first two of these items were for objects of great interest to the country. Fort Delaware was in ruins. Fort Mifflin inefficient-the approach to Philadelphia almost unobstructed. Yet they were neglected by the House. The other item of $100,000, for armament of fortifications, deserves attention. For many years that amount for that object had been uniformly put in the bill for the support of the army. On the 27th of January preceding, the usual army bill containing it had passed; and thus, by this amendment of the Senate, $200,000, instead of $100,000, were to be appropriated for this essential object. Is there in all this any evidence that the Senate was unwilling to provide for the national defence? It was far in advance of the House. They had sent to us $439,000; we added $421,000, for objects as important, for the security and defence of the country, as any which were contained in the bill. [SENATE. It created surprise, I believe, in every part of the Senate chamber, unless, indeed, some few may have been apprized of its approach. I do not deny that I was astonished and indignant, and, among others, gave utterance to my feelings. That a measure of such a description should have been reserved for such a moment, bad too much the aspect of finesse and management. It was rejected by the Senate, and sent back to the House, after a debate of about an hour, certainly of not more than an hour and a half. The reasons for its rejection appeared to me then, and appear to me now, most ample and satisfactory. It might have been objected to as irregular, unusual, and unparliamentary. It was made as an amendment to the amendment of the Senate. As such it must restrain, enlarge, or modify, the matter to be amended. It did neither. It was a distinct section, an independent and incoherent subject. The House might with equal propriety have added a new bill, or all the bills of the session. But it was not resisted on this ground. There were other and higher considerations, vitally affecting the institutions of the country. It was opposed to the spirit and meaning of the constitution, and the whole practice of the Government. The 7th item of the 9th section of the first article declares, "No money shall be drawn from the treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law." The term appropriation implies that the object must be specified. Without it is, the intent of the makers of that instrument is violated. A mere declaration that the Executive may draw out a million of dollars, and apply it to such objects as he shall think necessary for the public interests, is no compliance with the constitutional On the 24th of February it was received by the House, and referred to the committee on the next day. (Journal, pp. 442, 451.) There were but five items to be examined. The committee did not take much time for that purpose. It was reported on the 27th, agreeing to some, and disagreeing to other of the amendments, (J. p. 464.) If anxious for the defence of the country, it might then have been promptly considered. It was in the hands of the friends of the administration, and they had a large and not unmanageable majority. Yet it was left until the 3d of March, the last day of the session, when the amendments of the Senate were agreed to, except the one which related to Fort Delaware. Upon this the Senate afterwards insisted, and the House receded. (Journal, pp. 506, 509.) There was, then, no longer any difference between the two Houses on any of the items of the bill. Each had added what its sense of duty called for; and the amount appropriated by it was $860,000-provision. Its design was to guard sedulously the pubmore than the average appropriation during the last ten years. The Senate had shown no reluctance to make the most ample appropriations, provided they were specific. They had rejected nothing offered by the House. They had induced the House to take an amount almost double that proposed by the Executive and his friends. Houses had agreed on every item; the bill required only the forms of final passage. The Why, then, did it not pass? What circumstance, what contrivance, what accident, defeated it? In answering this inquiry, I shall refer to the journals of the two Houses, and the regular and ordinary report of the proceedings of the last night of the session, as it appeared in the National Intelligencer of the 7th March. When the House objected to one of the amendments, from which they afterwards receded, they sent the bill back to the Senate with a new section added to it, in the following words: "And be it further enacted, That the sum of three millions of dollars be, and the same is hereby, appropriated, out of any money in the treasury not otherwise appropriated, to be expended, in whole or in part, under the direction of the President of the United States, for the military and naval service, including fortifications and ordnance and increase of the navy; provided such expenditures shall be rendered necessary for the defence of the country prior to the next meeting of Congress." This amendment had been made by a vote of 109 to 77, (Journal, p. 509;) and it came to us about 8 o'clock of the last night, within three or four hours of the adjournment. We had then been in session three months; had discussed our relations with France; contemplated our position