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acy; and, finally, to show the extreme antiquity of this law, we may quote in terms a case

between private wrongs, as entitling the party injured to civil remedies, and private wrongs thus converted into public wrongs, in other words into offences and crimes, is to be found in the more aggravated and formidable character which the violation of individual rights under given circumstances assumes. It is upon this principle that the law of conspiracy by which the violation of private right, which if done by one, would only be the subject of civil remedy, when done by several is constituted a crime, can be vindicated as necessary and just. It is obvious that a wrongful violation of another man's right committed by many assumes a far more formidable and offensive character than when commited by a single individual. The party assailed may be able, by resource to the ordinary civil remedies, to defend himself against the attacks of one. It becomes a very different thing when he has to defend himself against many combined to do him injury."

These words would appear to contain the best and most comprehensive statement of the reason of the subject.

The next case, that of Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor (66 L. T. R., N. S., 1; L. R., 23, Q. B. D., 598), is the more instructive because it is a case where the decision went the other way, and the alleged boycott was sustained as lawful; and moreover, it was a decision of the court of ultimate appeal, the House of Lords. The defendants were firms of shipowners trading between China and Europe, and with a view to obtaining a monopoly of the homeward trade, and thereby keeping up the rate of their own freight, they formed themselves into an association, and offered very favorable terms to merchants in China who would ship their goods exclusively in their vessels. The plaintiffs, also owners of ships in the China trade, were excluded from the association, and their business suffered in consequence; but there was no evidence of an obstruction of or interference

which, although decided in the year 1221, slept in the Latin manuscripts of the English Plea

with them or their business directly. The court held that the association being formed for the benefit of the defendants, and not with any desire to injure the plaintiffs specifically, was not an unlawful conspiracy. The case is certainly very close to the line, and is most interesting because it turned solely on the point for which we have so often contended, that the legality of a trade combination may become a purely moral question, and the same series of acts will be legal or illegal according as their direct intent is to benefit the persons combining, or to work injury to the business of others, or hamper them in the exercise of their usual rights. The court in their opinion differ from the case of Hilton v. Eckersley (6 Ellis and Blackstone, 47); but it may be questioned whether the two cases are not reconcilable. It is interesting to note that in their decision they also cited many American cases, notably State v. Buchanan (5 Har. & J., 317, noted above), and Morris Coal Co. v. Barclay Coal Co. (68 Penn. St., 173), which we have elsewhere discussed.

Perhaps the most recent case in England is that of Temperton v. Russell, occurring 1893 (69 L. T. R., N. S., 78). In this case the defendants were members and officers of certain trades-unions connected with the building trade, which unions adopted certain rules in relation to building operations. A firm of builders having refused to observe these rules, the union, in order to compel them to do so, endeavored to prevent other persons from supplying them with materials. The plaintiff, who supplied materials to that firm, refused to comply with this request of the unions, whereupon the defendants induced certain persons who had made contracts with him not to carry them out, and not to deal in the future with the plaintiff, by threatening to withdraw the union workmen who were employed by them, whereby the plaintiff suffered damage. The reader who has gone through our discussion of the subject should have little diffi

Rolls until set forth in modern printed English by the zeal of the Seldon Society in 1887. It is as follows:

"The Abbot of Lilleshall complains that the bailiffs of Shrewsbury do him many injuries against his liberty, and that they have caused proclamation to be made in the town that none be so bold as to sell any merchandise to the Abbot or his men upon pain of forfeiting ten shillings, and that Richard Peche, the bedell of the said town, made this proclamation by their orders. And the bailiffs defend all of it, and Richard likewise defends all of it and that he never heard any such proclamation made by anyone. It is considered that he do defend himself twelve-handed (with eleven compurgators), and do come on Saturday with his law."

This is a remarkable report, for in twelve lines (ten lines of the law Latin) we have here set forth all the important principles of the law of boycott. The Abbot complains that the Shrewsbury people do him many injuries

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against his liberty," i.e., the Abbot claims a constitutional right to freely conduct his own business; then we have the recognition of the threat of a boycott as a particularly illegal act:

culty in making up his mind that this was a conspiracy which rendered the defendants liable to damages at suit of the plaintiff, and the court so held; and there is no doubt that it was a criminal conspiracy also.

"They have caused proclamation to be made that none sell merchandise to the Abbot." The defendants admit the illegality of their conspiracy, because they deny it as a fact; and the bedell likewise denies that he ever made such proclamation or threat, whereupon (the plaintiff being a man of the Church) they are set to trial by wager of law instead of by actual battle, neither party nor the court making any question of the illegality both of the conspiracy and of the act complained of.

§ 58. The American Decisions.-The English common law of conspiracy was recognized by early decisions as existing in this country despite the Revolution, and despite the adoption of complete criminal codes. Thus, in Massachusetts, in 1807, a conspiracy to manufacture spurious indigo with a fraudulent intent to sell the same was held an indictable offence, although they did not in fact make any such sale. It would be unnecessary to multiply citations on this point. The principal actual cases of boycotts which have been considered by the courts and held illegal are as follows:

2

Commonwealth v. Hunt (1842) was an indictment against journeymen boot-makers for entering into an agreement that they would not

'Com. v. Judd, 2 Mass., 329.

24 Metcalf, 111.

work for any master who should employ any workman not a member of their society, after notice given him to discharge such workmen. The indictment also alleged that by means of such conspiracy they did compel one Wait to turn out of his employment one Horne, because Horne would not pay a sum of money due said society for a penalty under some one of its bylaws. The third count charged directly a conspiracy to impoverish Horne and hinder him from following his trade as journeyman bootmaker; and the fourth and fifth counts were similar. The court held that the English common law of conspiracy was in force in Massachusetts, but the very elaborate opinion of Chief Justice Shaw succeeds in finding imperfections in the form of each count of the indictment, the court seeming to admit that the confederacy set forth in the constitution of the defendants, the Boston Journeymen Bootmakers, was an unlawful conspiracy, but failing to find in the indictment any allegation of a conspiracy for any other purpose than to benefit the industrial condition of the defendants themselves. The case is now probably valuable as establishing clearly that persons have a legal right to "form themselves into a society and agree not to work for any person who should employ any journeyman or other person not a member of such society, after notice given him to

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