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Burnside adhered to his own plan, as in all respects the most feasible of any that occurred or were proposed to him.

Immediately upon the reception of General Burnside's plan, General Halleck made arrangements for an early interview at Warrenton. The consultation took place on the 12th and continued through a considerable part of the night and the following day. Generals Meigs and Haupt accompanied General Halleck and occasionally participated in the council. It was a very important interview and had a decided effect upon the issue of the campaign. The two officers were very earnest in the support of their respective opinions and the points presented in General Burnside's paper were fully examined and discussed. General Halleck urged the expediency of continuing the march. of the army, retaining its present base, which would carry it towards Culpepper, assuming that that was the line suggested by the President. General Burnside was strenuous in his advocacy of the plan which he had already submitted, contending that that was in accordance with Mr. Lincoln's letter. After a long discussion, it was agreed that General Halleck would not take the responsibility of ordering the movement, but would consult the President in relation to the matter. If that functionary approved the new plan, General Halleck would telegraph from Washington to that effect, immediately upon his return. General Burnside also represented to General Halleck that, if the movement on Fredericksburg was made, telegraphic communication with Washington would necessarily be broken, and that General Halleck would be relied upon to provide for carrying out such parts of the plan as required action at Washington. He was assured that due attention would be paid to the subject by General Halleck, and that the General in Chief himself would at once "order by telegraph the ponton trains spoken of" in the plan, and "would, upon his return to Washington see that they were promptly forwarded."* Thus matters stood at the conclusion

*Burnside's Report.

of the interview, and on the afternoon of the 13th General Halleck returned to Washington. On the morning of the 14th, he telegraphed to General Burnside: "The President has just assented to your plan. He thinks it will succeed if you move rapidly, otherwise not." General Burnside immediately issued his orders for the movement of the army.

A conflict of statement now appears between Generals Burnside and Halleck, which it is necessary to examine. General Halleck, in his annual report for 1852-'63, declares that "General Burnside did not fully concur in the President's views, but finally consented to so modify his plan as to cross his army by the fords of the upper Rappahannock, and then move down and seize the heights south of Fredericksburg, while a small force was to be sent north of the river to enable General Haupt to reopen the railroad and to rebuild the bridges, the materials for which were nearly ready in Alexandria. I however refused," adds General Halleck, "to give any official approval of this deviation from the President's instructions. On my return to Washington on the 13th, I submitted to the President this proposed change in the plan of campaign, and on its receiving his assent, rather than approval, I telegraphed authority to General Burnside to adopt it. I here refer, not to General Burnside's written plan to go to Falmouth, but to that of crossing the Rappahannock above its junction with the Rapidan."* He again declares that General Burnside's "plan of marching his whole from Warrenton to Falmouth," army proved, nor was he ever authorized to adopt it." Again he says, that General Burnside "could not possibly have expected supplies and pontons to be landed at points then occupied in force by the enemy "-meaning, it is presumed, Aquia Creek and Fredericksburg. Here are three distinct assertions, viz. that General Burnside was deviating from Mr. Lincoln's instructions; that the written plan was not approved, but that some other verbal plan was assented to; and that certain points,

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*General Halleck's Report, in Report of Secretary of War, 1863-'64, p 17.

at which General Burnside expected supplies, were occupied in force by the enemy. These statements are contained in a document dated November 15, 1863. All these assertions are both in substance and in form incorrect.

Mr. Lincoln had given suggestions, not instructions. His words in closing his letter to General McClellan are: "This letter is in no sense an order." General Burnside did not deviate from the President's wishes, if these are to be understood by his words. He refers particularly to Aquia Creek and Fredericksburg, as points through which supplies were to be forwarded; as the army moved upon a "chord line." The lines would be "lengthened a little, if you press closer to the Blue Ridge part of the way." The President, in another paragraph of his letter, says that he "would press closely" to the enemy, "fight him, if a favorable opportunity should present, and, at least try to beat him to Richmond on the inside track" It cannot be denied that General Burnside's plan was completely in accordance with the spirit of the President's letter, and even with the language of that document when rationally interpreted. General Halleck, therefore, in accusing General Burnside of deviating from the President's instructions, is accusing wrongfully.