and our duties; had received the views of the Executive, and his estimates for the defence of the country, and not a suggestion had been made; no member of either House, no executive officer, had proposed such an appropriation. It broke upon us, in the last night, most suddenly and unexpectedly. lic treasure-to secure its control to those who make the laws-to cut off executive discretion as to the objects on which it should be expended. The present President has said (message December, 1834) that "the palpable object of this provision is, to prevent the expenditure of the public money for any purpose whatsoever which shall not have been first approved by the representatives of the people and the States in Congress assembled. It vests the power of declaring for what purposes the public money shall be expended in the legislative department of the Government, to the exclusion of the executive and judicial," &c. &c. He has also said, on another occasion, (message December, 1835,) "no one can be more deeply impressed than I am with the soundness of the doctrine which restrains and limits, by specific provisions, executive discretion, as far as it can be done consistently with the preservation of its constitutional character." That it is "the duty of the Legislature to define, by clear and positive enactments, the nature and extent of the action which it belongs to the Executive to superintend," &c. That the true rule of action "should make the President ever anxious to avoid the exercise of any discretionary authority which can be regulated by Congress. The biases which may operate upon him will not be so likely to extend to the representatives of the people in that body." It is true, these opinions were expressed on a different subject; but I commend them to the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. HUBBARD] as equally applicable to the bill whose character we are investigating. He seems to think it quite specific enough, and sufficiently reBut what are its straining to executive discretion. terms? The three millions are to be expended, "in whole or in part," as the Executive may see fit. On what objects?"The military and naval services, including fortifications, ordnance, and increase of the navy." On what conditions? "If the expenditure be necessary for the defence of the country." Who is to judge of SENATE.] National Defence. the necessity? The President. Can appropriation be more indefinite-less specific? The amount short of three millions is absolutely in his discretion. The "necessity" rests on his judgment, not on the judgment of Congress. The selection of objects is in his choice. He might expend the whole in raising an army. He might increase the navy by men and ships, at his pleasure. He might devote the whole to one object, or divide it among several. It clothed him with unlimited discretion on all points save one, the amount of three millions. Such a bill is new in the practice of the Government— unknown at former periods and under former Executives. We have before passed through times of trial, and been engaged in actual war; yet such investment of power was not found expedient or necessary. It was reserved for the disciples of Mr. Jefferson, who claim to be the especial advocates of his principles-the democrats, par excellence-the only men who have passed pure and unhurt through the corruptions of the times of Madison, Monroe, and Adams, to devise and support this bill. I commend to their notice the language and opinions of Mr. Jefferson. "In our care, too, of the public contributions intrusted to our direction, it would be prudent to multiply barriers against their dissipation, by appropriating specific sums to every specific purpose susceptible of definition; by disallowing all applications of money varying from the appropriation in object, or transcending it in amount; by reducing the undefined field of contingencies, and thereby circumscribing discretionary powers over money, and by bringing back to a single department all accountabilities for money, where the examinations may be prompt, efficacious, and uniform."-Mr. Jefferson's Message, December 8, 1801. [JAN. 25, 1836. prisals; the language of his advocates; I believed then, In Rome, sir, they did, sometimes, create a dictator, whose duty it was to look to it, ne quid detrimenti respublica capial; but they did it by no violation of their constitution and the principles of their Government, but when the enemy was at the gates of the Capitol, and despair found no other remedy. Was there any necessity, at that time, of bestowing the slightest discretionary power upon the President? In what did the necessity consist? We were not in war. We were not threatened with war, unless upon our own action. France had made no movement to assail us. She had no cause of complaint which could justify her in commencing hostilities. She claimed no debt of us. She insisted on no violation of treaty upon our part. There was not a man in Congress, in the nation, in the world, that believed that she would first assail us, unless we did something which should induce her. whatever it might be, it was proper that Congress, not the Executive, should decide. And, as Congress was about to adjourn, nothing would or could constitutionally be done to occasion the commencement of hostilities. The pretences