of Bull Run, for his plan was to go on to Manassas the day after we took Alexandria. That could have been done, and we would have taken it without firing a gun.

By Mr. Chandler:

Question. What is to prevent your capturing their left wing any day you see fit to throw out a column of 50,000 men between their left wing and Manassas? Answer. The mere fact that their left wing would be drawn right into Manassas when you attempted that.

Question. Suppose you should start at daylight and throw a column right in between their left wing and Manassas, what is to prevent their being obliged to come out and fight you there?

Answer. Nothing that I know of.

Question. And they must fight you on your own ground?

Answer. Yes, sir.

By the chairman:

Question. How many effective men do you suppose you have on the Potomac now?

Answer. I suppose we probably have 150,000 effective men; I count in that number what is in Baltimore and in Banks's division and Hooker's division also. By Mr. Johnson:

Question. Now your opinion as to a matter of policy. Is it your judgment now that there should be a forward movement upon any point of this southern confederacy here in Virginia during this present winter?

Answer. By all means, I think there should be a forward movement made upon them.

By Mr. Chandler:

Question. Almost an instantaneous one?

Answer. Yes, sir; just as soon as it can be done.

By the chairman:

Question. How soon could it be done, so far as you know?

Answer. I am utterly ignorant as to the state of preparation in the quartermaster's department.

Question. You are the commander of a division?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. In your judgment should there not be a council of war, and you commanders of divisions consulted, so that each of you should have a little understanding of what your chief means?

Answer. By all means. I think there is something wrong about that; but I do not know what it is, or where it is. I think there should be some consultation, though I think there may be very good reasons for keeping things quiet, because we know that everything so far has got out. Now the question is whether it is not better to tell nothing to any body, no matter how high in position in the army he may be, so that it cannot get out. I think that General McClellan has kept his own counsel pretty well. I do not think anybody knows what he intends to do, if the matter is left to him.

The chairman: This nation is making an extraordinary effort. Next March we shall be $600,000,000 in debt for what we have already done. And nothing has yet been done that seems to be at all commensurate with the exertions the nation has made. And everybody knows that our finances are not in a condition to keep this up eternally. All this is hanging upon one man who keeps his counsels entirely to himself. If he was an old veteran who had fought a hundred battles, Rep. Com. 108-9

or we knew him as well as Bonaparte or Wellington was known, then we could repose upon him with confidence. But how can this nation abide the secret counsels that one man carries in his head, when we have no evidence that he is the wisest man in the world?

The witness: I think General McClellan feels that as you do. He knows the country has reposed a great deal more confidence in him than he has yet shown that he deserves. But I believe he is doing all he can to show the country that he does deserve their confidence.

The chairman: I am not complaining of his faithlessness.

The witness: Now, whether he should tell his plans to all his generals of divisions for if he tells one he must tell all--is a question. It may be a question whether he had better not keep them all to himself.

By Mr. Chandler:

Question. Is it not customary, in a council of war, for the commander-in-chief to take the views of his generals, even if he does not give his own?

Answer. Yes, sir. Yet the best military authorities advise every general never to call a council of war.

By the chairman :

Question. Yet it is frequently done.

Answer. Yes, sir; but not always. I think it is better for a general to consult his officers, and learn what their ideas are without giving his own. General McClellan has told me some things about his plans which I have not told you. Question. I understand that.

Answer. And which I should like to see him about, in case you should want to know about it.

The chairman: We will waive that for the present. But it is exceedingly important that we should know. We are here armed with the whole power of both houses of Congress. They have made it our duty to inquire into the whole conduct of the war; into every department of it. We do not want to do anything that will result in any harm or wrong. But we do want to know, and we must know if we can, what is to be done, for the country is in jeopardy. I want you, therefore, to consult General McClellan. Though we expect him to be here and give us information, we hope you will consult him, as we may want to call you again.

By Mr. Johnson:

Question. Now in reference to the morale of your division. Do you believe the morale of it would be improved any by remaining in winter quarters until next April?

Answer. No, sir, not at all. I believe we would be ready to start to-morrow. Question. Your numbers would be diminished by spring?

Answer. Not diminished, for recruiting would keep the force up. The numbers would not be increased any.

