wars should be few indeed;-never, except in a case of terrible necessity. They intended they should be lawful wars, in due form—the justa bella of Grotius. There must be a denunciatio belli. This is one of the restraints imposed, and intended by the constitution, as a check, against the sudden or frequent breaking out of this pestilence of the human race. Sir, I cannot for a moment hesitate to believe | it will be war in fact-so deemed by Spain and her allies so deemed by the people of the United States-it is, at least, the contemplated, apprehended, inevitable consequence of our act. Why not, then, declare it directly, unequivocally, and without evasion? The rule of common law, is, in this respect, the rule of common sense, and of universal equity. What Sir, if you pass this law, to take possession you ought not to do directly, you ought not to of the colony of a foreign, friendly, European do indirectly. Intending war, at least calcula-power, you make no previous declaration of ting that the inevitable consequence of your war. But by the concession of all, it is war. proceedings will be war, why do we not frankly, It is absurd to say, you can shatter my arm, manfully, magnanimously declare it? Let the and cut off my limbs, and pretend it is not war people of this country understand it. Let us upon my person. To say nothing of the unhave an open war for an avowed object. Why fairness and injustice of this course, towards should we shroud our intention in dastardly the foreign nation who has thus no chance of ambiguity? This evasive course, this doing a making you voluntary reparation for real or thing "per obliquum, per fraudem," is what our imaginary wrong, what is your conduct towards constitution, springing as it does from our re- your own citizens? what is their miserable, publican habits, from our inborn love of justice, because uncertain condition? Would it be from our moral aversion to conquest, and our treason, to-morrow, for American citizens to physical inaptitude for it, from our love of give information to the Government of St. peace, from our well-founded apprehensions that Augustine, to supply their settlement with arms our extent of territory is already dangerously and provisions? Would it be treason to supply excessive; this evasive course, this obliquity the European mother country with grain? Sir, of conduct, is what our constitution, influenced there are no means of a nation carrying into by these considerations-prohibits, deprecates, effect an extra-territorial law, against a foreign and disdains. resisting nation, but by force, but by war. Though I am afraid, sir, this argument, in Ought you not to apprise your own citizens? reference to the constitutionality of our course, are they to be endangered and entrapped? If according to the fashion of the day, will be they can supply without treason, they certainly deemed a point of little consequence, yet, sir, I can without misdemeanor. For this act is deem it proper to suggest and enforce it. By included in the definition of treason, and all our constitution there can be no merely con- mere misdemeanors are merged. The people structive declaration of an offensive war. It of St. Augustine become your enemies;-can must be a direct one. As a Legislature, we you carry them succor? will you venture to have the power, not of making war, but of de- indict for treason those who supply them? or claring war. Congress shall have power to will you, most inconsistently and absurdly, "declare war." This clause, so worded, most permit your own citizens to counteract your evidently settles the old litigated question raised purpose, and frustrate your object? Will you by many writers on the law of nations, viz., place yourselves in the undignified, embarrassWhether a declaration should not always pre- ing attitude, of seeing them violate your laws, cede an offensive war? We are to declare it, to and yet be dispunishable? announce it in plain terms to our people, and to the enemy. It is intended we should refer them to a plain declaration of the change of our condition, not draw them into it by an act circuitously leading to this result, and involving this as an inevitable consequence. In interpreting our constitution, when it refers to the topics treated of, and the terms used in the law of nations, our construction ought to be in conformity to the law of nations; as much as when it adopts the principles and terms of the common law, we must refer to them, by them elicit its meaning, and modify its construction. War has a technical meaning in the law of nations. To declare war, is a precise, technical, appropriate, unambiguous, undeceiving phrase. It is the peculiar idiom of a just and wise nation. The declaration, with us, must always precede the act;-of course, I refer to offensive war:-defensive war explains and declares itself. The framers of our constitution intended that our offensive Sir, there is something in this proceeding at which the genius of our constitution revolts; it violates all our fundamental maxims of international intercourse and constitutional construction; it inverts all our theories, it overthrows all our precedents. What, sir, are the justificatory causes of this war, as understood by General Pinckney?—not that he approves them; he seems anxious to explain to the government, that he acts as a soldier in obedience to commands-he accepts with reluctance his compound character, half military, half diplomatic, and industriously collects apologies for the act he is compelled to execute, from his correspondence with the gov ernment. He enumerates six distinct grounds, on which he understands he is to justify his occupation of the Province of East Florida. 1st. Indemnity for the spoliations committed by Spain. 2d. Refusal to grant an amnesty to the Spanish revolutionary patriots. 