that we might have war, and that France might assail us before we met again, were utterly fallacious. The Executive might have so acted as to create speedy difficulties, but I had no desire to offer This, This doctrine of Mr. J. is among the earliest of my political recollections; and, being just and true in itself, it has been invariably approved in theory and practice, from his day to ours. It was sound when he uttered it; it is sound still with all except those who have unhesitating confidence in the present Chief Magistrate. He will not, in their opinion, abuse this or any other trust confided to him. He requires no guards, no checks, no controlling regulations. He will not err in the judg-him inducements so to act. We had claims on France: ment which he forms on any point. The biases which he assures us may operate upon the Executive are not to be regarded as extending to him. He is the exception to the salutary principle, which directs a jealous watchfulness towards those who are invested with power and authority. Mr. Jefferson must have been wrong when he said, "We have not found angels in the form of men to govern us." 66 Mr. President, that section of the bill, as it came to us from the House, violated the spirit and purpose of the constitution, in reference to the disposition of the public treasure. It disregarded the principle which requires specific sums to be devoted to specific objects. It spurned the doctrine with whose soundness the President is so deeply impressed," that executive discretion should be restrained and limited by specific provi sions. It omitted the duty of the Legislature to define by clear and positive enactments the nature and extent of the action which it belongs to the Executive to superintend." It presumed that "biases would not operate on him" in relation to the controversy with France, which would extend to the representatives of the people in Congress. It invested the Executive with the discretion which belongs to Congress, and to Congress only. It gave him the authority to raise armies and provide a navy.' It surrendered the power of war into his hands. With such an appropriation he might have put the question of war beyond the reach of the representatives of the people. And judging from the temper manifested by him; his recommendation of re she owed us money; we had a treaty which her honor and justice required her to keep; but the time and mode of enforcing the payment of that debt, and coercing the fulfilment of that treaty, was in our own power: and the constitution required, when force was to be applied, Congress should sit in judgment and decide it. There was no exigency which could demand that we should forget the ordinary guards which our Government provides. And even if our situation had been extreme, if the danger had impended, was there not time enough for Congress, during that session, to have defined the objects of expenditure, and specified the sums? If danger should have arisen subsequent to our adjournment, had not the Executive power to call together and consult those whom the constitution designates as the counsellors and guardians of the people's rights on such an occasion? I could not see or feel the necessity for vesting in the President a discretion in which his mode of dealing with constitutional questions had not given to me much confidence. I regarded that section as a dangerous encroachment upon the constitution, and the more dangerous because urged on under pretences of national defence and safety. It is by such encroachments that that instrument is to be beaten down and destroyed. I could not see its safest provisions hazarded unnecessarily. There is enough, day by day, and hour by hour, even in this hall, and much more out of it, to warn us that our only safety lies in guarding it; and that in it, and it alone, live the permanency of the Union and the hopes of freedom. In addition to all these considerations, it was an appropriation not called for by the Executive--a voluntary bestowal of discretionary power unasked by him. It was resisted, at the moment, by the Senator from Tennessee on this ground. If the President thought it necessary, it was his high constitutional duty so to declare officially. "He shall, from time to time, give to Congress information of the state of the Union, and recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient." (2 art. 3 sec.) When and where did he recommend this measure? In what communication is it to be found? Not in the message at the opening of the session; not in that of the 30th December. Was it, as the Senator from New Hampshire seems to suppose, in that of 27th February? (Jour. p. 194.) That message communicates the correspondence on the subject up to that date, with the information that Mr. Livingston had been instructed to quit France if an appropriation should not be made by the Chambers; and then adds, "the subject being now, in all its present aspects, before Congress, whose right it is to decide what measures are to be pursued on that event, I deem it unnecessary to make further recommendation, being confident that, on their part, every thing will be done to maintain the rights and honor of the country which the occasion requires." He expressly avoids further recommendations. He relies on those which he had before made. He does not ask