THE SOUTHERN GROUP.-The pioneer of literary activity in Virginia, during this period, was JAMES BLAIR, the founder of the College of William and Mary, and president of it for fifty years. ROBERT BEVERLY published, in 1705, å history of Virginia, and in 1724 HUGH JONES appeared with another history of this colony. Jones was a professor in William and Mary College, and wrote text-books also.

Professor Tyler says, "In general, the characteristic note of American literature in the colonial time is, for New England, scholarly, logical, speculative, unworldly, rugged, sombre; and, as one passes southward along the coast, this literary note changes rapidly toward lightness and brightness, until it reaches the sensuous mirth, the frank and jovial worldliness, the satire, the persiflage, the gentlemanly grace, the amenity, the jocular coarseness of literature in Maryland, Virginia, and farther south."

A growing tendency is observable, as the century progresses, towards a union of the colonies in closer fellowship. This tendency is strikingly apparent as we near the last third of the century, and takes distinct form as the oppressions of the mother country arouse first the spirit of resentment and then that of resistance. From this time on, political questions swallow up all others. The mere literary man, if he can be said to exist in this country during this century, gives place to the political orator and the statesman. And mighty is the race of these that now appear all along the line, called into existence by the terrible crisis; since of them, at the beginning of the struggle, assembled in the Continental Congress at Philadelphia in 1774, even Chatham could say, "I must declare and avow that, in the master states of the world, I know not the people nor the senate who, under such a complication of difficult circumstances, can stand in preference to the delegates of America assembled in General Congress at Philadelphia. For genuine sagacity, for singular moderation, for solid wisdom, manly spirit, sublime sentiments, and sim

plicity of language-for everything respectable and honorable they stand unrivalled." Of these men during the Revolutionary struggle we cannot here speak further, nor of them during the years immediately succeeding, when the Herculean labors of recuperation and reorganization were upon them. A new Constitution was framed. The masterly papers of ALEXANDER HAMILTON, JAMES MADISON, and JOHN JAY, essays now gathered together and composing The Federalist, were written to urge the adoption of this Constitution; the colonies were transformed into States, and the Union was created.

With an added word or two we pass to quote briefly from some of the works of this century. The first newspaper in America was printed in Boston in 1690, and called Public Occurrences; the first that lived was The Boston News-Letter, started in 1704. Before the close of 1765, forty-three newspapers had been established in the American colonies—twenty in New England, thirteen in the Middle group, and ten in the Southern. Before the close of this year, seven colleges also were established-Harvard in 1636; William and Mary in 1693; Yale in 1700; New Jersey (Princeton) in 1746; King's (Columbia) in 1754; Philadelphia (University of Pennsylvania) in 1755; Rhode Island (Brown University) in 1764. Their work in cementing together the colonies was great, and their influence upon our literature can scarcely be over-estimated.

From Edwards's Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will.

With respect to the degree of the idea of the future pleasure. With regard to things which are the subject of our thoughts, either past, present, or future, we have much more of an idea or apprehension of some things than others; that is, our idea is much more clear, lively, and strong. Thus, the ideas we have of sensible things by immediate sensa tion are usually much more lively than those we have by mere imagina tion, or by contemplation of them when absent. My idea of the sun, when I look upon it, is more vivid than when I only think of it. Our idea of the sweet relish of a delicious fruit is usually stronger when we taste it than when we only imagine it. And sometimes the ideas we have

of things by contemplation are much stronger and clearer than at other times. Thus, a man at one time has a much stronger idea of the pleasure which is to be enjoyed in eating some sort of food that he loves than at another. Now the degree, or strength, of the idea, or sense, that men have of future good or evil is one thing that has great influence on their minds to excite choice, or volition. When, of two kinds of future pleasure which the mind considers of and are presented for choice, both are supposed exactly equal by the judgment, and both equally certain, and all other things are equal, but only one of them is what the mind has a far more lively sense of than of the other, this has the greatest advantage by far to affect and attract the mind, and move the will. It is now more agreeable to the mind to take the pleasure it has a strong and lively sense of than that which it has only a faint idea of. The view of the former is attended with the strongest appetite, and the greatest uneasiness attends the want of it; and it is agreeable to the mind to have uneasiness removed, and its appetite gratified. And, if several future enjoyments are presented together as competitors for the choice of the mind, some of them judged to be greater and others less, the mind also having a greater sense and more lively idea of the good of some of them and of others a less, and some are viewed as of greater certainty or probability than others, and those enjoyments that appear most agreeable in one of these respects, appear least so in others, -in this case, all other things being equal, the agreeableness of a proposed object of choice will be in a degree some way compounded of the degree of good supposed by the judgment, the degree of apparent probability, or certainty, of that good, and the degree of the view, or sense, or liveliness of the idea the mind has of that good; because all together concur to constitute the degree in which the object appears at present agreeable; and accordingly volition will be determined.