3d. The pretendedly illegal attack upon the troops at 4th. Excite- | dividuals, in consequence of her own spoliations on our commerce. Moosa, during the negotiation. The first general ground, indemnity for the past, consists in an assertion that injuries have been committed against us by Spain, and that reparation has been and is refused. The second general ground, resolves itself into necessity. This but too frequently is the tyrant's plea, but in the present case it is asserted to be an honest necessity, justifying on military maxims this measure as the dictate of self-defence. That Spain, unregenerated, unrevolutionized, ancient Spain, as the ally of France and as instigated by France, committed unwarrantable spoliations on our commerce, is true; but that she has ever denied reparation and indemnity, I conceive that every step taken in the various negotiations with her will disprove. It can hardly be expected that I shall enter into a minute and elaborate discussion of these negotiations-the mere perusal of documents, published and unpublished, would occupy more of the precious time of the Senate than I feel myself authorized to consume. But, sir, I have felt it my incumbent duty to peruse these documents -to consider them with all the attention the importance of the subject demanded, and I have perused them with that eagerness of curiosity and that spirit of impartial inquiry which a young and unhacknied politician-who avows himself free from prejudices and prepossessions, in common liberality I hope may be presumed to feel. Sir, the honest and sincere conviction of my mind is, that Spain is not only guiltless of unwillingness of reparation, and of reluctance to indemnity, but that with such guilt our government never charged her, until circumstances rendered it as difficult for Spain to consummate reparation as it was unfair and improper for our government to urge, or to expect it. A nation as well as an individual has claims upon our compassion and humanity. By the treaty of 1795, concluded by General Thomas Pinckney, our merchants received not only adequate indemnity, but even a lucrative compensation for their losses. In opening the negotiation of 1802, Mr. Charles Pinckney refers to this fact, and eulogizes in a style of more than ordinary diplomatic courtesy, the integrity, the good faith, and the magnanimity of the Spanish government. Spain had become strictly allied to France, and through the pusillanimity, perhaps corruption, of the favorite, the Prince of Peace, had also become meanly subordinate to her designs, a partaker in her crimes and follies, though not in her spoils. She was at once the dupe of her councils and the prey of her rapacity. At the instigation of France she depredated upon our commerce. She grounded her proceedings upon French decrees. But these were wrongs, as I have before said, unintentionally committed, and which she was solicitous to repair. But few difficulties, and no great delay occurred in the settlement of the convention of 11th August, 1802. The principal difficulty arose from the attempt on the part of our negotiators, to have included in the treaty, compensation as well for Spanish wrongs as for those inflicted by France in Spanish territories. This was resisted-certainly with some show of reason and equity on the part of Spain. But Count Cevallos, the Spanish Minister, offered to include even these, in a certain way. That is, he was willing that the general question, how far Spain ought to be liable for French aggressions in her territories, on American property, should be left to the commissioners, who were to be appointed, according to an article of the convention. He was willing to leave it on the grounds of equity and justice, and the circumstances of the case, for them to determine. A proposition, in a transaction of this nature, certainly importing uncommon fairness and integrity; especially when we consider that the commissioners were to be mutually appointed-Mr. Pinckney, either from error of judgment or the strictness of his instructions, rejected this proposition, and insisted on and obtained an article holding in reserve and unextinguished our claims for French depredations, as matter for future negotiation. This convention, as has been explained by the honorable gentleman from Vermont, rested for a length of time, session after session, before the Senate. It was at length ultimately approved, and ratified here. Before, however, it was returned to Spain, the transfer of Louisiana by France to the United States took place-an event which was, as Mr. Jefferson informs us, as unexpected as disagreeable to Spain-an act which she bitterly regretted, against which she sol Ungenerous indeed must be his nature, who would press even his legal claim with the same stubborn and indiscriminate pertinacity against an individual struggling with adversity, and oppressed by misfortunes, as against one who was thriving and prosperous, and who resisted justice from the pride of power, and the arrogance of wealth. But, sir, I will not rest this point upon an appeal to our generosity, estimable as that feeling is, and prevalent as it is in this na-emnly but unavailingly protested. But our tion and this assembly. The facts,-evidence, justice bear me out in the assertion, that Spain has not refused, does not refuse compensation; a fair reparation for all losses sustained by in convention with France in respect to Louisiana, including as that did a settlement of all our claims for all French spoliations and depredations. had now materially and rightfully chang ed our relative situation with Spain. She no longer assented to that clause of the treaty, which kept alive against her, claims for French spoliations. As has been explained by the honorable gentleman from Vermont, she denied our right to a double satisfaction for the same injuries; a double payment of the same