officers, sheriffs, or constables, in the protection or preservation of public or private property.

"Hereafter no sheriff in this state shall appoint any under sheriff or deputy sheriff, except the person so appointed shall be, at the time of his appointment, a bona-fide resident of the state.

"The mayor, chief of police, and members of the board of police commissioners of any city in this state shall be governed by the same restrictions and subject to the same penalties as a sheriff of any county, under the provisions of this article.

"Any person or persons violating any of these provisions shall be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary for not less than two years nor more than five years; and if any company, association, or corporation shall be guilty of violating this article, said company, association, or corporation shall be punished by a fine of not less than one thousand dollars." 2

2 Mo., 3772-3775.

§ 64. Remedies by Injunction. We have shown in Chapter VIII. that a strike may occasionally be an unlawful conspiracy or a criminal conspiracy, while a boycott is so generally. It may be questioned whether there is, logically, any difference between an unlawful conspiracy, or one which subjects its members to liability to damages at suit of persons actually injured, and a criminal conspiracy. The act of an individual to the prejudice of a third person will very frequently render him liable to damages without being criminal, as, for instance, in the amusing case of Tarleton v. McGawley,' where the master of a ship was held liable in damages to the owner of another ship, both being traders off the coast

1 Peak N. P. C., 270. See § 5 above. So in the recent case of Graham v. St. Charles Street Ry. Co. and Newman, it was held that damages might be recovered of Newman personally, the foreman of the Street Railway Company, for instructing his men not to frequent the plaintiff's store under penalty of discharge, etc. 47 La. Ann., 214; 27 L. R. A.

of Africa, for purposely firing a cannon and so scaring the negroes on the beach that they ran away and did not trade with the other vessel. Obviously there was nothing criminal about this act, but it will be remembered (see § 55) that a combination of many for the specific purpose of injuring a third person is a criminal conspiracy, the reason of it being that the confederation of many becomes so dangerous to the state that it is a public wrong, i.e., a crime. Nevertheless, there is no doubt the courts have been more strict in applying the doctrines of conspiracy upon an indictment than in a civil suit brought by a person injured to recover damages. Logically, every combination which is so unlawful as to make the parties liable for damages for the combination itself, and not for the acts they commit, is necessarily a criminal conspiracy; but, practically, the courts, and particularly the juries, will require much more definite evidence of an unlawful purpose in the first place, and of acts more seriously unlawful in the second place, if the parties to it are brought before the court for punishment as criminals.

In the ordinary cases, therefore, it is more difficult for persons injured by a boycott, blacklist, or conspiracy, whether employers or employees, to get redress in the criminal courts, while it very frequently happens that the de

fendants are not responsible for any damages, as a judgment could not be collected against them. Moreover, in nearly all these cases, an action for damages against any one or more persons would be wholly inadequate, partly because the fraction of the wrong done by any particular person would be trifling, but more because the action of trade or industrial conspiracies, disorderly strikes, and boycotts is to work a damage which is irreparable after it has happened, besides being threatened or committed by such an indefinite number of persons that remedies by suits at law are quite useless.

This

This brings us to the third remedy against unlawful combinations, which has become by far the most important of all, the most effective in execution, and the most liable to abuse. is the remedy given in courts of equity by injunction; for under the procedure of equity courts a person apprehending injury by such combinations may bring a bill against one or more persons, and obtain at once, without waiting for any hearing or answer by the defendant, a preliminary injunction, addressed against not only the defendants named, but all their agents, servants, and subordinates named or unnamed; and, finally, against any person person whatever throughout the world who may have knowledge

2

2 Ex parte Lennon, 64 F. R., 320.

that such injunction has been granted; so that by widely publishing such injunction orders, posting them on fences, in workrooms and factories, or on railroad cars, it becomes not a difficult matter to render all the world liable to the summary jurisdiction of contempt if they interfere with the property or rights protected by the injunction. Such a preliminary injunction if not vacated may be confirmed after hearing on the merits, and made permanent, with the same permanent results. Moreover, the process which courts of equity have of enforcing their judgments or decrees is far more effective than any known to the common-law courts. The commonlaw courts can only mulet a man in damages, and, if he refuse to pay, may, under certain strict limitations, and with very great trouble and delay, occasionally, in rare instances, imprison a man for the debt; but when a decree is rendered in a court of equity, any party to the suit, or when an injunction is granted, any party who may have notice of the injunction, is liable to contempt process, if he do or suffer to be done any act against the decree or the injunction only; and contempt process is a very effective one, consisting as it does in the immediate and summary punishment of the offender by fine, or more usually by imprisonment until he obey the orders of the court. It is unquestioned law that the offender in cases of contempt is entitled to