governments of other powers (Great Britain, France and the Netherlands) in bombarding Shimonoseki forts and in exacting indemnity (1864), in securing at Osaka (in November 1865) the Imperial section to the existing treaties, and in negotiating a concerted international treaty (of June 1866) securing more liberal trade privileges and a regulation limiting duties at 5 per cent during the pleasure of the treaty powers but providing for revision within a specified time by concert of the powers-a regulation which proved burdensome to Japan. Religious toleration largely secured through the firmness of the American minister Van Valkenburg and his successors between 1868 and 1874 was later sanctioned by the Constitution of 1889.

Following the revolution which resulted in the establishment of the emperor's government at Tokio, Japan made unsuccessful efforts to negotiate for a reconsideration and revision of burdensome treaty relations with a view to securing autonomy, to take effect after 1872. These efforts were made, first through the foreign ministers at Tokio, and later (1871-72) through a Japanese embassy of five eminent men which was sent to visit foreign capitals but found no hope of concessions except at Washington. Then, encouraged especially by the friendly liberal spirit of the United States, the awakened nation began the task of reaching a high national standard which would be recognized by the treaty powers. The first step was taken by increasing the number of young Japanese students sent abroad for education, and by increasing travel abroad by Japanese of maturity to observe the ways of the western world. The progressive results appeared in the establishment of a system of diplomatic receptions at Tokio in 1872, the adoption of the Gregorian calendar in 1872, the creation of provincial assemblies in 1875, followed in rapid succession by codes of laws, compulsory universal education, a constitution, and a national parliament.

Meantime several incidents indicated the growth of mutual confidence and friendship between the United States and Japan. In