Question. Now as to discipline. Taking into consideration the demoralization of the troops, the numbers you would lose, aside from the recruiting, are you in as good condition now to make a forward movement as you would be then?

Answer. I think so; just as good a condition. I do not know, but I believe arrangements are being made to move the bulk of this army in one mass, as soon as preparations can be completed, or at least move it in two parts-the one to move right after the other. After the quartermaster gets through with Burnside, then something may be done.

WASHINGTON, D. C., December 26, 1861.

General IRVIN MCDOWELL sworn and examined.

By the chairman:

Question. You are aware, I suppose, that we are a committee of Congress instructed to inquire into the conduct of the war in every department of it. What is your present position in the army?

Answer. I am a brigadier general in the regular army.

Question. Are you in command of a division?

Answer. I am.

Question. About what number of men are there in your division?

Answer. Nominally it is a little over 11,000. Actually there are about 8,500 infantry, about 500 artillery, and about 700 cavalry. I state to you approximately the effective force.

Question. How far is your division located from the headquarters of the general-in-chief?

Answer. The division under my command is dislocated: two brigades and the artillery are at Upton's Hill, and one brigade and the cavalry are in the vicinity of Arlington. Arlington, I should think, was some three or four miles from the general-in-chief's quarters, and Upton's Hill is six or seven miles, at a rough guess.

Question. Are you in possession of any plans of movement now?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. Have you held any communication with the general-in-chief upon the subject?

Answer. We have had many conversations-more formerly than latterly— but they have been somewhat of a general nature. I have had my own general views upon the subject, which I have expressed to him.

Question. Has he called any council of war of his generals commanding divisions!

Answer. I am not aware that he has. I think I should have been aware of it if he had done so, because he has always expressed himself so kindly towards me personally that I am satisfied he would have called upon me if he had had such a council.

Question. So that you are not in possession of any general plan of operations?

Answer. I cannot say that I am. I will state that some time ago I expressed to the general-in-chief what I had thought would probably be the best course to take. It was a mere general statement, a desultory thing, while we were riding on horseback; and I thought that in a general way he coincided with those views. That was some time ago, and no doubt things are very much changed since then.

Question. Do you think that a general council of war of generals of division. would be useful?

Answer. People differ very much about councils of war. I myself never have inclined towards them; and from all that I have read, and from my general opinion of councils of war, I do not think well of them. But this is a mere matter of opinion. I think it would be proper for the general-in-chief to call upon any particular officer or officers in command or upon the staff whom he might suppose had knowledge that would be useful. I have no doubt that he would do so, too. Councils of war, where all the officers get together, and the question is discussed backwards and forwards, and voted upon, from all that I have ever learned, have always proved to be of little account, even if they have not been injurious.

Question. I suppose the general-in-chief could overrule them all. Still they might make important suggestions to him?

Answer. They might give him information. But men are all alike. If they were to express an opinion and he were to go against it, it would embarrass him; and if he went for it, it would not help him.

Question. What is the condition of your division, I mean as to efficiency? Answer. The men are excellent men. I do not suppose there are better men in the world.

Question. How is it in point of discipline?

Answer. The discipline has an exterior which is good, but an interior which is bad.

Question. Please to explain that?

Answer. I think discipline consists in an implicit obedience, not outwardly alone, but inwardly-that implicit reliance and confidence that must exist on the part of the commanded towards the commanders. I think our deficiency is in the quality of our officers. I do not think that our officers stand towards the men in the relations that officers should occupy towards men whom they are to put into battle and hold up to their work, and keep them from spreading or doubling their ranks, or falling back to the rear, or breaking ranks. I think that, in the battle in which I was engaged last summer, that thing developed itself in a very remarkable manner, and it became very evident to both men and officers. I know that men cried out to me on the field of battle that they had no officers, and they begged of me, if I had officers, they might lead them forward. Immediately after the battle resignations came in of officers to the number of two hundred, although they knew that the services of officers were wanted, that business at home was prostrated, that the pay they got in the army was larger probably than they ever got in any avocations they followed before; but, notwithstanding all this, they resigned by dozens. Their resignations came in so fast that we were obliged to stop, so as to hold enough of officers to keep the men together; and I do not think that we are free of that difficulty yet. I think that, while the men drill well enough for any purpose, the trouble lies in the officers.

