to be questioned only by thofe who queflion the right of a nation to govern itfelf, and to be ceded only by thofe who are prepared to cede their independence.

But the profperity of the United States is in a peculiar degree promoted by external commerce. A people almoft exclufively agricultural have not within themfelves a market for the furplus produce of their labour, or a fufficient number and variety of articles of exchange to fupply the wants of the cultivators; they cannot have an internal which will compenfate for the loss of an external commerce: they muft fearch abroad for manufactures, for many other articles which contribute to the comfort and convenience of life, and they muft fearch abroad alfo for a market for that large portion of the productions of their foil which cannot be confumed at home. The policy of a nation thus circumftanced muft ever be to encourage external commerce, and to open to itself every market for the difpofition of its fuperfluities and the fupply of its wants. The commercial and manufacturing character and capacities of England must turn into that channel a confiderable portion of the commerce of any nation under the circumftances of the United States. It is a market too important and too valuable to be voluntarily clofed; in confequence, a confiderable portion of their commerce has taken that direction, and a continual folicitude has been manifefted to regulate and fecure it by contract. To abolith this commerce, or to refuse to give it permanence and fecurity by fair and equal ftipulations, would be a facrifice which no nation ought to require, and which no nation ought to make. In forming her treaty of amity and commerce with the United States, France claimed no fuch prerogative. That treaty declares the intention of the parties to be," to fix, in an equitable and permanent manner, the rules which ought to be followed relative to the commerce and correfpondence which the two parties defire to eftablish between their respective countries, ftates, and fubjects;" and that "they have judged that the faid end could not be better obtained than by taking for the bafis of their agreement the most perfect equality and reciprocity; and by carefully avoiding all thofe burdenfome preferences which are ufually fources of debate, embarraffiment, and difcontent; by leaving alfo each party at liberty to make, refpecting commerce and navigation, thofe interior regulations which it fhall find most convenient to itself, and by founding the advantages of commerce folely upon reciprocal utility and the juft rules of free intercourfe, referving to each party the liberty of admitting at its pleasure, other nations to a participation of the fame advantages." The treaty itfelf contains no ftipulation in any degree contradictory to thofe declarations of the preamble, or which could fuggeft a fufpicion, that under thefe declarations was concealed a wish to abridge the fovereignty of the United States with refpect to trea

In

ties, or to control their interefts in regard to commerce. forming a commercial treaty with Britain, therefore, in which no peculiar privilege is granted, the government of the United States believed itself to be tranfa&ting a bufinefs exclufively its own, which could give umbrage to none, and which no other nation on earth would confider itself as having a right to interfere in. There exifted, confequently, no motive for concealing from France, or any other power, that the negotiation of Mr. Jay` might or might not terminate in à commercial treaty. The de-. claration therefore was not made; nor is it usual for nations about to enter into negotiations to proclaim to others the various objects to which thofe negotiations may poffibly be directed. Such is not, nor has it ever been, the practice of France. To fuppofe a neceffity or a duty on the part of one government thus to proclaim all its views, or to confult another with respect to its arrangement of its own affairs, is to imply a dependence to which no government ought willingly to fubmit. So far as the interefts of France might be involved in the negotiation, the inftructions given to the negotiator were promptly communicated. The minifter of this republic was informed officially, that Mr. Jay was inftructed not to weaken the engagements of the United States to France. Farther information was neither to have been required nor expected indeed, that which was given furnished reafon to' fuppofe that one of the objects of the negotiation with Great Britain was a commercial treaty. Why then fuch unnecessary' and unmerited farcafms against a cautious and unoffending ally? Thofe objects which the purfued were fuch as an independent nation might legitimately purfue, and fuch as America never had diffembled, and never deemed it neceffary to diffemble her with

to obtain.

Why fhould an effort be made to imprefs France with an opinion that Mr. Jay was not authorized to negotiate a commercial treaty with Britain, when the fixed opinion of America had ever been, that France could not be and ought not to be diffatiffied with the formation of fuch a treaty? Why fhould the minifter of France have been informed officially that Mr. Jay was efpecially inftructed not to weaken the engagement of the United States to France, if it was intended to convince that minister that his powers did not extend to fubjects in any degree connected with thofe engagements? To what purpofe fhould the govern ment of the United States have practifed a deception deemed by itself totally unneceffary, and which its utmost efforts could not long continue? It requires an equal degree of folly and vice to practife an ufelefs fraud which muft inevitably and immediately be detected, and the detection of which muft expofe its author to general infamy, as well as the enmity of thofe on whom the fraud had been practifed. Thefe confiderations ought to VOL. VII.

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have

have produced fome hesitation concerning the fact. The tefti mony in fupport of it ought to have been very pofitive and very unexceptionable before it received implicit faith. It should have been very clear that there was no mistake, no mifunderstanding, concerning the information communicated, before the charge was made in fuch terms as the minifter of France has been pleased to employ; but the teftimony is believed to be fatisfactory, that the government of the United States has not endeavoured to imprefs in France any opinion on, this fubject which the fact of the cafe did not warrant. The declaration of Mr. Randolph, made July 8th, 1795, is full on this point. It is in these words:

"I never could in truth have informed the French minifter, that the miffion, as set forth in the Prefident's message to the Senate, contemplated only an adjustment of our complaints; if, by. this phrafe, it be intended to exclude commercial arrangements, I could have no reafon for faying fo, fince the French republic could have had nothing to do with our commercial arrangements, if they did not derogate from her rights: it could have answered no purpose, when fo fhort a time would develope the contrary-L never did inform the French minifter as above itated.