debt. She contended she was virtually released; and in this she was supported by the express declaration of France, and by the opinion of the most celebrated lawyers and civilians of this country-some of them officers of the government. But she never refused compensation for her own spoliations. Fruitless negotiations on this and other topics still continued. And by the message of Mr. Jefferson, in 1808, we are informed, that "The important negotiation with Spain, which had been alternately suspended and resumed, necessarily experiences a pause, under the extraordinary and interesting crisis, which distinguishes her internal situation." pledge of that good-will towards us, which a newly emancipated people felt towards one happily already free and independent. What was the further effect, when the government was in some degree settled, and had leisure to attend to its foreign concerns? a mission to this country, in the person of Chevalier Onis Why, sir, is there this dexterous evasion, this strenuous effort on the part of the Administration, to keep from the sight of the people, from the sight of the Senate, a co-ordinate branch of the treaty-making power, the correspondence of Don Onis, or rather his attempts at correspondence. Why cannot this nation be authentically informed of the fact, whether he made a formal and express offer, to place in the hands of our government in advance, a sum in specie sufficient to satisfy all the claims for captures, and for injuries sustained, through the withholding the permission of deposit at New Orleans. That he likewise offered to adjust the subject That crisis has not yet subsided. This, sir, of the boundaries of Louisiana, in a manner satis a very concise, and I hope not uncandid his-isfactory to ourselves? That he offered subtory of our negotiation with Spain. I refer stantially to do all this, I am convinced. It has with confidence to the documents. They are been published in Spain, under the eye of the in the hands of gentlemen, who can detect any Cortes; it has been published, over and over involuntary error. If I have committed one, I again, in this country. It has never been conassure them it is involuntary. I said, sir, that tradicted. It has been made the ground of the interesting and extraordinary crisis, to ministerial assertion in England, to evince the which Mr. Jefferson referred, as distinguishing nature of French influence in the United States; the internal situation of Spain, had not subsid- it has been made the ground of reasoning, in ed. What was that crisis? A mighty effort the discussion of the French Moniteurs, to by the great mass of the people abandoned by evince to the Spaniards, how much safer they their king, deserted by their nobles, rising up were under French protection than that of the in their might to expel a foreign invader and patriots. France, say they, protected you usurper, from their dear native soil. Examine against the arrogant and enormous claims of the history of all previous revolutions--that those trans-Atlantic, shop-keeping democrats. which expelled Austria from Switzerland, Spain She gave you the means of restraining their from Holland, the Stuarts from England, and rapacity, or participating in their ill-got profits. England from this country, and you will dis- She was a guarantee to you against their ambicover none of them to be the effect of a more tious intentions, hostile to your valuable but genuine deep-felt popular emotion, than the unprotected colonies. But your patriotic govrevolution achieved by the patriots of Spain. ernment yields to these insolent demands, and Yes, sir, that people are engaged in a war of seems to favor their projects. It offers them defence of their native soil, their firesides, their the treasures, of which you are in want. It altars, against a foreign invader;-in a war of opens the protective barriers of your colonies, that kind, that does and ought to excite the and endangers the mines of Mexico-the source most sensitive interest, the most affectionate | of your opulence, and the basis of your national sympathy, in the bosoms of a free people, grandeur. especially of a people themselves but recently independent, and who had to fight for their Independence. Strange indeed it is, that the wars of Greece against Persia should retain an unfading interest in our memories, and excite, even at this day, sublime and pious emotions; and that the wars of the Spanish patriots should be forgotten. Strange indeed, that we remember Marathon, and forget Saragossa. Sir, we have served a notice on the President, to produce the correspondence, to detail the verbal offers of Don Onis-not being produced, we have a right to state what we justly suppose to be their substance. Our divinations, conjectures, if they be conjectures, can be put down at once; falsified by the production of the papers-but by nothing else. This again, sir, is a rule of common law, and common sense. Sir, what was the first effect of this revolu- Circumstances, the absence of all contrary proof tion in Spain, in regard to this country?-a-the cautious forbearance of all denial-the restoration, in mass, of all the vessels and property belonging to American citizens. An order, to their Court of Prizes, to act no more on the French decrees. An observance of all the articles of the treaty with us. This they did voluntarily, as an act of justice, and as a non-production of papers, when called for by friends, the gratuitous assumption of limiting the intentions of the Senate, in their call of papers, to those which had occurred since the last session; all this tends convincingly to prove, that this offer of indemnity, on the part of the Spanish government, has been made, and has | been rejected. nay, you would absolutely reject it. But if you carve out your own remedy-convert into How stands the case, then, on the foot of possession and enjoyment, your deposit-your indemnity?