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The second statement, that the President assented to some other plan than that which was written is disproved by General Halleck's own testimony given before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, on the 22d of December, 1862. The following questions by Mr. Gooch and answers by General Halleck are conclusive upon this point: "Q. When you were there [at Warrenton] was the time considered that it would take to move the army from where it was to Falmouth, opposite Fredericksburg?' A. No, sir; for it was not determined at that time that the movement should be made.' Q. Was it not determined it should be made provided the President assented to it? A. Yes, sir; and he was immediately to commence his preparations as though it had been assented to until telegraphed to the contrary, but not to make any movement.'

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Q. 'Was or was not the time requisite for the movement of the army from where it was to Falmouth considered at that time?' A. 'It may have been spoken of in conversation. We had a long conversation of three or four hours, and it may have been alluded to; nothing definite was decided upon in relation to the time it would take. Indeed, I remarked when I left him that he was of opinion that he would-cross a portion of his forces at the fords above the junction of the rivers. That was the opinion that he expressed before I left.' Q. And the residue at Falmouth? A. Yes, sir.'"* Here the chief thought, both in Mr. Gooch's and General Halleck's minds, was the movement to Falmouth. Only casually did the idea of crossing at the upper fords occur, and that too in relation to the crossing of a portion of the army. It is evident that the written plan of General Burnside was the only plan which General Halleck, on the 22d of December, believed to have received the President's assent. His idea of another verbal plan, as spoken of in the following November, was without question an after thought. Corroborative evidence on this point is given in the testimony of General Meigs on the same day. He says: "From what little I heard of the discussion between General Halleck and General Burnside-I only heard a part of it-I expected that a portion of General Burnside's army would cross above Fredericksburg, and I think he used the expression, that within twenty-four or forty-eight hours, I do not remember which, after he got permission to move, his cavalry would be in Fredericksburg, the main body of his army, however, not crossing above but crossing at Falmouth." General Haupt's testimony before the same committee has not one word favoring the declaration of General Halleck-that a "small force was to be sent north of the river to enable General Haupt to reopen the railroad and re-build the bridges" while the army was to cross by the upper fords. All of General Haupt's testimony shows that he had in mind the necessity of making provision for the

*Report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War, Part I., pp. 675.

transportation of the supplies of a large army from Aquia Creek to Fredericksburg and beyond. He declares, moreover, that "on Friday, November 14, General Halleck informed him that the change of base was approved by the President."*

General Halleck's third assertion is that the points in question were held in force by the enemy. There were but a few pickets at Aquia Creek, and those ran away as soon as some of our troops a small part of the' engineer brigade-landed there. At Fredericksburg there was not a large force. Captain Dahlgren had made a dash into that place with a few cavalrymen not long before the army moved, and General Sumner testified, that he thought he "could have taken Fredericksburg and the heights on the other side of it any time within three days after" his arrival, if the pontons had been at Falmouth, for he did "not think there was much force of the enemy there up to that time." A remark of General Halleck's, in the same report, respecting an expectation of General Burnside, that "gunboats were to cover the crossing" of his troops at Falmouth has no foundation whatever. Thus General Halleck stands open to the grave charge of attempting, in an official document, to mislead the public mind.

General Burnside, having received the President's assent to his plan, and trusting that General Halleck would be as good as his word in forwarding pontons and supplies, proceeded to put his designs in execution. In accordance with the President's suggestion, he determined to move rapidly. He had organized his army into three grand divisions, of two corps each, the right under General Sumner, the centre under General Hooker, and the left under General Franklin. General Sumner's command started at daylight on the 15th of November, and the remainder of the army on the 16th. The Ninth Corps made demonstrations towards the Rappahannock, and the cavalry guarded the fords as the army passed. General Sumner's advance reached Falmouth on the 17th, and was

*Report of Committee on Conduct of the War, Part 1., p. 683.

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