five; absent by authority, thirty-four thousand four hundred and seventy-two; without authority, three thousand seven hundred and seventy-eight; present and absent, one hundred and forty-four thousand four hundred and seven. The number of officers and men present sick is sixteen thousand six hundred and nineteen. The medical director will fully explain the causes of this amount of sickness, which I hope will begin to decrease shortly. Thus the number of men really absent is thirty-eight thousand two hundred and fifty. Unquestionably, of the number present some are absent-say forty thousand will cover the absentees. Quite agree with you that more than one-half of these men are probably fit for duty to-day. I have frequently called the attention lately of the War Department to this evil of absenteeism. I think that the exciting of the public press to persistent attack upon officers and soldiers absent from the army, the employment of deputy marshals to arrest and send back deserters, summary dismissal of officers whose names are reported for being absent without leave, and the publication of their names, will exhaust the remedies applicable by the War Department. It is to be remembered that many of those absent by authority are those who have got off either sick or wounded, or under pretence of sickness or wounds, and having originally pretext of authority, are still reported absent by authority. If I could receive back the absentees, and could get my sick men up, I would need but small re-enforcements to enable me to take Richmond. After the battles of Williamsburg, Fair Oaks, &c., most of these men got off; well men got on board hospital boats, taking care of sick, &c. There is always confusion and haste in shipping and taking care of wounded after a battle; there is no time for nice examination of permits to pass here or there. I can now control people getting away better, for the natural opportunities are better. Leakages by desertion occur in every army, and will occur here, of course; but I do not at all, however, anticipate anything like a recurrence of what has taken place. GEO. B. MCCLELLAN,

His Excellency A. LINCOLN,

President of the United States.

Major General.

The number of men composing the army of the Potomac on the 20th day of

July, 1862.

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFfice,

Washington, D. C., December 31, 1862.

It is hereby certified that the preceding statement is accurately compiled from the morning report of the army of the Potomac of the 20th day of July, 1862,

Grand aggregate

signed by Major General McClellan and his assistant adjutant general, Seth Williams, and now on file in this office.

E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant General.

Statement of the re-enforcements sent to General McClellan after his disembarkation upon the Peninsula prior to the 15th day of June, 1862.

* Taken from the last return before the 31st of May, 1862.

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, Washington, D. C., December 31, 1862.

It is hereby certified that the preceding statement is accurately compiled from reports of Major General McClellan, General Wool, and General Dix, which are on file in this office.

E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant General.

Statement of the comparative strength of the army of the Potomac on the 1st day of April, 1862, and the 20th day of June, 1862.

ADJUTANT GEneral's Office,

Washington, D. C., December 31, 1862.

It is hereby certified that the preceding statement is accurately compiled from the morning report of the army of the Potomac of the 1st day of April and the 20th day of June, 1862, signed by Major General McClellan and his assistant adjutant general, Seth Williams, and now on file in this office.

E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant General.

WASHINGTON, February 17, 1863.

General SAMUEL P. HeintzelMAN sworn and examined.

By the chairman:

Question. What is your present position in the army?

Answer. I am a major general of volunteers; at present in command of the department of Washington, which includes the defences of Washington.

Question. Will you give the committee a brief history of the campaign of the Peninsula from the time you left Alexandria until you embarked from Harrison's Landing?