—not a refusal on the part of Spain, pledge-consummate your right of lien by own to make adequate and liberal indemnity; but a ership-select your means and chance of inrefusal on our part, to accept it. Sir, the mass demnity-estreat your bond with all its amount of papers produced, bulky as they are, is more of penalties-you have all that in law, justice remarkable for its deficiency, than its contents. or equity you can demand. The question is There is something, not produced, which if it closed-you have no action open on your cove were produced, would be fatal, on the head of pants or assumpsits. But, sir, to whom is indemnity. There are various other topics of Florida, with its wide waste of sands-its disargument, which might be urged against this mal swamps-its mixed, mongrel population, strong ground of pretended indemnity. If you transferred? To the actual sufferers by Spanare injured, and deem yourself entitled to in- ish and French spoliations?-to the individual demnity, ought you not previously to demand sufferers in the cities of Charleston, Baltimore, it? Even the British demanded the Danish fleet, Philadelphia, New York, Boston, Salem, Proviand it was refused, before they seized it. Has dence, and Newport? No, sir; it is transferred the honorable chairman of the committee forgot-nominally to the United States, who takes it in ten his own able and successful arguments, and her corporate capacity as Trustee for the State those of his friends, on this point, in this Senate, of Georgia. She will have the greatest, if not on Mr. Ross's resolutions in 1803? A positive the sole beneficiary interest; as for the claims injury was inflicted, a perfect and essential of the merchants, they will still be uncompensaright, secured, and consecrated by treaty, was ted; Spain or France, or the United States, will denied you; but, then, the honorable gentleman, still stand debited in their ledgers. Sir, I with his usual ability-supported by his amiable know a house in the town of Providence, who friend De Witt Clinton, manfully, triumphantly are interested in this claim to the amount of stemmed the torrent of the redundant-I will $200,000. I know of another in the city of not say overbearing eloquence of Ross and New York interested to double this amount: Gouverneur Morris-explained to the nation and whose right and chance of compensation, the duty, the necessity, the justice, of previous under the Convention of August, 1802, were negotiation, and preserved this young and pros- admitted and ascertained. perous nation from a premature and unnecessary conflict. What was correct, judicious, and moral then, I humbly apprehend will be so now. But, sir, upon the mere principles of indemnity -conceding that you had a right to take it-it would not, in any sense of the term, be one. It is inadequate, if obtained; even if it cost nothing to obtain it. Waving the consideration of the amount of spoliations, it will cost more to recover the thing sued for than it is worth. It is no indemnity to the actual sufferers by Spanish spoliations, and this act is accompanied by no pledge of the national faith, that they shall be individually compensated from this fund for their losses, while their losses are made the only ground or pretext of this proceeding. Even, sir, at the risk of being tedious and uninteresting, I must concisely examine each of these points. Will it be pretended that Florida is worth the whole claim of our government against Spain? We must take gentlemen on their own principles, and calculate the amount set down by our government, including Spanish spoliations French spoliations in Spanish territories and the injuries sustained by the prohibition of the right of deposit at New Orleans. The first item amounts to three, the second to two millions-the last may be stated at one, making six millions principal-with the interest for ten years constituting an aggregate of about ten millions of dollars. And would you as a matter of purchase, give a fourth of this sum for Florida, if you could have quiet possession of it to-morrow? No sir, you would wisely hesitate Sir, I would as soon shake at them the sand of an hour-glass-as measure out to them the sands of Florida as a compensation, even if you meant to give them that which you do not intend. It would indeed be a memento mori of their claim. If this transaction is bottomed upon a pure and comprehensive equity, why is it not accompanied with a pledge of the faith of the United States to compensate the individual sufferers? Are they to be left to their legal remedies, against sovereigns not suable? Is one part of the Union to convert to their own exclusive benefit the misfortunes of the other part? Are the planters of the South, (against whom I certainly have no prejudices,) to thrive and prosper upon the losses of the merchants of the North? Are they, who have paid no consideration, to hold and enjoy this estate? I put this plain matter to the understandings and consciences of gentlemen, on both sides of the House. It is not a matter of party politics. I do not, on the ground of party, oppose this measure. But, sir, I must hurry on to consider what this indemnity will cost you; what will be the expenses of this suit, to reduce to possession this pledge. What will you have to pay for the instru ment, by which you are to carve out your own remedy? Will it not cost much more than you will actually obtain? What is this project as de scribed by Gen. Pinckney? To reducethe fortress of St. Augustine-to occupy East Florida. What force will this require? Omitting the walled towns of Flanders, and Quebec, and Gibraltar, St. Augustine is the strongest place, by nature and art, in the world. Attend to the descrip- | romantic theories of the law of nations, and tion of it in the papers