us to place a part of the treasury at his disposal. He does not tell us that it is necessary for us to arm. He gives no indication of a wish for such an appropriation. It is true he has since told us that this section of the bill was "in conformity with the wishes of the Executive;" but when, and where, and to whom, were those wishes made known? If communicated at all, it must have been by private confidence to favorite members. It must have been with the understanding that it should operate upon their votes, and not be publicly and officially promulgated. I do not accuse him of such a course. It would be a base shrinking from the responsibility of his high station, holding, on a great national question, in which the peace of his country was involved, a language official and unofficial; a language public and a language confidential. I do not credit the assertion that he deals with members of Congress in this mode. And yet, sir, if he did wish that appropriation to pass in that form, and his wish was known, it must have been by secret, confidential communications to members; for it is to be found in no public document, no official declaration of the Chief Magistrate. So far as the Senate is concerned, his wish was not known. We were not only ignorant that such was his wish, but had no knowledge that the proposition would be made. The Senator from New Hampshire tells us that we were notified, and that Mr. Cambreleng had stated in the House, upon the vote respecting the French treaty, that he should move such an appropriation. I beg the Senator to reflect upon such an argument to sustain such a proposition. A member of the House states, in his place, in debate, that he will move a particular appropriation at some future time, and this is to be regarded as sufficient official information that the Senate will be called upon to make that appropriation! And we must be prepared to pass upon it, without estimate, without document of any kind, to examine and guide us. We have fallen on strange times, sir, and new notions multiply in relation to official duties and legislative obligations. But let us look at this warning given by the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, who is to be our oracle in these high matters. When was it made? On the 28th February. Where? In debate in the House. When was it published? I find it in the Globe of the 2d March, issued at a moment [SENATE. when it is not probable that half a dozen of even the most devoted students of that print were able to read its report of the proceedings of Congress. And yet this report, at such a time and under such circumstances, is offered as evidence that the Senate ought to have known and been prepared for this most extraordinary proposition. But it is still more unfortunate for the reasoning of the Senator, that the proposition of which Mr. Cambreleng gave notice was not that which is contained in the section which we rejected. It was, in substance, that "he should move an amendment to the fortification bill, when it returned from the Senate, of one million for the army, and two millions for the navy, in case it should be necessary before the next meeting of Congress. This, he understood, would be all that would be required by the executive branch of the Government." Now, it is obvious to remark on this report: 1. That the bill was not then in the Senate; it had been returned to the House, referred to and reported on by the committee. (Journal, pp. 451, 464, 506.) 2. That his notice differs widely in substance from the proposition subsequently made. 3. That he understood that the Executive would require no more. How did he understand it? He ought to have given to other members the light which he had on the subject. Is it to be understood that as chairman, or in any other than a public official capacity, he receives directions from the Executive what amount of public money he is to put at his disposal? If he do, he may as well adopt Antony's profession of faith: "I shall remember, When Cæsar says, do this, it is performed." As little benefit by way of justification can be found for this appropriation in the vote of the House respecting the treaty. The messages of the 7th and 30th December had been before the Committee on Foreign Relations up to the 27th February, when a report was made, accompanied by three resolutions. (Journal, p. 466.) On the 2d of March the House considered them, in conjunction with three resolutions offered by Mr. Adams, as amendments thereto. (Journal, p. 496.) The first resolution of the committee was, "That it would be incompatible with the rights and honor of the United States further to negotiate in relation to the treaty entered into by France on the 4th July, 1831, and that this House will insist upon its execution as ratified by both Governments." The amendment was, "That the rights of the citizens of the United States to indem nity from the Government of France, stipulated by the treaty concluded at Paris on the 4th July, 1831, ought, in no event, to be sacrificed, abandoned, or impaired, by any consent or acquiescence of the Government of the United States;" and was subsequently, after debate, modified by Mr. Adams, and was in these words: "Resolved, That, in the opinion of this House, the treaty with France of the 4th July, 1831, should be maintained, and