the mail is an offence against United States law, and that persons inciting rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United States or the laws thereof may be punished criminally under U. S. R. S. 5334; and he specially called the attention of the grand jury to a report in the newspapers of a speech made by one Doctor Ravlin at a public meeting held on a previous night. This charge is particularly interesting because it covers not only the point of the criminal liability of the laborers, but of the railway company as well, and even of persons who belong to neither, but are engaged in fomenting the disorder. 14 The case of United States v. Agler 1a further reinforces the general interpretation of the AntiTrust Act, and holds that the injunction issued is binding as against a person not even named in the bill nor served with a subpoena as "one of the unknown defendants referred to in the bill," whenever the injunction order is served upon them. By Baker, J.: "Prior to the Act of 1890, the United States had no power by petition or bill to go into its courts of equity and invoke their aid to prevent interference with the carriage of mails or interstate commerce; prior to that time the sole remedy was on the criminal side of the court. This act enlarged 14 62 F. R., 824. the jurisdiction of the federal courts and authorized them to apply their restraining power for the purpose of checking or arresting all lawless interference with the peaceable and ordinary carriage of mails and conduct of railroad business between the states." Another instructive charge was that made by Judge Grosscup, in the District Court of Illinois, July 10, 1894." While not so far reaching as that of Judge Ross, it holds that the open and active opposition of a number of persons to the execution of the laws of the United States, of so formidable a nature as to defy for the time being the authority of the government, constitutes an insurrection, even though not accompanied by bloodshed; and charges also what is criminal conspiracy: "A corrupt or wrongful agreement between two or more persons, that the employees of railroads carrying the mails and conducting interstate commerce should quit, and that all others should, by threats or violence, be prevented from taking their places," and that two or more leaders of a labor association insisting on demanding such quitting of employment are guilty of criminal conspiracy. Judge Morrow, in his charge to the grand jury, delivered July 30, 1894," while reaffirming 15 In re Charge to Grand Jury, 62 F. R., 828 the principle as to conspiracy of employees against the Anti-Trust Act, seems to differ from Judge Ross in holding that the railroad company corporation must keep its line open, and this without regard to the make-up of regular trains; in other words, that they cannot insist upon moving Pullman, mail cars, etc., with them. The case of Lennon, discussed more fully in § 65, was a case where one railway company sued another for refusing to interchange business and cars with it in consequence of a strike or boycott against it, in the course of which litigation the injunction was issued under which Lennon was held for contempt, and filed his petition for habeas corpus; and the court again held that such suits between railroad companies engaged in interstate commerce involved a federal question, without regard to the citizenship of the parties. The elaborate charge of Judge Woods in the famous case of United States v. Debs," reaffirmed the dissent from United States v. Patterson, and held that the Anti-Trust Act is not limited by its title, "an act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies," to combinations of capital merely, or of a contractual nature; but the words "contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspir 17 64 F. R., 724. acy," include any combination in restraint of trade or commerce, whether by employers, employees, or other persons. This charge contains, perhaps, the most full and elaborate interpretation of this part of the Anti-Trust Act and consideration of authorities, and has been reviewed by the United States Supreme Court; " and the more recent decisions seem to add no new principles." 20 18 The last case is that of United States v. Cassidy, which was an indictment, under Revised Statutes 5440, of some of the strikers in the California Pullman strike of 1894, for conspiracy under the Anti-Trust Act. The charge is most voluminous, covering eighty-two pages of the report, and very interesting for its full discussion of the facts. 18 158 U. S., 564. 19 United States v. Debs, 65 F. R., 210. This was the charge given by Judge Grosscup, the case in 54 F. R. being the charge upon contempt process. For other charges, see 62 F. R., 828; 63 F. R., 436. The latter was a charge against the employers, it having been alleged that some of the railroads fomented the disorder and disturbance of trains, even perhaps the destruction of property, in order to create public sympathy with them against the strike; and this, also, was held to be a conspiracy on their part within the meaning of the interstate law. 20 67 F. R., 698. CHAPTER X REMEDIES BY ARBITRATION § 67. State Boards of Arbitration. State boards of arbitration have been provided in nearly half the states, up to the time of this writing, for the adjustment of grievances and disputes between employers and employees by conciliation or arbitration.' There is also a federal statute (see U. S. Laws, 1888, Ch. 1063) applying, however, to railroad and transportation companies only. It was under this statute (§ 6) that President Cleveland appointed the commissioners to investigate the Chicago riots of 1894. There are three general types of these statutes providing for arbitration of labor disputes by a state board (for private or local boards, see § 68). The prevailing type, judging by the number of states adopting it, is that of the New York law, 1 Mass., 1886, 263; 1887, 269; 1890, 385; Ct., 1895, 239; N. Y., 1887, 63, 5; N. J., 1892, 137, 6; Pa. Dig., pp. 133, 134; Ohio, 1893, p. 83; Mich., 1889, 238; Ill., 1895, Special Session; Iowa, 1886, 20, 1; Wis., 1895, 364; Kansas, 1886, 28; Cal., 1891, 51; Idaho Con., Art. 13, 7; Wy. Con., Art. 5, 28; 19, 2; Mon. Pol. C., 3330; La., 1894, 139. |