had made compensation for these injuries, and until she should make surrender of the Western posts. The popular excitement was intense. Meetings were held on the subject of British spoliations. "Peace or war" was the absorbing question. The partisans of France were now in the ascendent. It was scouted as pusillanimous any longer to hold terms with England. "No doubt," said they, "she despises the proclamation of neutrality, as an evidence of timidity; every motive of self-respect calls on the people of the United States to show a proper spirit.” It was suggested that those who were in favor of resisting British aggressions should mount the tri-colored cockade; and forthwith it was mounted by many; while a democratic society was formed to correspond with the one at Philadelphia, and aid in giving effect to these popular sentiments. While the public mind was in this inflammable state, Washington received advices from Mr. Pinckney, the American minister in London, informing him that the British ministry had issued instructions to the commanders of armed vessels, revoking those of the 6th of November, 1793. Lord Grenville, also, in conversation with Mr. Pinckney, had explained the real motives for that order, showing that, however oppressive in its execution, it had not been intended for the special vexation of American commerce. Washington laid Pinckney's letter before Congress on the 4th of April. It had its effects on both parties; federalists saw in it a chance of accommodating difficulties, and, therefore, opposed all measures calculated to irritate; the other party did not press their belligerent propositions to any immediate decision, but showed no solicitude to avoid a rupture. Jefferson, though reputed to be the head of the French party, avowed in a letter to Madison his hope that war would not result, but that justice would be obtained in a peaceable way;* and he repeats the hope in a subsequent letter. "My countrymen," writes he, "are groaning under the insults of Great Britain. I hope some means will turn up of reconciling our faith and honor with peace. I confess to you, I have seen enough of one war never to wish to see another." t ""Tis as great an error," writes Hamilton, at the same time, "for a nation to overrate as to underrate itself. Presumption is as great a fault as timidity. 'Tis our error to overrate ourselves and underrate Great Britain; we forget how little we can annoy, how much we may be annoyed."‡ The war cry, however, is too obvious a means of popular excitement to be readily given up. Busy partisans saw that the feeling of the populace was belligerent, and every means were taken by the press and the democratic societies to exasperate this feeling; according to them the crisis called, not for moderation, but for decision, for energy. Still to adhere to a neutral position would argue tameness-cowardice! Washington, however, was too morally brave to be clamored out of his wise moderation by such taunts. He resolved to prevent a war, if possible, by an appeal to British justice, to be made through a special envoy, who should represent to the British government the injuries we had sustained from it in various ways, and should urge indemnification. The measure was decried by the party favorable to France, as an undue advance to the British government; but they were still more hostile to it when it was rumored *Jefferson's Works, vol. iv., p. 102. Ib., vol. iv., p. 104. Letter to John Adams. that Hamilton was to be chosen for the mission. A member of the House of Representatives addressed a strong letter to the President, deprecating the mission, but especially the reputed choice of the envoy. James Monroe, also, at that time a member of the Senate, remonstrated against the nomination of Hamilton, as injurious to the public interest, and to the interest of Washington himself, and offered to explain his reasons to the latter in a private interview. Washington declined the interview, but requested Mr. Monroe, if possessed of any facts which would disqualify Mr. Hamilton for the mission, to communicate them to him in writing. "Colonel Hamilton and others have been mentioned,' adds he, "but no one is yet absolutely decided upon in my mind. But as much will depend, among other things, upon the abilities of the person sent, and his knowledge of the affairs of this country, and as I alone am responsible for a proper nomination, it certainly behooves me to name such a one as, in my judgment, combines the requisites for a mission so peculiarly interesting to the peace and happiness of this country." Hamilton, however, aware of the "collateral obstacles” which existed with respect to himself, had resolved to advise Washington to drop him from the consideration, and to fix upon another character; and recommended John Jay, the Chief-justice of the United States, as the man whom it would be advisable to send. "I think," writes he, "the business would have the best chance possible in his hands, and I flatter myself that his mission would issue in a manner that would produce the most important good to the nation. * Hamilton's Works, vol. iv., p. 531. Mr. Jay was the person ultimately chosen. Washington, in his message, thus nominating an additional envoy to Great Britain, expressed undiminished confidence in the minister actually in London. "But a mission like this," observes he, "while it corresponds with the solemnity of the occasion, will announce to the world a solicitude for a friendly adjustment of our complaints and a reluctance to hostility. Going immediately from the United States, such an envoy will carry with him a full knowledge of the existing temper and sensibility of our country, and will thus be taught to vindicate our rights with firmness, and to cultivate peace with sincerity." The nomination was approved by a majority of ten Senators. By this sudden and decisive measure Washington sought to stay the precipitate impulses of public passion; to give time to put the country into a complete state of defense, and to provide such other measures as might be necessary if negotiation, in a reasonable time, should prove unsuccessful.* Notwithstanding the nomination of the envoy, the resolution to cut off all intercourse with Great Britain passed the House of Representatives, and was only lost in the Senate by the casting vote of the Vice-President, which was given, according to general belief, "not from a disinclination to the ulterior expedience of the measure, but from a desire," previously, "to try the effect of negotiation." ↑ While Washington was thus endeavoring to steer the vessel of State amid the surges and blasts which were threatening on every side, Jefferson, who had hauled out of the *Letter to Edmund Randolph. Writings, x. 403. |