its execution insisted on." After various efforts at amendment and change, it passed unanimously. (Journal, p. 500.) The other amendments offered by Mr. A. were then withdrawn by him. The second resolution of the committee was in these words: "Resolved, That the Committee on Foreign Affairs be discharged from the further consideration of so much of the President's message as relates to commercial restrictions or to reprisals on the commerce of France," and passed unanimously: thus concurring with the unanimous vote of the Senate in regard to the recommendation of the Executive. The remaining resolution was in these words: "Resolved, That contingent preparation ought to be made to meet any emergency growing out of our relations with France;" and this resolution was, on motion of Mr. Cambreleng, ordered to lie on the table. (Journal, p. 501.) It was the 2d SENATE.] National Defence. March; the order to lie on the table was, under the circumstances, equal to rejection or withdrawal; for there could be no hope of again calling it up, discussing and deciding it. Here, then, on the very day before this extraordinary section was introduced into the bill, while a resolution which declared contingent preparation to be proper was before the House, the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, on his own motion, disposed of it, and declined taking the sense of the House upon it. Could it have been anticipated, after that, that Congress would be called upon to place three millions of money in the hands of the Executive, without specification of objects? Did the committee expect war? Did they think France would assail us? Did they believe legislation necessary? Why, then, was not the sense of the House taken upon the question? The Senate had long before unanimously declared that no legislative action was at this time necessary. The House had just before unanimously relieved the committee from all further consideration of the only recommendations made by the Executive: thus declaring those recommendations improper, or, at least, the measures proposed unnecessary. And now the resolution for contingent preparation is laid on the table by the assent of the friends of the Executive. Sir, I ask again, did they expect war? No, sir, they knew better. The appropriation was not called for by anticipation of an attack from France. If it was, the friends of the Executive, the House of Representatives, were greatly wanting in their duty to the country. To sup Look at the only resolution which they did pass. It declares that the treaty should be maintained, and its execution insisted on." And who in this country has ever held a different language? But how insisted on? By immediate war? Was that the meaning of the House? Was it a war measure? Then, more guilty legislation connot be imagined. Go to war with peace appropriations, without one preparatory measure by Congress? The House meant no such thing. pose that they did would be an impeachment of something more than their intelligence. They left the question of further negotiation entirely open by the rejection of the resolution which declared it incompatible with our rights and honor, and they adopted one which merely declared that the treaty ought to be maintained. And had France then, or has she yet, declared that she did not consider it binding on her, and that she would not maintain it? On the contrary, she has always admitted its validity, and acknowledged that the debt was due to us. She has delayed, and delayed improperly, upon insufficient reasons, to comply with her obligations under it; but the resolution of the House asserted no fact which France has controverted. I do not intend to inquire, on this occasion, into the sufficiency of the reasons urged by her. It is enough, for the present, to say that the act of the House did not render war necessary; that it was not anticipated as speedily, if at all, to arise; and that those who favored this contingent appropriation can find in this resolution no apology for it. The chairman of the committee, the person who moved this section, is reported to have said in debate, as late as the 28th of February, "If we are to have peace, the less said, the better. If war, the next Congress would have enough to say on that great question." The question of war, if decided at all, was, in his opinion, to be decided by another Congress. And, out of the House, all parties concurred in the hope and belief that it would be avoided. It was but four or five days previous that the official paper, which is regarded, even by our foreign ministers, as expressing opinions worthy of all confidence, contained the following editorial remarks. (Globe of 24th February.) "From the extracts given in this day's paper from [JAN. 25, 1836. the foreign journals, and especially the remarks of the French minister on the introduction of the law to provide for the treaty, it will be seen that there is now the fairest prospect of a speedy and happy adjustment of our difficulties with France," &c. "Mr. Livingston will not, it appears, apply for his passports, but will await the action of the Chambers in relation to the law proposed by the ministry." It then gives an extract of a letter of congratulation on the prospects which the late news has opened on the country, which, in conclusion, says: "The opposition