he was deficient in cavalry and said that he must be better supplied with horses for remounts, and that too" within the shortest possible time." Otherwise, he declared, he would" be constantly exposed to rebel cavalry raids." Mr. Lincoln read the despatch and, with his accustomed shrewdness, directed General Halleck to suggest "that if the enemy had more occupation south of the river, his cavalry would not be so likely to make raids north of it."

The truth was, that the President and the country were becoming impatient on account of the continued inactivity of General McClellan and his army. As early as the 6th of October, the President directed General McClellan to "cross and give battle to the enemy, or drive him South." But General McClellan, instead of obeying this distinct command, still made excuses, found occasions for delays, objected to the different orders sent from Washington, endeavored to argue the cases presented, complained of want of supplies, and spent a large part of his time in correspondence with the heads of the different departments of the army in Washington. Horses, shoes, clothing and other needful things, in ample quantities, seem to have been sent from the Quartermaster's stores in Washington, but, by some miscarriage, could not readily reach the camps of the soldiers.* It began to be suspected that General McClellan did not wish to cross the Potomac, that he intended. to go into winter quarters along the line of the Upper Potomac, and wait for the following Spring before he inaugurated another campaign in Virginia. It was supposed that the march of the army was to be delayed, under various pretexts, until the season had become so far advanced as to make any movement impracticable. Whether the latter supposition had any foundation in fact, cannot now be known. That the former opinion

*It was said at the time, that cars filled with supplies were allowed to remain unloaded at Hagerstown and other points. General Meigs's Letter to General McClellan, October 22, 1862, in Report of Committee on the Conduct of the War, I., 539. It is fair to add that General Ingalls denied the truth of the statement.

rested on good grounds, there can be but little doubt. General officers, who were friends and admirers of General McClellan, virtually admitted as much to the writer of these pages in a familiar conversation with him in the latter part of the following December, at General Burnside's headquarters at Falmouth. General McClellan did not wish to march against the enemy in the neighborhood of Winchester. The authorities at Washington determined that he should move, and nearly the entire month of October was occupied in the discussion of this simple proposition. The President was particularly anxious that the army should move, and on the 13th wrote a long letter to General McClellan on the subject, which has been several times published. This letter was of so important a character and bearing upon subsequent operations, and exhibited so clearly the President's characteristics, as to make it desirable to reprint it here, though at the risk of repeating what may be already familiar to the reader:

"EXECUTIVE MANSION, Washington, October 13, 1862.

"MAJOR GENERAL MCCLELLAN : "MY DEAR SIR,--You remember my speaking to you of what I called your over-cautiousness. Are you not over-cautious when you assume that you cannot do what the enemy is constantly doing? Should you not claim to be at least his equal in prowess and act upon the claim?

"As I understand, you telegraph General Halleck that you cannot subsist your army at Winchester, unless the railroad from Harper's Ferry to that point be put in working order. But the enemy does now subsist his army at Winchester, at a distance nearly twice as great from railroad transportation as you would have to do without the railroad last named. He now wagons from Culpepper Court House, which is just about twice as far as you would have to do from Harper's Ferry. He is certainly not more than half as well provided with wagons as you are. I certainly should be pleased for you to have

the advantage of the railroad from Harper's Ferry to Winchester, but it wastes all the remainder of autumn to give it to you; and in fact, ignores the question of time, which cannot and must not be ignored.

"Again, one of the standard maxims of war, as you know, is 'to operate upon the enemy's communications as much as possible, without exposing your own.' You seem to act as if this applies against you, but cannot apply in your favor. Change positions with the enemy, and think you not he would break your communications with Richmond within the next twenty-four hours? You dread his going into Pennsylvania. But if he does so in full force, he gives up his communications to you absolutely, and you have nothing to do but to follow and ruin him; if he does so with less than full force, fall upon and beat what is left behind all the easier.

"Exclusive of the water-line, you are now nearer Richmond than the enemy is, by the route that you can and he must take. Why can you not reach there before him, unless you admit that he is more than your equal on a march? His route is the arc of a circle, while yours is the chord. The roads are as good on yours as on his.

