for a moment. In coming to us, he tenders us an advantage which we should not waive. We should not so operate as to merely drive him away. As we must beat him somewhere, or fail finally, we can do it, if at all, easier near to us than far away. If we cannot beat the enemy where he now is, we never can, he again being within the intrenchments of Richmond.

"Recurring to the idea of going to Richmond on the inside track, the facility of supplying from the side away from the enemy is remarkable-as it were by the different spokes of a wheel extending from the hub towards the rim and this whether you move directly by the chord, or on the inside arc, hugging the Blue Ridge more closely. The chord line, as you see, carries you by Aldie, Haymarket and Fredericksburg ; and you see how turnpikes, railroads, and finally the Potomac by Aquia Creek, meet you at all points from Washington. The same, only the lines lengthened a little, if you press closer to the Blue Ridge part of the way. The gaps through the Blue Ridge, I understand to be about the following distances from Harper's Ferry, to wit: Vestal's, five miles; Gregory's, thirteen; Snicker's, eighteen; Ashby's, twenty-eight; Manassas, thirty-eight; Chester's forty-five; and Thornton's, fiftythree. I should think it preferable to take the route nearest the enemy, disabling him from making an important move without your knowledge, and compelling him to keep his forces together, for dread of you. The gaps would enable you to attack if you should wish. For a great part of the way, you would be practically between the enemy and both Washington and Richmond, enabling us to spare you the greatest number of troops from here. When at length running for Richmond. ahead of him enables him to move this way, if he does so, turn and attack him in rear. But I think he should be engaged long before such point is reached. It is all easy, if our troops. march as well as the enemy, and it is unmanly to say they cannot do it. This letter is in no sense an order.

It was evident, by the latter part of October, that the movement could not be delayed longer upon any pretext. But the weather had now become cold and stormy. The rains made the roads heavy, and the tops of the mountains began to whiten, as the early snows settled down upon them. General Halleck became more and more impatient, and somewhat sharp in his language. At last, on the 26th of October, the army commenced crossing the Potomac upon a ponton bridge, at Berlin, the divisions of Generals Burns and Sturgis of the Ninth Corps, being in advance, with General Pleasonton's cavalry. The weather was very bad, and the troops suffered much. Having spent the fine weather in camp, the army moved in a storm. Two detached divisions, respectively under the command of General Stoneman and General Whipple, were now added to the command of General Burnside, and these, with the two divisions of the Ninth Corps already across, formed the vanguard of the army. The command, with the exception of General Stoneman's division, marched to Lovettsville and on the night of the 26th there encamped. On the 27th General Getty's division crossed. The cavalry advanced to Purcellsville. General Stoneman's division crossed at Edwards' Ferry on the 29th and occupied Leesburg. The other portions of the army crossed at different times between the 26th of October and the 2d of November, at Berlin and other places below. The movement, thus commenced, was continued with commendable promptness-both with caution and celerity. The Ninth Corps, having the advance with General Pleasonton's cavalry, came occasionally into collision with the enemy's skirmishers. But in general the march was made with but little serious interruption. The gaps of the mountains were successively occupied, and the army wound its way along upon the eastern side of the Blue Ridge.

On the 2d of November the Ninth Corps advanced to Bloomfield, Union and Philomont. On the 4th it was at Upperville. On the 5th it was beyond the Manassas Railroad, between Piedmont and Salem, with one brigade guarding

