posed to personal danger, it is difficult to appreciate the merit he seems to make of yielding up his personal escort, provost and camp guards, and head-quar ter baggage-teams, when he had no use for them himself, and when they were needed for the purpose for which they are maintained-operating against the enemy, and that too in a pressing emergency. Even as it was, he seems to have retained nearly a hundred, many of whom he says were orderlies, &c., &c., around his person.

Leaving this personal matter, we come to the important question-Is it true that General McClellan left, as he avers, nothing undone in his power to forward supplies and re-enforcements to General Pope's army? Did he, on this momentous occasion, honestly and faithfully do his whole duty in this respect, without any personal aims, or any jealousy, and with the single eye to the success of our arms, and the honor, welfare, and glory of the nation?

He had been repeatedly urged to hurry forward the troops from the Peninsula. On the 9th of August, he was informed by General Halleck that "the enemy is massing his forces in front of Generals Pope and Burnside to try and crush them, and move forward to the Potomac ;" and was further told, "Considering the amount of transportation at your disposal, your delay is not satisfactory. You must move with all celerity.”

Again, on the 10th, General Halleck informed him that "the enemy is crossing the Rapidan in large force. They are fighting General Pope to-day. There must be no further delay in your movements: that which has already occurred was entirely unexpected, and must be satisfactorily explained. Let not a moment's time be lost, and telegraph me daily what progress you have made in executing the order to transfer your troops." Again, on the 21st, he was told, "the forces of Burnside and Pope are hard pushed, and require aid as rapidly as you can. By all means see that the troops sent have plenty of ammunition. We have no time to supply them; moreover, they may have to fight as soon as they land."

Whether or not the delays of General McClellan were

excusable, those telegrams must have shown him, if proof were necessary, the emergency in which Pope was placed, and that the concentration of the two armies was not being effected in the time expected, and, as a consequence, that Pope was in a critical position, needing immediate help to save his army from defeat. It was under these circumstances that General McClellan left the Peninsula.

When he reached Aquia on the 24th, under most posi tive and pressing orders from Washington, General Pope, who had been holding the line of the Rappahannock for nearly a week against the assaults of Lee's whole army, and keeping up communication with Fredericksburg, so as to receive the re-enforcements McClellan had been ordered to send up from the Peninsula-finding these re-enforcements not coming by water to join his left as fast as Lee marched by land around his right, and that his right, though stretched to Waterloo Bridge, had been turned and his rear threatened, had been obliged to throw back his right, first to Warrenton, and then to Gainesville, and his left and centre from Rappahannock and Sulphur Springs to Warrenton Junction, Bristol, and Manassas. General McClellan knew on the 24th, when at Aquia, of the abandoning of Rappahannock Station, and of Pope's having broken his communication with Fredericksburg, and himself reported the facts to General Halleck.

August 26th, General Halleck ordered General McClellan from Aquia to Alexandria, and told him "General Franklin's Corps," which had arrived at Alexan dria, "will march as soon as it receives transportation.'

General Pope had, when his line was stretched from below Rappahannock Station to beyond Warrenton, asked that Franklin's Corps might be sent out to take post on his right at Gainesville, to which there was transportation by turnpike and railroad, to guard against what afterwards happened-the movement of the enemy through that place on his rear. The failure to have that corps at that place, or in the action at all, was one of the chief causes of Pope's failure. Why was this?

August 27th, as already stated, General McClellan was directed to take entire direction of the sending out of the troops from Alexandria." On the same day he was informed of the position of Pope's head-quarters; of that of most of Pope's forces; of where Pope wished reenforcements sent him-Gainesville; and that Fitz-John Porter, then under Pope, reported a battle imminent. At 10 A. M. on that day, he was told by Halleck, "that Franklin's Corps should march in that direction (Manassas) as soon as possible;" and again at 12 P. M., he was further told by Halleck that "Franklin's Corps should move out by forced marches, carrying three or four days' provisions, and to be supplied as far as possible by railroad."

It is well to bear in mind these explicit orders, and the circumstances under which, and the object for which they were given, for General McClellan either seems to have forgotten them, or to have utterly failed to appreciate their importance. A battle reported by his favorite general, Fitz-John Porter, as imminent, within cannon sound of where he was,-the road to the battle-field, a wide, straight, Macadam turnpike, well-known to both General McClellan and General Franklin, as each had been over it more than once,-the whole of the enemy and army which had been pressing Pope since the 9th, now concentrating to overwhelm him,-here, one would think, was every motive for him to do, as he claims to have done, every thing in his power to send re-enforcements forward, and to send them instantly.