produced. Recollect especially of our profound system of controlling the failure of General Oglethorpe, in the year warlike and ambitious States, by the precepts '39, and the discomfiture (I will not say dis- of justice, philosophy, and philanthropy; it is a grace) that then on this account was attached lash of satire, that cuts to pieces all the pretty, to the arms of Great Britain and her colonies. flowery phrases of Mr. Jefferson, and shivers, To give a probability of success to this mea- into a thousand shreds, the sturdy dissertations sure, 4,000 regular troops, an immense train of of Mr. Madison. This country was but lately battering artillery, all the volunteer force that deemed the last retreat and sanctuary of the Tennessee, South Carolina, and Georgia are good old-fashioned law of nations; we affected able to supply, will be necessary, besides a to reverence that law, and the virtues on which large maritime force of gunboats, brigs, &c. it was founded; and we acknowledged and con-Ten thousand men, in different ways, must gratulated ourselves upon the benefits which be employed in this expedition, and its connected were its result. On this account we have been and associated objects of the subjugation of the comparatively happy at home, and applauded Seminoles, the Creeks and other Indian nations. and admired abroad. This national habit and Even if you are successful, you will lose one- disposition, has been worth to us fleets and half of your troops by battle, or by sickness. armies; and, combined with ordinary foresight, You will not be able to commence the siege with strict impartiality, and a continuance of until April; and in June the climate would the Washingtonian policy, of preparing in peace oblige you to abandon it. The troops must come for war, would still avail us, as our cheap and from the upland country of the adjoining efficient defence. States. Sir, it is a medical fact, that they, no more than the men of an extreme northern climate, can endure the intense heat, the pestilential vapors, and the clouds of musquitoes that darken and pollute the swamps and sands of Florida. If you are successful, it will be by the destruction of 5,000 lives, and by the expenditure of five millions of dollars. Is your object worth this price? If you gain it, you obtain nothing: for that nothing you pay in a vast effusion of blood and treasure. The northern and middle States, those to whom you pretend indemnity, obtain none. They bear their full, their over proportion in the expenses of this new war, and obtain no compensation at last. I must dismiss this point of indemnity, not because it is exhausted, but because I feel myself trespassing on your patience. The second general justificatory ground on which this measure is defended, is that of necessity. The apprehension of the use that may be made of the country by our enemy, or, in the words of the honorable gentleman from Georgia, a military measure of self-defence. Sir, I do not mean to undervalue this plea. There are palpable occasions, and desperate emergencies, in which it may rightfully be urged. "Salus populi suprema lex." I will not say, that if the danger is instant and imminent, that an enemy can and will seize a point of annoyance that we ought not to anticipate his design; but I do say that if the danger apprehended be inconsiderable, remote, and contingent, and especially if it be but too apparently matter of artificial contrivance, proceeding from your own wrong, attended with circumstances of suspicion, that it never can warrant so atrocious an act as that of seizing on the territory of a friendly neutral power. Gentlemen must all allow, that it is an act exhibiting a most signal exception to the general pacific policy, the cautious forbearance-the solicitous neutrality of this country. It is, at once, an overthrow of all our sublime and Sir, what is the point on which this plea of necessity now rests? What is the danger apprehended? The occupation of Florida by England. But it is three years since you have had or feigned this fear; this is the third time you have called us to drive out the wolves from among the sheep. But the English, restrained by their treaty of alliance which guarantees the integrity of the Spanish empire, have shown no inclination to go there, and, while your present law remains, never will. They know of course, as well as you do, the contingency upon which, by the law of 1810, you have placed your right or intention of occupying East Florida. It would be an act as impolitic in itself, as treacherous to their allies, to create that very contingency which is to be the apology of your operations, and the occasion of immense mischief to their friends. They benefit their friends by forbearance, they embarrass you, they suspend you in a ridiculous attitude, panting with the eagerness of desire, and the pressure of prohibition. They have made no attempt to seize East Florida, they will make none. But if by the adoption of the act now under consideration, you alter your present policy, and, fatigued with waiting for English aggression and despising the contingent remainder, you grasp at a present absolute estate, their system both of policy in regard to themselves, and of good will to their allies, of course must change. The moment you raise your entrenchments against St. Augustine, the English will succor it, and defeat your enterprise. You have drawn attention to your project, you have served them with a notice. Withdraw your troops from East Florida, where they have been now for two years-abandon this undertaking, and you are secure from English interference or Spanish aggression. Let them alone, and they will let you alone. It appears to me clearly that the adoption of this bill accelerates and renders certain the very event which you have reason to dread. Then, sir, the ground of ne |