Manassas Gap. On the 6th the corps had moved up to and occupied Waterloo and its neighborhood on the Rappahannock. The army was closed up on the two following days, and on the evening of the 9th the entire command was in position as follows: "The first, second and fifth corps, reserve artillery and general headquarters were at Warrenton; the Ninth Corps on the line of the Rappahannock, in the vicinity of Waterloo; the sixth corps at New Baltimore; the eleventh corps at New Baltimore, Gainesville and Thoroughfare Gap; Sickles's division of the third corps on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad from Manassas Junction to Warrenton Junction; Pleasonton across the Rappahannock at Annissville, Jefferson, &c., with his pickets at Hazel river facing Longstreet, six miles from Culpepper Court House; Bayard near Rappahannock station."* The enemy had not yet emerged from the Shenandoah valley with his entire force. General Longstreet "was immediately in our front near Culpepper," with the advance of the rebel army. But the remainder of the enemy's command had not yet come up. General Jackson with-as supposed-Generals A. P. and D. H. Hill, was near Chester's and Thornton's Gaps, and the most of their force was west of the Blue Ridge. A heavy snow storm set in on the morning of the 7th, and continued for two days, changing to rain. The situation was excessively uncomfortable, and the roads were in very bad condition. But the entire command was well closed up. And as no apprehensions were entertained of any immediate trouble with the enemy, the army was in good spirits, "perfectly in hand" and in "excellent condition to fight a great battle.'

Late on the night of the 7th, a special messenger from the War Department at Washington arrived at General McClellan's Headquarters, bearing the following order:

"WASHINGTON, Nov. 5, 1862. "By direction of the President of the United States, it is ordered that Major General McClellan be relieved from the

*McClellan's Report, p. 237.

command of the Army of the Potomac, and that Major General Burnside take the command of that army.

66

By order of the Secretary of War,

E. D. TOWNSEND, Ass't. Adj't. Gen.

On the 9th of November General Burnside assumed the command of the Army of the Potomac, and issued the following order:

"HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

"General Orders, No. 1.

"WARRENTON, VA., Nov. 9, 1862.

"In accordance with General Orders, No. 182, issued by the President of the United States, I hereby assume command of the Army of the Potomac.

"Patriotism and the exercise of my every energy, in the direction of this army, aided by the full and hearty cooperation of its officers and men, will, I hope, under the blessing of God, ensure its success.

"Having been a sharer of the privations and a witness of the bravery of the old army of the Potomac in the Maryland campaign, and fully identified in their feelings of respect and esteem for General McClellan, entertained through a long and most friendly association with him, I feel that it is not as a stranger that I assume this command.

"To the Ninth Corps, so long and intimately associated with me, I need say nothing; our histories are identical.

"With diffidence for myself, but with a proud confidence in the unswerving loyalty and determination of the gallant army now entrusted to my care, I accept its control with the steadfast assurance that the just cause must prevail.

General Burnside's assignment to the command of the Army of the Potomac separated him for a time from the intimate,

personal control of the Ninth Corps which he had heretofore exercised. The confidence and esteem which had existed between the men and officers of the corps and himself continued unabated. But they were now obliged to look to another commander, to be immediately present with them in the scenes of danger and duty which were now before them. Major General Parke followed his friend and became Chief of Staff of the Army of the Potomac. Brigadier General Orlando B. Willcox, who had been assigned to the command of the Ninth Corps upon the retirement of General Cox, was still continued in command. The organization of the corps at this time was as follows: First Division under the command of Brigadier General W. W. Burns, consisting of two brigades, respectively under the command of Colonels Thomas Welsh and B. C. Christ; Second Division under the command of Brigadier General Samuel D. Sturgis, consisting of two brigades respectively under the command of Brigadier Generals James Nagle and Edward Ferrero; Third Division under the command of Brigadier General G. W. Getty, consisting of two brigades respectively under the command of Colonels R. C. Hawkins and Edward Harland. The artillery was distributed as follows: First Division, Dickinson's Battery E, 4th New York artillery, and Durell's Battery A, 104th Pennsylvania artillery; Second Division, Benjamin's Battery E, 2d United States artillery, Cook's 8th Massachusetts battery; Third Division, Whitney's howitzer battery, 9th New York, Edwards's two sections each of batteries L and M, 3d United States, and Muhlenburg's battery A, 5th United States Artillery. General Willcox had already seen much and painful service and it may not be inappropriate to insert here a brief account in detail of his career up to this point.

Orlando Bolivar Willcox was born in Detroit, Mich., April 16, 1823. Securing an appointment to the Military Academy at West Point, he graduated from that institution, the eighth in his class, June, 1847. He was promoted to Second Lieutenant July 1, 1847, was soon after assigned to Light Battery