facts consisted in the following of plaintiff's employees to their homes, and the besetting both the factory and their lodging-places. There was no physical violence or actual threats, but some ridicule and opprobrious epithets were used. The opinion of the court announces clearly the principle that a court of equity will enjoin even discharged employees-they were, in fact, members of the labor union-from gathering about the plaintiff's place of business, and from following his employees to and from work, and from gathering about their boarding-places, and from any and all manner of threats, intimidation, ridicule, and annoyance; and to the same effect see the case of the Wick China Co. v. Brown," decided in New Jersey in 1894, where an injunction was granted against members of a union from combining to prevent, by threats, following, and ridicule, the plaintiff's employees from working.

We conclude that in the United States to-day only the most reasonable and peaceable picketing, for mere purposes of information and observation, is lawful, and only quiet and peaceable persuasion, by workmen of workmen, and conducted in such a way as not to amount to an elaborate conspiracy to prevent the plaintiff from getting help; though it is not probably

10 30 Atl., 261.

necessary to render such action lawful that the persons doing it should be actually employees of the plaintiff; if they are members of the labor union concerned or engaged in the trade, so as to have a solidarity of interest, that will be sufficient; but picketing for the purpose of interfering with the plaintiff's trade, as by driving away his customers, is never lawful.

§ 61. Blacklisting. The blacklisting of employees does not, of course, mean the making a list of employees, against whom the employer has a complaint, for his personal and private use; but the exchanging of such lists with other employers for the purpose of preventing them from employing such employees; or the advising them not to employ men who have been discharged by the person giving the advice. It is possible that blacklisting might be carried to such an extent as to be an unlawful combination under the common law; but it is doubtful whether the facts would ever sufficiently sustain an indictment for combining to injure any definite person. So-called "characters" given to employees and servants are usually held privileged communications when unfavorable, unless, of course, they are false or malicious, in which case they fall under the head of libel. But a few states have recently passed statutes forbidding blacklisting. Thus, in North Dakota, the ex

2

change of blacklists between corporations is prohibited by the constitution,' and statutes of Iowa, Indiana, Wisconsin, Alabama, Virginia, Montana, and Georgia (in Georgia the law applies only to corporations) make it a penal offence wilfully to prevent discharged employees from obtaining a new situation, and the employee is to be furnished with the cause of his discharge; but a truthful statement of the reason for such discharge may be furnished other employers; while in Iowa, Missouri, Montana, Georgia, and Colorado blacklists are specially prohibited eo nomine.5 So, in Indiana, Georgia, and Montana there is a law requiring an employer discharging an employee to furnish him with a written statement of the cause, failing which he may not blacklist the employee; provided, that such statement shall not, in Georgia and in Indiana, be used as the cause for an action of slander or libel. In Wisconsin, combinations of employers to prevent any person from obtaining employment, either by threats, promises, or by circulating blacklists, or by any

11 N. D. Const., § 212.

2 Ind., 7076; Iowa, 1888, 57; Mon. Pol. C., 3390; Wis., 1895, 240, 246; Ga., 1891, p. 183; 1895, 321; Col., 1887, p. 58; Va., 1892; Ala., 1895, 321.

* Ind., Mon., Ga. This latter part of the statute was declared unconstitutional in Georgia. See note 9 below.

4 Ind., Io., Wis., Va.; Mon. Pol. C. 3392.

5 Mo., 1891, p. 122; Io., Mon., Col., Ga., ib.

means whatsoever, or for the purpose of so procuring his discharge, are made a misdemeanor. And corporations or partnerships allowing blacklisting by their agents or otherwise are sometimes made liable to the employee in exemplary damages, and railroads in treble damages.

6

8

There is a very early reported case, disclosing a blacklist, in Massachusetts, though its legality was not decided. It was a case where one employer sued another in tort for enticing workmen from his service, and an agreement of several employers, including the plaintiff and defendant, not to employ workmen while in the service of either of the others, unless such workmen first procured a written discharge, and that each party should keep the others advised of the names of the workmen in his employment, was offered in evidence. This was, of course, a typical blacklist. The defendants objected to it on the ground that it was a contract and not evidence of any act of the defendants in an action of tort, and the document was excluded; but neither court nor counsel say anything in doubt of its validity.

But the statute itself, when applying only to corporations, has been held unconstitutional in one state."

Ind., 1895, 110, 7076; Mon., 3391; Ga., ib.

7 Io., Ga., ib.

8 Boston Glass Manufactory v. Binney, 4 Pick., 425.

9 Wallace v. Georgia C. & N. Ry. Co., 22 S E., 579. This

§ 62. Special Laws Concerning Railroad Employees, etc. Many states have recent statutes

was an action based on Georgia Statutes, 1891, p. 188, declaring that defendant had employed plaintiff as car inspector, July 9, 1892, and discharged him on August 12th; that on August 18th he made a written request of the company to give him a specific statement in writing of the reasons which had caused his discharge; that he had waited for more than twenty days, during which time defendant had refused or failed so to do, whereupon it became liable to him in the sum of $5,000, under the statute referred to. The city court of Atlanta gave judgment dismissing the action. The opinion of the Supreme Court of Georgia appears in two words: "Judgment affirmed." But the Reporter prints the head note called a 66 Syllabus by the Court" in the following words:

"1. The public, whether as many or one, whether as a multitude or a sovereignty, has no interest to be protected or promoted by a correspondence between discharged agents or employees and their late employers, designed, not for public but for private information, as to the reasons for discharges, and as to the import and authorship of all complaints or communications which produced or suggested them. A statute which undertakes to make it the duty of incorporated railroads, express, and telegraph companies to engage in correspondence of this sort with their discharged agents and employees, and which subjects them in each case to a heavy forfeiture, under the name of damages, for failing or refusing to do so, is violative of the general private right of silence enjoyed in this state by all persons, natural or artificial, from time immemorial, and is utterly void and of no effect. erty of speech and of writing is secured by the constitution, and incident thereto is the correlative liberty of silence, not less important nor less sacred. Statements or communications, oral or written, wanted for private information, cannot be coerced by mere legislative mandate at the will of one of the parties and against the will of the other. Compulsory

Lib