Question. That is, the men have no confidence in their officers?

Answer. I do not think they have. I cannot say it; I cannot go and ask it; but I think so from the way that orders are carried out.

Question. Have you in your mind provided any remedy for that evil? Answer. I think that it is a trouble irreparable, from the fact of bringing up an army from a small body to a large one. You are then obliged, as it were, to take in all kinds of fish by a sort of drag-net. I do not know but that they are getting better little by little; but it is a very difficult matter to arrange.

Question. What is the condition of the roads over in Virginia now? Answer. The roads were good until this last rain, very good. Just now they are not good. In a climate like this, the theory is that the roads will become very bad from raining, freezing, and thawing. I am told, by those who know the country better than I do, that from this time for several weeks it is almost impossible to get to church. The roads will soon be cut up so as to be almost impassable. Even now, after a little rain, the wagons cut into the mud up to the hubs, and so with artillery and baggage trains. But I have always thought that we had a remedy for that. I have talked with many officers who were in the Crimean war, and they have said that the condition we would soon be in here would make it utterly impossible for us to stir. They instanced the case of the British army in the Crimea, where, though they were but six or seven miles from their depot, still men of great wealth and means could not get even a change of clothing, or anything, from the depot to the camp. I know they said they actually dug out the bodies of several British soldiers who had been engulfed in the mud and perished. They said to me that we had here just the same climate, and a good deal the same kind of soil, as in the Crimea, and that we

should be in pretty much the same condition as the British were there. My answer to that has been, that all over this country here we have a growth of these old field pines which we could use, and I had a little bit of ground close to my division experimented upon in that way. It was a piece of springy ground, so bad that nothing could get through it. I had those pines cut down, and I had made what we call out west a corduroy road, of very small but straight pieces of pine. It is not the most comfortable road to roll over, but it is about as good as Pennsylvania avenue; it is a road that will bear artillery and a train of wagons. It takes some time to make such a road, but then there are a great many men to make it.

I have told the general-in-chief that anything to be done this winter must be in the nature of a siege. We would have to make these roads, but these are easier to make than a parallel or a flying sap. I thought our men could work better than their men could, and would suffer less than they. If it was difficult for us, it might be almost impossible for them. And there always does come a time when the ground is frozen, when we can march better.

Question. Then you suppose it would not be impracticable to make an advance even at this time of year?

Answer. It would be difficult, and would involve a great deal of labor. The artillery would not be able to go off the roads. I have seen it tried in the fields, and the horses got very tired by pulling the pieces over the yielding ground. They soon got tired and exhausted. General Wadsworth told me yesterday that as he went over the drill ground, after even this little rain, his horse was up to the fetlocks every step.

Question. You think then that the season for active operations is very much past?

Answer. I will not say that. After the example of Arnold going through Maine to Quebec in the depth of winter, and other campaigns such as we have in the world's history, it would not become any man to say that the time for active operations is past. It is now a question whether the country can stand the delay necessary to give us a better opportunity for operations, or whether we should at once decide to meet all the difficulties of the season in addition to the difficulties inseparable from every kind of campaign.

Question. Would your army, in your judgment, be as effective when the spring shall open, say in April, as it is now?

Answer. Some parts of it would be more so; some parts of it possibly less so. There is always a waste, a great deal of waste, in a division. It is true that might be supplied by recruiting. As to the health of the troops, it is very good now, I think.

Question. Such being the condition of things here, how many troops do you suppose are necessary for the defence of this capital during the winter season. I mean, barely for defensive purposes, not contemplating anything more than merely to hold the capital safe?

Answer. That is a matter which it is difficult to give an opinion upon.

Question. You are a military man, and have an opinion, I merely want your opinion.

Answer. I should want more information than I now have to answer that question correctly. A lawyer would want the brief of his case, and a doctor would want a diagnosis of the disease before passing an opinion. Now I have been living very retired for some time past, and know very little, and have few means of knowing what is on the other side. It is perhaps little creditable to me that I do not know more. But I have felt that I should not obtrude myself more than I have done. I do not know the condition of the two armies. I do not know how many we have, and I have to guess in the roughest way what they have on the other side. I do not think they contemplate moving against us, for the difficulties I have suggested are quite as great for them as for us.