Why was it, then, that, at 7.15 P. M. on the 29th, more than two days after the order for it to go by forced marches to re-enforce an army engaged in battle, Franklin's Corps, was still at Anandale, about seven miles from Alexandria, and Franklin himself in Alexandria? General Halleck says it was all contrary to his orders, and McClellan acknowledges himself "responsible for both these circumstances."

In the mean time, Pope's forces fought the battles of the 27th, 28th, and 29th, and were now to fight that of the

30th without Franklin's help. Why was this? Were the orders to send Franklin out countermanded? General Halleck says they were not. As it is never just to judge a person by the light obtained after the fact, let us see, so far as the correspondence enables us, what were the dif ferent phases of the case as they presented themselves at the time.

The intimation to McClellan on the 26th, that Franklin was to go to the front, was followed by the positive orders of the 27th, given at 10 A. M. and 12 M. On that day General McClellan reports that Generals Franklin, Smith, and Slocum are all in Washington; and that he had given orders to place the corps in readiness to march to the next in rank. At the same time, he reports heavy firing at Centreville.

On the 28th, Halleck, learning that McClellan, who it seems had also gone to Washington, had not returned to Alexandria, sent orders to Franklin direct, to move with his corps that day (the 28th) towards Manassas Junction. On the 28th, at 3.30 P. M., Halleck informs McClellan that not a moment must be lost in pushing as large a force as possible towards Manassas, so as to communicate with Pope before the enemy is re-enforced." On the same day, at 7.40 P. M., he again tells him :

"

There must be no further delay in moving Franklin's Corps towards Manassas. They must go to-morrow morning, ready or not ready. If we delay too long to get ready, there will be no necessity to go at all, for Pope will either be defeated or victorious without our aid. If there is a want of wagons, the men must carry provisions with them till the wagons come to their relief.

There is no possible room for misunderstanding the intention of the General-in-Chief from these orders. He wished, and ordered, that communication should be at once re-established with Pope, and Pope re-enforced in time to be of service.

Why did not McClellan re-establish the communication, and re-enforce Pope in time to be of service? Why did he halt Franklin's Corps at Anandale?

He gives reasons for this in his telegram to Halleck of

August 29th. "By referring to my telegrams," he says, "of 10.30 A. M., 12 M., and 1 P. M., together with your reply of 2.48 P. M., you will see why Franklin's Corps halted at Anandale." Let us examine these telegrams in connection with the circumstances then existing. The first is as follows:

CAMP NEAR Alexandria, August 29, 10.80 A. M. Franklin's Corps are in motion; started about six A. M. I can give him. but two squadrons of cavalry. I propose moving General Cox to Upton's Hill to hold that important point with its works, and to push cavalry scouts to Vienna vid Freeman's Hill and Hunter's Lane. Cox has two squadrons of cavalry. Please answer at once whether this meets your approval. I have directed Woodbury, with the Engineer Brigade, to hold Fort Lyon. Sumner detached last night two regiments to the vicinity of Forts Ethan Allen and Marcy. Meagher's Brigade is still at Aquia. If Sumner moves in support of Franklin, it leaves us without any reliable troops in and near Washington; yet Franklin is too weak alone. What shall be done? No more cavalry arrived. Have but three squadrons belonging to the Army of the Potomac. Franklin has but forty rounds of ammunition, and no wagons to move more. I do not think Franklin is in a condition to accomplish much if he meets strong resistance. I should not have moved him but for your pressing orders of last night. What have you from Vienna and Drainsville ?

GEO. B. MOCLELLAN, Major-General,

Major-General H. W. HALLEOK, General-in-Chief.

To this Halleck replies :

War Department, WASHINGTON, D. C., August 29, 1862. Upton's Hill arrangement all right. We must send wagons and ammunition to Franklin as fast as they arrive. Meagher's Brigade ordered up yesterday. Fitzhugh Lee was, it is said on good authority, in Alexandria on Sunday last for three hours. I hear nothing from Drainsville. H. W. HALLEOK, General-in-Chief.

Major-General MOCLELLAN, Alexandria.

To this McClellan sends the second of the dispatches he refers to, as follows. There are two telegrams of the same date :

HEAD-QUARTERS ARMY POTOMAо, August 29, 1802, 12 M. Your telegram received. Do you wish the movement of Franklin's Corps to continue? He is without reserve ammunition, and without transportation. GEO. B. MOCLELLAN, Major-General. Major-General H. W. HALLEOK, General-in-Chief.