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not done that which a tenant from year to year ought to do. The sash lines, the broken panel of the door, the latches, catches, locks, and keys, are all, clearly, things which a tenant from year to year ought to make good.

Lord TENTERDEN, C. J. (in summing up).-It appears that this was a very dilapidated house, when the defendants took it, and that they have had a very considerable quantity of work done upon it. However, the first question is, what are the things which an occupier of a house from year to year, is bound to do. I am of opinion, that he is only bound to keep the house wind and water tight, and that that is all he is bound to do. A tenant who covenants to repair, is to sustain and uphold the premises, but that is not the case with a tenant from year to year. A great part of what was claimed by the plaintiff consists of new materials where the old were actually worn out; for that the defendants are clearly not liable: and if you think the defendants have done all that tenants from year to year ought to do, considering the state of the premises when they took them, the defendants are entitled to your verdict.

1832.

AUWORTH

บ.

JOHNSON.

Verdict for the defendants.

Campbell and Kelly, for the plaintiff.

Hutchinson and Channell, for the defendants.

[Attornies-Garry, and Lowten & N.]

In the case of Ferguson v. 2 Esp. N. P. C. 590.-Lord Kenyon said, "A tenant from year to year is bound to commit no waste, and to make fair and tenantable repairs, such as putting in windows or doors which have been broken by him, so as to prevent waste and decay of the premises."

In the case of Gibson v. Wells, 1 N. R. 290, which was an action

on the case against a tenant at
will, for permissive waste, the
Court held, that the action would
not lie for permissive waste, al-
though it would have lain for
wilful waste.

In the case of Baker v. Holt-
pzaffell, 4 Taunt. 45, it was held
that the landlord of premises
demised under a written agree-
ment might recover, in an action

1832.

AUWORTH

บ.

JOHNSON.

for use and occupation against the tenant, the rent accruing after the premises were burnt down, and no longer inhabited by the tenant. But it appears by the case of Horsefall v. Mather, Holt, N. P. C. 9, that the tenant would not be bound to rebuild or repair after a fire.

In the cause of Powley v. Walker, 5 T. R. 373, it was held that the mere relation of landlord and tenant of a farm, is a sufficient consideration for the tenant's promise to manage the farm in a husbandlike manner. In the case of Legh v. Hewitt, 4 East, 160, the plaintiff succeeded in an implied assumpsit in the tenant to manage the farm according to the custom of the country. And in the case of Horsefall v. Mather, Gibbs, C. J., said, that a tenant from year to year "is bound to

use the premises in a husbandlike manner, but is not liable to general repairs."

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With respect to clerical dilapidations, in the case of Wise v. Metcalf, 10 B. & C. 229, the Court held that the incumbent of a rectory was bound to maintain the parsonage, and also the chancel, and to keep them in good and substantial repair; restoring and rebuilding when necessary, according to the original form, without addition or modern improvement; and that he was not bound to supply or maintain any thing in the nature of ornament, to which painting (unless necessary to preserve exposed timbers from decay), and white-washing, and papering belong."

See also the case of Percival v. Blake, ante, Vol. 2, p. 514.

June 20th.

In stating the termini of the

journey in de

Adjourned Sittings at Westminster, after Trinity
Term, 1832.

BECKFORD, Esq. v. CRUTWEll.

ASSUMPSIT against defendant, as a common carrier

from London to Bath, for not safely carrying and deliverclaring against ing a painting, of the value of 807., sent by his waggon from

a

word London

will be taken as

all is com

London to Bath.

a nomen collec- The plaintiff proved the delivery of the case contivum, including taining the painting, at the Old White Horse Cellar, in monly so called, Piccadilly, in the county of Middlesex; and that twopence and not the city merely. was paid for the booking, the book-keeper being told that In an action

against a carrier

for the loss of a painting, it appeared that the stage waggon in which it was sent had seven horses, but that there was only one waggoner: the L. C. J. left it to the Jury to say, whether the sending but one waggoner was gross negligence; and they found that it was so.

it was a painting, no extra carriage or insurance being paid.

Campbell and Wyborn, for the defendant, objected, that, upon this evidence, the plaintiff should be nonsuited, as the termini of the journey were not properly described, the Old White Horse Cellar not being in London, but in another county; and they cited Tucker v. Cracklin (a), where, on a count stating a contract to carry from the Blue Boar in Whitechapel, in the county of Middlesex, it being proved that the Blue Boar was actually in the city of London and not in the county of Middlesex, although the whole neighbourhood commonly went by the name of Whitechapel, the plaintiff was nonsuited.

Lord TENTERDEN, C. J.-The word London is nomen collectivum for this purpose, although some convictions against stage-coach proprietors have erroneously proceeded upon this supposed distinction.

The defendants proved an express notice that they would not be liable for parcels above 57. value, unless entered as such, and paid for accordingly (b). But it was proved,

(a) 2 Stark. 385. In the case of Ditcham v. Chivis, 1 M. & P. 735, which was an action on the case against a stage coach proprietor for an injury sustained by a passenger, the declaration alleged, that the defendant was the owner of a stage coach, for the conveyance of passengers from London to Blackheath, and that the plaintiff had agreed to become a passenger, and that the defendant had agreed to receive her as such passenger, to be carried from London to Blackheath; and the evidence was, that the words London and Blackheath were painted on the coach door; that the

coach was licensed to run from
Charing Cross only; and that the
plaintiff was taken up at the Ele-
phant and Castle, in St. George's
Fields: It was held, that, as Char-
ing Cross and St. George's Fields
are both in common parlance stiled
London, the allegation was suffi-
ciently proved.