Answer. After the army of the Potomac was divided into army corps I gave up the command of my division to General C. S. Hamilton. He not having arrived, I myself superintended the embarkation of that division. It left Alexandria on the 17th of March, and those were the first troops that embarked. General Fitz-John Porter's division of my corps left on the 22d of March, and I left at the same time. We arrived at Fort Monroe on the 23d of March, and there we went into camp. I had orders to encamp as near Fort Monroe as possible, so as not to give the enemy any idea of the direction in which we were going to move-whether towards Yorktown or towards Norfolk. On the 25th of March General Smith's division of General Keyes's corps arrived, and was soon followed by others. On the 27th of March a portion of General Fitz-John Porter's and General Smith's divisions made a reconnoissance as far as Big Bethel, and out on Watts's creek. They found very few of the enemy at Big Bethel, and returned the same day, without leaving anybody there. I reported this to General McClellan, and got a telegram in reply that he hoped I had not done anything to disclose his plans to the enemy. I knew he did not want any advance made, and for that reason I withdrew all the troops the same day. We did not remain more than two or three hours. Though we sent a reconnoissance very near to the Half-way House, we saw only some 400 of the enemy's cavalry and some few artillery. On the 2d of April General McClellan and his staff arrived. I was sent for, and went on board the steamer and had some conversation with him, and an advance was then determined upon. On the 4th of April we moved forward on the direct road to Yorktown. General Porter's and General Hamilton's divisions took that road. General Keyes's corps went to the left, up towards the York river. We met with some trifling resistance at Howard's Branch, I think they call it, and early the next day we were in front of Yorktown.

Question. What amount of force had we there at the time we moved upon Yorktown?

Answer. I do not know that I could tell you. I had two divisions and General Keyes had two divisions, making about 40,000 men. I do not now recollect whether there were any more or not.

Question. What was the amount of the whole army we had then landed upon the Peninsula, as you understood it?

Answer. I never knew.

Question. What was the amount of the enemy's force at Yorktown, as near as you could estimate it?

Answer. A few days after I got to Fort Monroe I got information, which I considered reliable, that General Magruder had about 7,500 men on the Peninsula. That included the garrison at Yorktown and the line of defences across to Warwick river, and at Williamsburg; at all events, not to exceed 10,000 men. That was the highest estimate.

Question. What was the strength of the enemy's position at Yorktown? Answer. I never knew the strength of the garrison at Yorktown. But I think if I had been permitted, when I first landed on the Peninsula, to advance,

I could have isolated the troops in Yorktown, and the place would have fallen in a few days; but my orders were very stringent not to make any demonstration, and I expected General McClellan every day, so I waited. I thought from the tenor of his telegram that he was not pleased with my moving as far as Big Bethel, although I remained there only two or three hours. He wanted it left uncertain whether the army intended to move on Norfolk or on Yorktown, on their way to Richmond.

Question. How long was your army before Yorktown before the enemy left? Answer. We got there on the 5th of April, I think; and the rebels left on the morning of the 4th of May. It was whilst I was before Yorktown that the third division of my corps, under General Hooker, arrived. I had three divisions in my corps: Hamilton's, Porter's, and Hooker's. During the siege of Yorktown, Hamilton was relieved from the command of his division and General Kearny placed in command.

Question. What was the plan of that campaign, as you understood it; and why was it detained before Yorktown so long?

Answer. The general got the idea that the place had to be besieged, and that delayed us from day to day until it ran out to a month. I supposed when I first got there that we could force the enemy's lines at about Wynn's Mills, isolate Yorktown, so as to prevent the enemy from re-enforcing it, when it would have fallen in the course of a little while.

But if

Question. We had the command of the water there, had we not? Answer. In a measure we had. The gunboats were not very active. we had isolated Yorktown, the gunboats could have run by the fort. Question. If there was only about 7,000 men in Yorktown, and large an army, what military objection was there to isolating the place and attacking further up the Peninsula ?

you

had so

Answer. By the time we got to Yorktown, their army had been largely re-enforced there, though nothing like as fast as ours.

Question. What was the estimated strength of our army there?

Answer. I never heard. I was always of the opinion that we could have forced their lines; and from information I got at the Adams House, about two miles from Williamsburg, the day before the battle there, I was satisfied we could have done so. We were willing to try it with a single brigade. General Hamilton made the application, and I forwarded it to the commanding general. Question. You were not permitted to do it?

Answer. No, sir; it was not done.

Question. What reasons were given?

Answer. I do not think there was any reply. I do not recollect distinctly, but I am pretty sure there was no reply. I knew nothing of what was proposed to be done. I knew no more about it than any other officer in the army. The siege of Yorktown commenced before I knew anything of it. I merely judged so from the orders that were issued.

