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Opinion of the Court.

tribunal of France, upon full consideration held, while the Convention of 1853 was in force, that the French courts had rightful jurisdiction, for reasons which sufficiently appear in the following extract from its judgment:

"Considering that it is a principle of the law of nations that every state has sovereign jurisdiction throughout its territory;

"Considering that by the terms of Article 3 of the Code Napoleon the laws of police and safety bind all those who inhabit French territory, and that consequently foreigners, even transeuntes, 'find themselves subject to those laws;

"Considering that merchant vessels entering the port of a nation other than that to which they belong cannot be withdrawn from the territorial jurisdiction, in any case in which the interest of the state of which that port forms part finds itself concerned, without danger to good order and to the dignity of the government;

"Considering that every state is interested in the repression of crimes and offences that may be committed in the ports of its territory, not only by the men of the ship's company of a foreign merchant vessel towards men not forming part of that company, but even by men of the ship's company among themselves, whenever the act is of a nature to compromise the tranquillity of the port, or the intervention of the local authority is invoked, or the act constitutes a crime by common law," (droit commun, the law common to all civilized nations,) "the gravity of which does not permit any nation to leave it unpunished, without impugning its rights of jurisdictional and territorial sovereignty, because that crime is in itself the most manifest as well as the most flagrant violation of the laws which it is the duty of every nation to cause to be respected in all parts of its territory."1 1 Ortolan Diplomatie de la Mer (4th ed.), pp. 455, 456; Sirey (N. S.), 1859, p. 189.

The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.

1 "Attendu que c'est un principe du droit des gens que chaque État a la juridiction souveraine dans l'étendue de tout son territoire;

"Attendu qu'aux termes de l'article 3 du Code Napoléon, les lois de police et de sûreté obligent tous ceux qui habitent le territoire français, et que, par suite, les étrangers, même transeuntes, s'y trouvent soumis;




Argued April 9, 1886. - Decided January 10, 1887.

In an action in which a jury has been waived in writing, and the judgment of the Circuit Court is for more than $5000, the question whether the facts set forth in a special finding of the court are sufficient in law to support the judgment may be reviewed on writ of error, without any bill of exceptions or certificate of division of opinion.

At common law, a factor has no power to pledge, whether he is intrusted with the possession of the goods, or with the bill of lading or other symbol of property.

The statute of Missouri of March 4, 1869, gives no validity to a transfer, without indorsement in writing, of a bill of lading or warehouse receipt. The statute of Missouri of March 28, 1874, making the pledge of goods by

a factor, without the written authority of the owner, a criminal offence, does not render such a pledge valid as between the owner and the pledgee. A usage of trade for banks to take pledges from factors, as security for the payment of the general balance of account between them, of goods known to be held by them as factors, is unlawful.

An unauthorized pledge by a factor, of goods owned by a partnership of which he is a member, to secure the payment of his own debt to one who knows him as a factor only, is invalid against the partnership.

"Attendu que les bâtiments de commerce entrant dans le port d'une nation autre que celle à laquelle ils appartiennent ne pourraient être soustraits à la juridiction territoriale, toutes les fois que l'intérêt de l'État dont ce port fait partie se trouve engagé, sans danger pour le bon ordre et la dignité du gouvernement;

"Attendu que tout État est intéressé à la répression des crimes et délits qui peuvent être commis dans les ports de son territoire, non-seulement par des hommes de l'équipage d'un bâtiment du commerce étranger envers des personnes ne faisant pas partie de cet équipage, mais même par des hommes de l'équipage entre eux; soit lorsque le fait est de nature à compromettre la tranquillité du port, soit lorsque l'intervention de l'autorité locale est réclamée, soit lorsque le fait constitue un crime de droit commun que sa gravité ne permet à aucune nation de laisser impuni, sans porter atteinte à ses droits de souveraineté juridictionelle et territoriale, parce que ce crime est par lui-même la violation la plus manifeste comme la plus flagrante des lois que chaque nation est chargée de faire respecter dans toutes les parties de son territoire."

Statement of Facts.

If a factor, to whom the owner of goods has made a negotiable promissory note and consigned the goods under an agreement between them that the proceeds of the goods when sold shall be applied to the payment of the note, indorses the note and pledges the goods to secure the payment of advances made to him by one who knows him to be a factor and to hold the goods as such, the pledgee is bound to apply the proceeds of the goods to the payment of the note, and the maker may set up this obligation in defence of an action by the pledgee on the note.

This court, on reversing a judgment of the Circuit Court for the plaintiff on a special finding which ascertains all the facts of the case, will order judgment for the defendant without further trial.

THE original action was brought by the St. Louis National Bank against Augusta B. Allen and her daughter on a promissory note for $3750, with interest at the rate of ten per cent. yearly, made by the defendants May 10, 1878, and payable December 20, 1878, to the order of J. H. Dowell & Co., and by them indorsed to the plaintiff.