The only official converfation, which I recollect with Mr. Fauchet upon this fubject was, when I communicated to him, with the President's permiffion, that Mr. Jay was inftructed not to weaken our, engagements to France. Neither then, nor at any other time, in official nor unofficial converfation, did I ever fay to him, that nothing of a commercial nature was contemplated, or that nothing but the controverfies under the old treaty and the fpoliations were contemplated.

"Mr. Fauchet fome time ago faid to me, that he understood from what I faid, that Mr. Jay was not authorized to treat of commercial matters. I told him, that he mifunderftood me; no letter had ever paffed upon this subject."

If then Mr. Randolph did give Mr. Fauchet the information contended for, it is plain that he never was authorized to do fo; but the confiderations already detailed render it infinitely more. probable that Mr. Fauchet has mifunderstood Mr. Randolph, than that Mr. Randolph has mifinformed Mr. Fauchet.

The undersigned, have taken, they trust, a correct view of the leading and influential measures adopted by the government of the United States: they have endeavoured to ftate, with plainnefs and with candour, the motives which have occafioned the adoption of those measures and the operation they are believed to have. They have thown that if America is to be reproached with partialities, irreconcilable with her neutral fituation, it is not by France that thofe reproaches ought to be made. They have been induced to take this review by a hope which they cannot relinquish without regret, that it may contribute to efface im

preffions

!

preffions which mifreprefentation may have made, and to take from the intention and conduct of the government they reprefent that falfe colouring which unfriendly pencils have fo profufely bestowed upon them. They are anxious ftill to cherish a hope, that, by expofing frankly and fincerely the fentiments which have hitherto guided their nation, they may reftore difpofitions on the part of France compatible with the continuance of thofe fenti

ments.

Complaints have been made, that in the application in particular cafes of thofe general principles which the neutral station of the United States rendered indifpenfable, inconveniencies and vexations which were unavoidable have been fometimes, fuftained. These complaints have been feparately and fully dif cuffed.

The undersigned perfuade themfelves that the explanations which have been given refpecting them, if not entirely fatisfactory, have yet been fuch as to prove the good faith and upright intention which never ceafed to direct the conduct of the United States.

If, notwithstanding this good faith and the purity of thefe intentions, the difficulty of their fituation has in any cafe produced even an involuntary departure from thofe principles by which they profeffed to be guided, they are ready to confider that cafe, and to repair any fault which may inadvertently have been committed. With thefe difpofitions on their part, with this confcioufnefs of having never ceafed to merit the friendship and esteem of the French nation, with a conviction that a temperate and thorough view of the past cannot fail to remove prejudices not. warrantedly facts, the United States have relied confidently on the juftice of France for a difcontinuance and reparation of thofe ferious and heavy injuries which have been accumulated on them.

Defirous of establishing, not the dependence of a weak on a powerful nation, but that real and cordial friendship, the willing and fpontaneous offering of generous minds, which can only be lafting when evidenced to be mutual, and can only be preferved when bottomed on reciprocal juftice, the undersigned will now represent with candour and franknefs the well-founded complaints with which they are charged.

Thefe complaints confift

Of claims uncontroverted by the government of France, but which remain unfatisfied; and

Of claims founded on captures and confifcations, the illega lity of which has not yet been admitted.

In the first clafs are arranged

Firstly, Those whofe property has been feized under the decree of the National Convention of the 9th May 1793.

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Secondly,

Secondly, Thofe who are entitled to compenfation in confequence of the long detention of their veels at Bourdeaux in the years 1793 and 1794.

Thirdly, The holders of bills and other evidences of debts due, drawn by the colonial adminiftrations in the West Indies.

Fourthly, Those whofe cargoes have been appropriated to pubKc ufe without receiving therefor adequate payment; and,

Fifthly, Those who have fupplied the government under contracts with its agents, which have not yet been complied with on the part of France.

Thefe well-founded claims of American citizens, thus originating in voluntary and important fupplies, in the forcible feizure of valuable property, accompanied with promifes of payment, and in injurious detentions, conftitute a mafs of debt which the justice and good faith of the French government cannot refufe to provide for, and which is too confiderable to be unnoticed by that of the United States. The undersigned are inftructed to folicit your attention to this fubject, and they would perfuade themselves that they do not folicit in vain. So many circumstances concur to give force to the application, that they leave it to your government, in the confidence that no additional reprefentations can be neceffary. They pafs to complaints ftill more important for their amount, more interesting in their nature, and more ferious in their confequences.

1

On the 14th Meffidor, 4th year of the French republic, one and indivifible (July 28, 1796), the Executive Directory decreed, "That all neutral or allied powers fhall without delay be notified that the flag of the French republic will treat neutral veffels, either as to confifcation, as to fearches or capture, in the fame manner as they fhall fuffer the English to treat them." This decree, in any point of view in which it can be confidered, could not fail to excite in the United States the moft ferious attention. It difpenfes at once, as they conceive, with the moft folemn obligations which compact can create, and confequently afferts a right on the part of France to recede at her difcretion from any ftipulations fhe may have entered into. It has been demonstrated that governments may by contract change, as between themselves, the rules established by the law of nations, and that fuch contract becomes completely obligatory on the parties, though it can in no manner affect the rights of others: yet by this decree allies with whom fuch stipulations exift are to be treated, without regard to fuch ftipulations, in the fame manner as they are treated by others, who are bound by a different rule. This, as it refpects the United States, is the more unfriendly, because a. readiness has been manifested on their part fo to modify by confent their treaty with France, as to reinflate the rules eftablished by the law of nations.

The