Question. Will you proceed and state about the siege of Yorktown?

Answer. When we first sat down in front of Yorktown we got a little too near, and we fell back a little way. We were entirely within range of their artillery. They could throw shells all over our camp.

Question. Did you force them to evacuate Yorktown by a cannonade upon their works, or did they leave without your doing that?

Answer. There were a few 100-pounder Parrotts fired for a few days, but we had not commenced the bombardment. It was put off from day to day. The engineers wanted a little more time, and the artillery wanted a little more to make preparations, and in that way it was put off from day to day.

On the afternoon of Saturday, the 3d of May, the enemy threw a great many shells into our camp. Every time the balloon moved they fired at it. They kept up till after midnight a sort of random fire without any apparent object.

I did not go to bed until after midnight. Towards daylight I was waked up by a rattling fire of musketry. I immediately got off and telegraphed to the officer commanding the trenches, and he telegraphed that there was no skirmishing. I went out where I could see their works, and saw a great fire. I ordered the balloon up, and they reported that there was something burning at Yorktown, or on the wharves. As there was no skirmishing, I went to sleep again. About daylight I heard that the enemy were evacuating Yorktown. I went up in the balloon with Professor Lowe. The number of camp fires about Yorktown was very much diminished. We could see no guns, and after a little we saw the skirmishers go into the works. I came down, and supposing, of course, that we would be immediately ordered in pursuit, I at once gave orders for my troops to prepare three days' rations. About nine o'clock I went over to headquarters, and was informed that Stoneman, with the cavalry, was to follow with Hooker's division, and then Kearny's division was to move. But we did not get ffo until after midday.

I stopped about half an hour in Yorktown, and then followed on. I soon heard firing to the front, and got a message that Stoneman had engaged the enemy. I pushed forward, and when I got to the Half-way House between Yorktown and Williamsburg, I found the road filled with troops. Hooker's division was stopped by Smith's division coming across from another road. General Hooker had gone to the front, and I went up to meet him. He told me General Sumner was there, and that there was no getting up that road, but there was another road to the left which he wished to follow. I told him to take it, and to make a demonstration on the enemy to our left.

I rode forward to the Adams House, and there I met General Sumner and some half a dozen other generals. General Sumner ranked me, and I had nothing to do. Brooks's brigade, I think, had come up and had stacked their arms, and the men were resting and getting a little something to eat. I understood that the enemy were to be attacked that afternoon with the bayonet. Our cavalry had been repulsed. One delay after another occurred until it got to be dark. The troops got separated, and did nothing that night.

In the morning it commenced raining. A note was brought from General McClellan for General Sumner. As General Sumner was not to be found, I opened it myself. My previous orders were to take charge of operations in front. This note placed that matter in General Sumner's hands. When he came up I handed the note to him. General Keyes suggested that we hold a conference, which we did. I heard that there was a man there who a few days before wished to go to Williamsburg, and finding the road blocked, went around by another road. I thought if he could go around that way on horseback, the infantry certainly could go, and I suggested that we go around that way and turn the enemy's position. A reconnoissance was made, and it was reported that there were some unfinished works not occupied by the enemy, I proposed that they should be occupied by us at once. The others thought they better wait until the reconnoissance was completed. In a little while they returned, and the order was given to occupy those works. It was then getting on towards 11 o'clock in the forenoon.

The firing on General Hooker's front getting to be pretty heavy, I began to feel uneasy about him, and left to join him. I had to go back some two or three miles and take another road. When I met General Hooker, he told me that he had attacked the enemy about half-past seven o'clock; that they were in considerable force: and that he had sent a note to me by an orderly right across the country, informing me of his position and asking for aid. I had left when the orderly reached there. But one of my staff was there, and he induced General Sumner to read the note. He read it, but did not do anything. When I reached General Hooker, he informed me that the orderly was absent on this duty about twenty minutes. As soon as I learned these facts I wrote another