"You know I desired, but did not order you to cross the Potomac below instead of above the Shenandoah and Blue Ridge. My idea was that this would at once menace the enemy's communications, which I would seize if he would permit. If he should move northward, I would follow him closely, holding his communications. If he should prevent our seizing his communications, and move towards Richmond, I would press closely to him, fight him if a favorable opportunity should present, and at least try to beat him to Richmond on the inside track. I say 'try;' if we never try, we shall never succeed. If he make a stand at Winchester, moving neither north or south, I would fight him there, on the idea that if we cannot beat him when he bears the wastage of coming to us, we never ean when we bear the wastage of going to him. This proposition is a simple truth, and is too important to be lost sight of

for a moment. In coming to us, he tenders us an advantage which we should not waive. We should not so operate as to merely drive him away. As we must beat him somewhere, or fail finally, we can do it, if at all, easier near to us than far away. If we cannot beat the enemy where he now is, we never can, he again being within the intrenchments of Richmond.

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Recurring to the idea of going to Richmond on the inside track, the facility of supplying from the side away from the enemy is remarkable--as it were by the different spokes of a wheel extending from the hub towards the rim-and this whether you move directly by the chord, or on the inside arc, hugging the Blue Ridge more closely. The chord line, as you see, carries you by Aldie, Haymarket and Fredericksburg ; and you see how turnpikes, railroads, and finally the Potomac by Aquia Creek, meet you at all points from Washington. The same, only the lines lengthened a little, if you press closer to the Blue Ridge part of the way. The gaps through the Blue Ridge, I understand to be about the following distances from Harper's Ferry, to wit: Vestal's, five miles; Gregory's, thirteen; Snicker's, eighteen; Ashby's, twenty-eight; Manassas, thirty-eight; Chester's forty-five; and Thornton's, fiftythree. I should think it preferable to take the route nearest the enemy, disabling him from making an important move without your knowledge, and compelling him to keep his forces together, for dread of you. The gaps would enable you to attack if you should wish. For a great part of the way, you would be practically between the enemy and both Washington and Richmond, enabling us to spare you the greatest number of troops from here. When at length running for Richmond ahead of him enables him to move this way, if he does so, turn and attack him in rear. But I think he should be engaged long before such point is reached. It is all easy, if our troops march as well as the enemy, and it is unmanly to say they cannot do it. This letter is in no sense an order.

It was evident, by the latter part of October, that the movement could not be delayed longer upon any pretext. But the weather had now become cold and stormy. The rains made the roads heavy, and the tops of the mountains began to whiten, as the early snows settled down upon them. General Halleck became more and more impatient, and somewhat sharp in his language. At last, on the 26th of October, the army commenced crossing the Potomac upon a ponton bridge, at Berlin, the divisions of Generals Burns and Sturgis of the Ninth Corps, being in advance, with General Pleasonton's cavalry. The weather was very bad, and the troops suffered much. Having spent the fine weather in camp, the army moved in a storm. Two detached divisions, respectively under the command of General Stoneman and General Whipple, were now added to the command of General Burnside, and these, with the two divisions of the Ninth Corps already across, formed the vanguard of the army. The command, with the exception of General Stoneman's division, marched to Lovettsville and on the night of the 26th there encamped. On the 27th General Getty's division crossed. The cavalry advanced to Purcellsville. General Stoneman's division crossed at Edwards' Ferry on the 29th and occupied Leesburg. The other portions of the army crossed at different times between the 26th of October and the 24 of November, at Berlin and other places below. The movement, thus commenced, was continued with commendable promptness-both with caution and celerity. The Ninth Corps, having the advance with General Pleasonton's cavalry, came occasionally into collision with the enemy's skirmishers. But in general the march was made with but little serious interruption. The gaps of the mountains were successively occupied, and the army wound its way along upon the eastern side of the Blue Ridge.

On the 2d of November the Ninth Corps advanced to Bloomfield, Union and Philomont. On the 4th it was at Upperville. On the 5th it was beyond the Manassas Railroad, between Piedmont and Salem, with one brigade guarding