seem confounded this morning, and even the most desperate in their ranks say the President has had the good fortune to take the right course in this matter. Chance has had no hand in it, my friend; it is parcel of his great, fair, and clear course." "We believe all the difficulties in the matter have grown out of the intrigues of some one on our own side of the Atlantic," &c. The extract administers the usual dose of flattery which parasites are ever ready to bestow on the hand that dis. tributes honors and profits, but it conveyed the strong impression which then prevailed. And war was not expected here or elsewhere, at least not so expected as to justify large discretionary appropriations. To have gone to war, then, would have been most absurd; nothing could, indeed, have been more absurd than the position which we, should have occupied. It was justly remarked about that time, "To go to war now would be like two boys standing before each other with clenched fists, and each daring the other to strike. If we go to war with France on this subject, it would all end in an expenditure of millions upon millions of treasure, and oceans of blood, and we should then be asking each other who struck the first blow." Mr. President, that section of the bill, thus introduced, was neither necessary nor expedient, to be justified by no facts, hostile to every correct principle of legislation, and the majority of the Senate, by a vote of 29 to 19, rejected it. (Journal, page 232.) The names are recorded; and, while the minority doubtless acted upon a proper sense of their duty, the majority will not, I feel assured, have cause to condemn themselves. For myself, I concurred most heartily on the disagreement to the section, and cheerfully put myself upon the principles involved, and leave my act to the award of the future. But, Mr. President, I ask attention while I proceed still further with the history of the bill. It returned to the House, as is, I believe, agreed on all hands, before ten o'clock. Mr. Gholson then moved that the House recede from their amendment, and urged it strongly upon them. (Journal, p. 516.) It was opposed, sir, and the reported language is worthy of observation. Mr. Cambreleng, the chairman of the committee, and the person who moved the section, "hoped that the House would not recede. If the Senate had chosen to take the responsibility of defeating the appropriation, it might remain with them; he would take no part of it." And Mr. Bynum sustained him. Now, this was long before twelve o'clock. It was upon the first disagreement. It was while there was a quorum, for the vote against receding was 110 to 87. Why, at this early hour, with a full attendance of members, was the declaration made that "the responsibility of defeating the appropriation" was upon the Senate? Why did the mover refuse to take any part in it? Was the appropriation necessary to the defence of the country, and was it not worth while to make an effort to save it? Was an enemy approaching our shores, and was it more desirable to cast the responsibility on the Senate than to defend the country. The House, on motion of Mr. Cambreleng, determined to insist upon the section, and so informed the Senate; but they asked no conference. It was their amendment; they had voted to insist; and it was proper, if they desired to avoid difficulty, and secure its passage, to ask a conference respecting it. The Senate had previously done so, that very night, on an amendment of theirs to the bill making appropriation for the civil and diplomatic expenses of the Government. The conference was had, and the bill passed. (Journal, pp. 512, 515.) But the House, upon this bill, did not choose to take this course. They chose rather to put it in jeopardy. The Senate adhered to their decision, by a vote of 29 to 17, (Journal, p. 235,) and the bill was speedily returned. This course of the Senate was perfectly parliamentary and correct, as is known to Senators, and as I shall presently have cause to explain. When the bill again came to the House, they had another opportunity of asking a conference, and saving their amendment, and the whole bill, if there could be a compromise made. They did not seize the opportunity. Other counsels prevailed. The mover of the section now moved to adhere to it. This would have defeated the bill irretrievably. No subsequent movement could have saved it. Why, then, was the motion made? Was it resolved upon that the whole bill, with all its appropriations, should be lost, because the Senate had not consented to put three millions of dollars at the disposal of the President? There was yet time enough. It was not twelve o'clock, and there was a quorum. Yet, if this motion had prevailed, the bill would have been lost with time and quorum both. The course taken exhibited a fixed purpose that no appropriation should be made for any of the fortifications, unless this large sum was granted, and this most improper and unconstitutional demonstration of confidence was manifested towards the President. Was it deemed necessary, as an offset against the unanimous rejection of his advice, and the refusal to give him the power of making reprisals? Mr. Mercer moved that the House recede. This would have ended the controversy, and saved the appropriations for fortification, amounting to $860,000. And how, sir, was this motion met? Mr. Polk, the chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means, urged that the motion to adhere was first in order, and to be first put. And, in no very measured language towards the Senate, Mr. Lytle sustained him; thus aiding the movement of Mr. Cambreleng to adhere, defeat the whole bill, and try to throw the blame upon the Senate. The Speaker (then Mr. Bell) decided that the question on receding must be first taken. It was put, and rejected by 107 to 88. (Journal, p. 519.) Upon both of the motions to recede the votes were recorded. It was an almost precise division of parties. Those who are called opponents of the administration voted so as to save the bill, but lose the contingent section. Its friends voted to save the grant of money to the Executive, at the hazard of the whole bill. In this stage of these extraordinary proceedings, Mr. Hubbard (and he deserves thanks for breaking rank) moved for a conference. (Journal, p. 519.) It was asked, and promptly agreed to by the Senate, although they had voted to adhere to their rejection of the section. (Journal, p.237.) If they had desired to defeat the bill, why did they waive their vote to adhere; and agree to the conference? They might have refused it, and been perfectly justified by parliamentary rule and propriety. Even the desire to throw the responsibility on the Senate could not have put them in the wrong. There is potent authority on this point in the journals of this body. In January, 1826, the two Houses had before them a very important measure-a judiciary bill, having the same object as that which has recently passed the Senate, to extend the circuit court system to all the States. The [SENATE. bill from the House was considered, debated on several days, amended, and sent, back. The House voted not to accept a part of the amendments, and returned it to the Senate. The Senate, on the motion of Mr. Van Buren, then chairman of the Judiciary Committee, adhered to their amendments. The House asked a conference. The message asking the conference was referred to the Judiciary Committee, and the same chairman made a report refusing the conference. That report is worthy of the respectful consideration of all those who now condemn the Senate. It sustains the positions which I have advanced in defence of the course of the Senate on this occasion. It justifies the vote to adhere, without the vote to insist. It places the duty of calling for the conference on the House which first insists. It refuses a conference after the House had asked it, because it was not the intention of the Senate to recede, and a conference was therefore unnecessary. The Senate sustained the report, by 24 to 13; and among the majority are found the names of Messrs. Van Buren, Benton, Berrien, Branch, Dickerson, Eaton, Hayne, Rowan, Tazewell, White, Woodbury. The bill was lost by this decision. The report and vote may be found in vol. 16 of Senate Journal, pages 306312. If this be correct parliamentary doctrine, and our opponents will not deny it, and if the Senate had desired to defeat this bill, why did we not refuse the conference? We did not. We were resolved to resist the three millions, but we sought earnestly the passage of the bill, and waived every rule of practice, in such cases, to accomplish it. Yet we are now charged with the defeat of the bill. The conferees, on the part of the House, were Messrs. Cambreleng, Hubbard, and Lewis; on the part of the Senate, Messrs. Webster, Frelinghuysen, and Wright. They agreed; the conferees of the Senate unanimously, and the majority of those of the House. It was at the time understood that they also were unanimous. It seems to have been since denied that Mr. Cambreleng did agree to the report; and the Senator from New Hampshire will not say that he did. It is quite possible that he did not. He had desired to adhere to the amendment, which would have destroyed the bill. He had manifested his anxiety to throw the blame on the Senate; and he may have feared the defeat of his object if the conferees agreed upon a reasonable report to the two Houses. He had made a provision which reposed all confidence and power in the President, and he may have been unwilling that the offering should be withdrawn. But it is of little importance. The conferees did agree, and those of the Senate reported. (Journal, p. 237.) In lieu of the section of three millions, they proposed As an additional appropriation for arming the fortifications of the United States, three hundred thousand dollars." "As an additional appropriation for the repair and equipment of the ships of war of the United States, five hundred thousand dollars." When this report was made, the Senate were prepared to approve it. The committee, of which the Senator from New York was one, had agreed to it, and it would have passed unanimously. Sir, the whole Senate was ready to pass it. There was no fault in that respect on either side of this body. The censure must rest elsewhere. The Senator from New Hampshire seems to find no difference between this proposition and the section, except in the amount. Has he looked at them? The one is without specification, leaving the whole expenditure, as to objects, to the Executive. The other defines the objects for which the money is appropriated. It com |
