where the property of a railroad or other corporation is being administered by a receiver, it is competent for the court appointing him to adjust difficulties between such receiver and his employees which in the absence of such adjustment would tend to injure the property and defeat the purpose of the receivership; and this principle unquestionably gives the court somewhat greater power in enforcing the contracts of the employees than exists in ordinary cases or with private employers of labor.8 9 So, in Booth v. Brown, where the employees of receivers of a railroad have joined in a general strike, without grievance of their own, for the purpose of compelling, by obstruction of travel, parties to one side of a pending controversy to yield actual or supposed rights, Judge Hanford refused to order the reinstatement of such striking employees by the receivers. $66. Labor Combinations made Unlawful under Recent Federal Statutes.-In § 64 we discussed the history of remedies by injunction and contempt process, and noted that an injunction could not be granted solely as against a crime unless there were some property or contract right involved. In § 65 we noted the fact of the increased modern practice of putting corpora 8 Waterhouse v. Comer, 55 F. R., 149.62 F. R., 794. tions, and particularly railroads, in the hands of receivers appointed by the federal courts, with the consequence that any interference with the possession or management of the receiver becomes a matter for which contempt process may lie. It remains in this section to note the great extension of equity jurisdiction caused by the recent federal statutes concerning interstate commerce and trusts or combinations. Before these statutes—although undoubtedly the owners of a railway had a property right which would justify the interference of courts of equity in labor disputes in all proper cases-such remedies were not very often sought; and the government as government, and the courts as courts, could not intervene except by the ordinary processes of criminal law, by the police, or, in case of extreme disorder, by militia or troops. The Interstate Commerce act, passed, first, February 4, 1887,1 and amended March 2, 1889,2 applied to any common carrier engaged in the transportation of passengers or property, wholly or partly by railroad, to or from one state or territory of the United States to any other state or country; or from any place in the United States through a foreign country to any other place in the United States. In short, it applied to all possi 1 U. S. Stats., 1887, Chap. 104. ble transportations of passengers or property except such as were received, transported, and delivered entirely within one state or territory. The object of the statute was, of course, to regulate charges and forbid unreasonable advantages or preferences to special places or persons, and to forbid the pooling of earnings, and to create a permanent national commission for the enforcement of the provisions of the statute. But it had two very important consequences. Section 10 made it a misdemeanor for any person employed to do or suffer any interference with such interstate transportation, and while it was probably intended to apply only to interference by improper exactions, charges, or combinations among the railroad companies, it in fact applied equally to interferences by the railroad employees with the actual transportation or its machinery, and such interference being thereby made criminal, any combination to effect it became, of course, criminal also (see above, §§ 51, 55). Secondly, it put all matters of interstate transportation so expressly under the protection of the United States government as to make possible the application by the courts of equity of the theory that the government itself had a property right in goods the subject of such transportation, which would justify them in granting to it the affirmative protection of the powerful arm of the courts of equity. 337 But a far more momentous statute in extending the powers of the federal government over labor disputes was the Anti-Trust Act of July 2, 1890. Section 1 of this act expressly provided that "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal." It is probable that Congress, when it passed this statute, also had in mind only such combinations among employers or purchasers; but the statute made no such limitation, and very probably would not have been held constitutional had it done so. Consequently the words of this section apply equally to all "combinations commerce among the in restraint of several states;" and it is easy to see how the courts were forced to hold that these words would include combinations by laboring men intended to impede or prevent transportation of interstate freight or passengers, especially when read in connection with the words of the Interstate Commerce Act itself. But more, Section 4 provided that "the several circuit courts of the United States are hereby invested with jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of this act; and it shall be the duty of the several dis 3 U. S. Stats. 51st Cong., 1st Sess., Chap. 647. trict attorneys of the United States, in their respective districts under the direction of the Attorney-General, to institute proceedings in equity to prevent and restrain such violations." "Such proceedings may be by way of petition setting forth the case and praying that such violation shall be enjoined or otherwise prohibited." If there had been any previous doubt, under the Interstate Commerce Act, that the federal government had such a property right in goods the subject of interstate transportation that they could invoke equity jurisdiction to secure the same, such doubt is wholly removed by this section. The circuit courts are especially invested with jurisdiction to prevent any and all violations of the act; and the district attorneys of the United States are expressly charged with the duty of instituting proceedings in equity to prevent and restrain such; and, moreover, the statute is precise enough to point out how exactly it may be done, viz., that such proceedings may be by the way of petition setting forth the case and praying that such violation shall be enjoined. And now, the injunction once issued, as the statute requires, the ordinary remedies of contempt process, etc., follow as a matter of course, and there can be no question of their legality, provided only the court had jurisdiction |