(b) There has been a great altera-
tion made in the law on this subject,
by the statute 11 Geo. 4 & 1 Will.
4, c. 68, by sect. I of which it is en-
acted, "That from and after the
passing of this act, no mail con-
tractor, stage coach proprietor, or
other common carrier by land for
hire shall be liable for the loss of

1832.

BECKFORD

v.

CRUTWELL.

1832.

BECKFORD

v.

CRUTWELL.

upon cross-examination of the defendant's witnesses, that the practice with their waggon was to proceed out of

or injury to any article or articles or property of the descriptions following; (that is to say,) gold or silver coin of this realm or of any foreign state, or any gold or silver in a manufactured or unmanufactured state, or any precious stones, jewellery, watches, clocks, or time-pieces of any description, trinkets, bills, notes of the governor and company of the Banks of England, Scotland and Ireland respectively, or of any other bank in Great Britain or Ireland, orders, notes, or securities for payment of money, English or foreign, stamps, maps, writings, title deeds, paintings, engravings, pictures, gold or silver plate or plated articles, glass, china, silks in a manufactured or unmanufactured state, and whether wrought up or not wrought up with other materials, furs, or lace, or any of them, contained in any parcel or packages which shall have been delivered, either to be carried for hire or to accompany the person of any passenger in any mail or stage coach or other public conveyance, when the value of such article or articles or property aforesaid contained in such parcel or package shall exceed the sum of ten pounds, unless at the time of the delivery thereof at the office, warehouse, or receiving house of such mail contractor, stage coach proprietor, or other common carrier, or to his, her, or their book-keeper, coachman, or other servant, for the purpose of being carried, or of accompanying the person of any passenger as afore

said, the value and nature of such article or articles or property shall have been declared by the person or persons sending or delivering the same, and such increased charge as herein-after mentioned, or an engagement to pay the same, be accepted by the person receiving such parcel or package." And also, by sect. 2, "That when any parcel or package containing any of the articles above specified shall be so delivered, and its value and contents declared as aforesaid, and such value shall exceed the sum of ten pounds, it shall be lawful for such mail contractors, stage coach proprietors, and other common carriers, to demand and receive an increased rate of charge, to be notified by some notice affixed in legible characters in some public and conspicuous part of the office, warehouse, or other receiving house where such parcels or packages are received by them for the purpose of conveyance, stating the increased rates of charge required to be paid over and above the ordinary rate of carriage as a compensation for the greater risk and care to be taken for the safe conveyance of such valuable articles; and all persons sending or delivering parcels or packages containing such valuable articles as aforesaid at such office shall be bound by such notice, without further proof of the same having come to their knowledge." And also by sect. 4, "That, from and after the first day of September now next ensuing, no pub

London for one stage with two men, and after that with one waggoner only, changing the waggoner every twentyfive miles. It was also proved, that no stage waggons ever employed more than one waggoner beyond the first

lic notice or declaration heretofore made or hereafter to be made shall be deemed or construed to limit or in anywise affect the liability at common law of any such mail contractors, stage coach proprietors, or other public common carriers as aforesaid, for or in respect of any articles or goods to be carried and conveyed by them; but that all and every such mail contractors, stage coach proprietors, and other common carriers as aforesaid shall from and after the said first day of September be liable, as at the common law, to answer for the loss or any injury to any articles and goods in respect whereof they may not be entitled to the benefit of this act, any public notice or declaration by them made and given contrary thereto, or in anywise limiting such liability, notwithstanding." And by stat. 5, "That for the purpoposes of this act every office, warehouse, or receiving house which shall be used or appointed by any mail contractor or stage coach proprietor or other such common carrier as aforesaid for the receiving of parcels to be conveyed as aforesaid, shall be deemed and taken to be the receiving house, warehouse, or office of such mail contractor, stage coach proprietor, or other common carrier; and that any one or more of such mail contractors, stage coach proprietors, or common carrier shall be

liable to be sued by his, her, or their name or names only; and that no action or suit commenced to recover damages for loss or injury to any parcel, package, or person, shall abate for the want of joining any co-proprietor or co-partner in such mail, stage coach, or other public conveyance by land for hire as aforesaid." And also, by sect. 6, "That nothing in this act contained shall extend or be construed to annul or in anywise affect any special contract between such mail contractor, stage coach proprietor, or common carrier, or any other parties, for the conveyance of goods and merchandizes.” And also, by sect. 8, "That nothing in this act shall be deemed to protect any mail contractor, stage coach proprietor, or other common carrier for hire from liability to answer for loss or injury to any goods or articles whatsoever arising from the felonious acts of any coachman, guard, book-keeper, porter, or other servant in his or their employ, nor to protect any such coachman, guard, bookkeeper, or other servant from liability for any loss or injury occasioned by his or their own personal neglect or misconduct." But, by sect. 9, carriers, although the value of the goods is declared, are not to be liable for more than the value proved at the trial; and by sect. 10, they may pay money into Court.

1832.

BECKFORD

v.

CRUTWELL

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