The answer alleged that the plaintiff was bound to apply in payment of the note the proceeds of certain cotton pledged to the plaintiff by the payees; and set out the facts attending the making and indorsement of the note and the pledge of the cotton, substantially as afterwards found by the court and stated below, except in the following respects: The answer alleged that the plaintiff took the note and the cotton with full notice of the agreement and understanding between the makers and the payees, and was not a holder of the note in good faith and for value, but took it as collateral security for preexisting debts of the payees to the plaintiff. The answer contained no statement of the general course of dealing between the payees and the plaintiff, and no mention of any usage of trade. As a further defence, the answer alleged that the note had been paid and satisfied.

The plaintiff filed a replication, denying all the allegations of the answer. A jury was duly waived in writing, and the case was tried by the court, which made this special finding of facts:

"1st. The promissory note set forth in the petition was made by the defendants, and delivered by them to J. II. Dowell for J. H. Dowell & Co., the said J. II. Dowell being

Statement of Facts.

the active partner of J. H. Dowell & Co., and as such having the control and management of their business as cotton factors; and such note was so made under the circumstances and for the purposes hereinafter stated. Said J. H. Dowell procured said note before its maturity to be discounted by the plaintiff, who paid to him the amount of said note less the usual discount, and thereupon the said J. II. Dowell, in the name of J. H. Dowell & Co., indorsed and delivered said note to said. plaintiff, by whom it is still held. Said note has not been paid, unless the facts hereinafter found amount to or operate as a payment thereof. The amount due on said note with interest to this time, if the plaintiff is entitled to recover thereon, is the sum of $5377.08. The plaintiff is the bona fide holder of the note sued on, for value, before maturity, without notice of any of the defences herein claimed, unless notice is to be implied from the facts hereinafter set forth.

"2d. At the date of said note and for several years before, and until March, 1879, J. II. Dowell was a cotton factor at St. Louis, Mo., doing business as the active member of J. H. Dowell & Co., and as such having the control and management of their business as cotton factors, receiving consignments of cotton for sale on commission from planters and others, and making advances during the pending season to their consignors of supplies and cash, to be reimbursed out of the proceeds of the cotton crops of said consignors when received and sold. Said J. II. Dowell and the defendants were also partners in the working of a cotton plantation in Clover Bend, Arkansas, under the firm name and style of Allen & Dowell; and said J. H. Dowell & Co. of St. Louis acted as the factors of said Allen & Dowell, receiving the cotton raised by them each year and disposing of it at St. Louis, and furnishing each season the supplies needed by Allen & Dowell for carrying on the plantation, and charging such advances to Allen & Dowell in account, and crediting them on said account with the proceeds of the cotton when received and sold or disposed of, the accounts being kept with Allen & Dowell in the same manner as with other consignors of cotton.

"3d. The note sued on was made and delivered to J. H.

Statement of Facts.

Dowell, the active member of the firm aforesaid, under the name of J. H. Dowell & Co., by the defendants, at or about its date, at the request of said J. H. Dowell, for the purpose of being used by him and for his accommodation, to enable him to raise funds to furnish the necessary supplies to Allen & Dowell for operating said plantation during the season of 1878, and with the understanding between J. H. Dowell and the defendants (but not with any understanding or knowledge of the plaintiff) that it should be taken up and paid by J. H. Dowell at maturity out of the proceeds of the cotton crop of Allen & Dowell for that year, when received and sold by J. H. Dowell & Co. There was no other or further consideration as between J. H. Dowell and the defendants for the making of said note. The amount of said note was credited by J. H. Dowell for J. H. Dowell & Co. to Allen & Dowell at its date on account, and at its maturity was charged to Allen & Dowell on said account as though taken up and paid by J. H. Dowell & Co. But it was not in fact paid or taken up. The proceeds of the cotton crop of Allen & Dowell for 1878, consigned to J. H. Dowell & Co., were more than sufficient to pay and satisfy the said note, together with all other advances and charges by J. H. Dowell & Co. to Allen & Dowell, if such proceeds had been applied to the payment of said note. The balance in favor of Allen & Dowell on said account was never paid or settled by J. II. Dowell, and the partnership accounts between the partners composing the firm of Allen & Dowell have never been adjusted and settled.

"4th. During the year 1878, and until March, 1879, J. H. Dowell & Co. kept their bank deposit account with the plaintiff and were very large borrowers of money from said bank. During the said period the following transactions were had between J. H. Dowell & Co. and the said bank, concerning all the cotton consigned to J. H. Dowell & Co., including the cotton of Allen & Dowell consigned to J. H. Dowell & Co. The mode of such transactions was as follows: The cotton being shipped to J. II. Dowell and Co. by railroad, the bills of lading therefor as soon as received by J. H. Dowell & Co. were delivered to the bank, which thereupon gave J. H. Dowell &

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