I might further observe, the state of mind that views a proposed object of choice is another thing that contributes to the agreeableness or disagreeableness of that object; the particular temper which the mind has by nature, or that has been introduced and established by education, example, custom, or some other means; or the frame, or state, that the mind is in on a particular occasion. That object which appears agreeable to one does not so to another. And the same object does not always appear alike agreeable to the same person at different times. It is most agreeable to some men to follow their reason; and to others, to follow their appetite; to some men it is more agreeable to deny a vicious inclination than to gratify it; others it suits best to gratify the vilest appetites. It is more disagreeable to some men than to others to counteract a former

resolution. In these respects, and many others which might be mentioned, different things will be most agreeable to different persons; and not only so, but to the same persons at different times.

But possibly it is needless and improper to mention the frame and state of the mind as a distinct ground of the agreeableness of objects from the other two mentioned before; viz., the apparent nature and circumstances of the objects viewed, and the manner of the view; perhaps, if we strictly consider the matter, the different temper and state of the mind makes no alteration as to the agreeableness of objects any other way than as it makes the objects themselves appear differently beautiful or deformed, having apparent pleasure or pain attending them; and, as it occasions the manner of the view to be different, causes the idea of beauty or deformity, pleasure or uneasiness, to be more or less lively.

However, I think so much is certain, that volition, in no one instance that can be mentioned, is otherwise than the greatest apparent good is, in the manner which has been explained. The choice of the mind never departs from that which at that time, and with respect to the direct and immediate objects of that decision of the mind, appears most agreeable and pleasing, all things considered. If the immediate objects of the will are a man's own actions, then those actions which appear most agreeable to him he wills. If it be now most agreeable to him, all things considered, to walk, then he wills to walk. If it be now, upon the whole of what at present appears to him, most agreeable to speak, then he chooses to speak; if it suits him best to keep silence, then he chooses to keep silence. There is scarcely a plainer and more universal dictate of the sense and experience of mankind than that, when men act voluntarily, and do what they please, then they do what suits them best, or what is most agreeable to them. To say that they do what they please, or what pleases them, but yet do not do what is agreeable to them, is the same thing as to say they do what they please, but do not act their pleasure; and that is to say that they do what they please, and yet do not do what they please.

It appears from these things that, in some sense, the will always follows the last dictate of the understanding. But then the understanding must be taken in a large sense, as including the whole faculty of percep tion, or apprehension, and not merely what is called reason, or judgment. If by the dictate of understanding is meant what reason declares to be best or most for the person's happiness, taking in the whole of his duration, it is not true that the will always follows the last dictate of the understanding. Such a dictate of reason is quite a different matter

from things appearing now most agreeable; all things being put together which pertain to the mind's present perception, apprehensions, or ideas, in any respect. Although that dictate of reason, when it takes place, is one thing that is put into the scales, and is to be considered as a thing that has concern in the compound influence which moves and induces the will, and is one thing that is to be considered in estimating the degree of that appearance of good which the will always follows; either as having its influence added to other things, or subducted from them. When it concurs with other things, then its weight is added to them, as put into the same scale; but when it is against them, it is as a weight in the opposite scale, where it resists the influence of other things: yet its resistance is often overcome by their greater weight, and so the act of the will is determined in opposition to it.

The things which I have said may, I hope, serve in some measure to illustrate and confirm the position I laid down in the beginning of this section; viz., that the will is always determined by the strongest motive, or by that view of the mind which has the greatest degree of previous tendency to excite volition. But, whether I have been so happy as rightly to explain the thing wherein consists the strength of motives, or not, yet my failing in this will not overthrow the position itself; which carries much of its own evidence with it, and is the thing of chief importance to the purpose of the ensuing discourse; and the truth of it, I hope, will appear with great clearness, before I have finished what I have to say on the subject of human liberty.

From Franklin's Autobiography.

And now I set on foot my first project of a public nature, that for a subscription library. I drew up the proposals, got them put into form by our great scrivener, Brockden, and, by the help of my friends in the Junto, procured fifty subscribers of forty shillings each to begin with, and ten shillings a year for fifty years, the term our company was to continue. We afterwards obtained a charter, the company being increased to one hundred; this was the mother of all the North American

subscription libraries, now so numerous. It is become a great thing itself, and continually goes on increasing. These libraries have improved the general conversation of the Americans, made the common tradesmen and farmers as intelligent as most gentlemen from other countries, and perhaps have contributed in some degree to the stand so generally made throughout the colonies in defence of their privileges. At the time I established myself in Pennsylvania, there was not a good bookseller's shop in any of the colonies to the southward of Boston.