That is a policy matter, in other words.

Senator DONNELL. Do you not think, General, that the power of determining whether or not the executive departments did have a legal right to bind the Government must be decided and should be appropriately decided by the judicial branch of the Government rather than by the legislative?

Mr. DANIEL. Sir, that would be a matter of opinion, and I see this thing so deeply the other way that if I were in the legislative position, where I have been in a State, I would not agree with the Court on its decision on that matter at all.

Senator DONNELL. At any rate, regardless of whether you would or would not agree with the Supreme Court, the decision of the Court itself is a binding and valid decision, binding upon all the people of the country. That is correct, is it not?

Mr. DANIEL. As to the power of the executive officers who bind the Government by its acquiescence.

Senator DONNELL. That is right.

Mr. DANIEL. It would be binding, except that, of course, the Congress might see fit, and we hope will see fit, to agree with those executive officers on what they interpreted the law to be.

Senator DONNELL. That is to say, Congress could, so to speak, could go back and ratify, nunc pro tunc, you might say, the action of those executive departments.

Mr. DANIEL. Yes, sir. The matter of national policy that you state certainly could well be in accordance with the policy of the executive departments for lo these 150 years.

Senator DONNELL. But the fact is, I take it, that we agree, General, would we not, that the Supreme Court if it has held, and I shall come to that in a moment, that the executive departments were not the power to make the acquiescence and approval, that decision of the Supreme Court is as a matter of law binding and final, is it not?

Mr. DANIEL. Until something else is done, yes, sir; it is.

Senator DONNELL. It is binding and final as to what happened in the past.

Mr. DANIEL. As to what happened in the past; yes, sir.

Senator DONNELL. And you are basing this bill largely on what has happened in the past. Is that correct?

Mr. DANIEL. Yes, sir.

Senator DONNELL. I am wondering if you would turn me loose. I would love to answer your questions further, but there are some Governors that have to leave. I wonder if you would excuse me and let me come back for these questions. I am enjoying it, and I want to be back, but they are here, and I am afraid I am taking up their time.

Senator DONNELL. Very well, General. As in the case of General Johnson, I shall reserve the right for further cross-examination, but I will want to examine you upon quite a number of questions embraced in your testimony.

Mr. DANIEL. I will be here through the whole hearings.

Senator MCCARRAN. Before he leaves, in view of the fact that the Senator from Missiuri has raised the question, do you know whether or not you take issue with the provision of the Constitution, article 14, that there is vested in Congress the power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory of the United States?

Senator DONNELL. Article 4, Senator McCarran.

Senator MCCARRAN. That is right.

Mr. DANIEL. That is right. I don't think there is any doubt about that. The Supreme Court itself said that, Senator.

Senator MCCARRAN. Congress has exclusive rights.

Mr. DANIEL. The Court put it this way. It said the Congress has unlimited powers in that field.

Senator MOORE. I assume that since General Daniels was to give the governors an opportunity, he volunteers to come back for crossexamination by other Senators and they waive their opportunity at this time to ask questions.

Senator MCCARRAN. I would like to have the attorney general of Texas back because Texas is peculiarly involved in this question. More than that, Mr. Chairman, the Atlantic Seaboard States are peculiarly involved in this question because of the very language of the Supreme Court itself and the language of this bill that is before us, which to my mind may require some alteration or amendment

because of that.

Mr. DANIEL. Thank you, gentlemen.

Senator MOORE. Who is your next witness, Mr. Johnson?

Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I would like to present at this time the Governor of the State of Virginia, the Honorable William Tuck.

Senator MOORE. All right, Governor.

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. TUCK, GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF VIRGINIA

Governor TUCK. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I have no statement to make other than to say that I wholeheartedly endorse the resolution adopted by the Governors' Conference at Salt Lake City. The attorney general of Virginia has interested himself in the matter and is very much interested in this subject. Our attorney general recently died and the new attorney general who is now a Member of the Congress, has filed and will appear at a later time before this committee to state the position of the Commonwealth of Virginia on this subject.

We are very desirous of avoiding, insofar as possible, the impact of the Supreme Court's decision on this subject.

I thank you very much for your attention.

Senator DONNELL. May I ask Governor Tuck does he prefer to have discussion of the legal phases presented rather by the attorney general when he comes, so that we would not at this time cross-examine the Governor, or would you prefer to be cross-exmined yourself?

Governor TUCK. I might say this, sir. I have not given any study to the legal phases. I am in the executive part of the government. I was a country lawyer before I came to Richmond. I have always understood that these tidelands belonged to the State. I would much prefer that you leave that discussion to him. I think he is very much more learned in the law, particularly on this subject.

If you have any questions to ask, I shall be glad to answer them if I can.

Senator DONNELL. Governor Tuck, I have great confidence in your judgment. I had the pleasure of knowing you, as you realize, for

years, and I am glad to see you here this morning. If you prefer that the discussion of the legal phases be taken up with the attorney general rather than yourself, of course I shall abide by your suggestion.

Governor TUCK. I think the committee would get very much more benefit out of a discussion of the legal phases of this subject with the attorney general than they would out of me.

However, if you have any questions to ask I will be glad to answer them if I can.

Senator DONNELL. May I ask you, Governor, since you referred to the Governors' Conference resolution adopted at Salt Lake City. Will there be someone here who will present that for our record? Governor TUCK. Yes, sir. I understand there will be.

Senator DONNELL. General Johnson assured me, likewise, that there will be.

Very well, thank you, sir.

Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, at this time I would like to present Gov. Millard Caldwell, of Florida. Governor Caldwell is immediate past president of the Council of State Governments.

During his encumbency in both positions these organizations have considered this question in great detail.

Governor Caldwell will testify for those organizations and in his capacity as Governor of the State of Florida.

STATEMENT OF HON. MILLARD F. CALDWELL, GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

Governor CALDWELL. Mr. Chairman, as you know, the Conference of Governors has a rule which requires that all resolutions be approved by the conference unanimously.

On July 16, 1947, at the conference at Salt Lake City, the conference approved a resolution relating to the tidelands similar in content to the resolution which had previously been approved at Oklahoma City in 1946, at Mackinac Island in 1945, and perhaps at earlier conferences which I did not attend.

The Salt Lake City conference approved this language:

Since the founding of our Nation, the States have exercised sovereignty over the tidelands, the submerged lands, including the soil under navigable inland waters and soils under all navigable waters within their territorial jurisdiction, whether inland or not.

Under the common law and civil law, the States' sovereignty and authority over and title to said lands has been long acknowledged, affirmed, and respected by the Federal Government whose only powers were expressly delegated to it by the States at the time of the formation of our Government.

The States did not delegate unto the Federal Government authority or power over or title to said lands but retained same to and for the States.

The recent decision of the United States Supreme Court, while not deciding the question of ownership of tidewater lands, cast a cloud on the States' title to said lands and the oil and other minerals beneath. The decision of the Supreme Court recognizes that the matter of ownership of tidewater lands is still a question for Congress to decide.

The title to the tidelands and submerged lands of the States is clouded by this decision, and the language therein is so broad as to be extendable to the soil under navigable inland waters and soils under the navigable waters within the territorial jurisdiction of the States, and even to other minerals or important elements on or beneath the soil of the States.

This cloud of uncertainty should be removed by Congress acknowledging and reaffirming ownership to the States.

Therefore, The Governors' Conference hereby resolves that the governors of the respective States unite in proposing and supporting enactment of suitable legislation at the next session of Congress for the purpose of acknowledging and affirming ownership of submerged lands and resources to the respective States in accordance with the heretofore long-recognized constitutional rights of the States.

The Council of State Governments, meeting in Chicago on January 1947, adopted a resolution similar to that which has been approved by the governors at Salt Lake City [reading]:

Whereas on the adoption of the Declaration of Independence, the original States, as successors to the English Crown, became the owners of the tide and submerged lands within their respective borders and such ownership was retained by them on the adoption of the Constitution and never has been relinquished; and

Whereas the States were admitted to the Union on the basis of equality with the original States, possessing and enjoying all the attributes of sovereignty residing in the original States, including the ownership of the tide and submerged lands within their borders; and

Whereas such ownership has long been recognized with the result that the States and their grantees, both public and private, relying thereon, have expended vast sums of money in the development of such lands, including harbor facilities, reclamation, and filling in, and the erection of costly structures; and Whereas legislation declaring such title to be in the States is necessary to clear any possible cloud on titles; and

Whereas appropriate legislation has been introduced declaring the States to be the owners of tide and submerged lands within their respective borders: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the eighth general assembly of the States, That the President and the Congress of the United States are respectfully urged and memorialized to consider and approve Senate Joint Resolution 14 or House Joint Resolution 51 affirming State rights to tide and submerged lands; be it further

Resolved, That the eighth general assembly of the States is directed to transmit copies of this resolution to the President of the United States, to the President pro tempore of the Senate of the United States, to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and to the members of the Judiciary Committee of the Senate and House of Representatives.

The board of managers of the Council of State Governments in January of 1948 in Washington approved a resolution quite like the others:

The eighth general assembly of the States, meeting in Chicago in January of 1947, memoralized Congress to consider and approve a pending measure affirming State ownership of tide and submerged lands.

The Congress subsequently passed a joint resolution acknowledging and reaffirming ownership of such lands by the several States. This action was vetoed by the President on the grounds that a pending case before the Supreme Court of the United States was approaching a decision, and that such advance action by the Congress was, therefore, ill-timed.

The decision of the Supreme Court, somewhat later announced, set forth a "paramount right" on the part of the Federal Government to all the resources in and under the marginal sea. It did not confirm or deny either State or Federal ownership of these lands.

The board of managers of the Council of State Governments again urges that by appropriate legislation the Congress should recognize and confirm State ownership and control of these lands and the resources therein.

The board further directs its executive offices to circularize the Congress with a copy of this resolution.

The board finally requests and directs its executive officers to encourage a favorable consideration of this matter by the Congress and to continue its practice of keeping the States fully advised of the progress made.

Then I would like to submit a statement which has been very carefully documented and which I feel shows in here the need for affirmative action on the part of this Congress.

Of grave import to the people of Florida is the decision by the Supreme Court of the United States in United States v. California (67 Sup. Ct. 1658 (June 23, 1947)).

By superimposing the legal doctrine there applied to the tidelands-the term "tidelands" is employed in more than one sense: As used in the opinion in this case at 1664 it denotes the area between the high-water and low-water marks, probably between mean flood tide and mean ebb tide; in a second, or popular, sense it signifies the area extending from the high-water mark to the limit of the marginal belt of sea claimed; in the last precise sense it relates to the constantly flooded area between the low-water mark and the seaward limit of the marginal belt; this last meaning has been used in the name by which this case is currently mentioned, probably because this is the area transferred by the decision, for all practical purposes, from State to Federal ownership-of California upon the coastal waters of Florida, in an analysis of its possible effect on her sovereignty, on her people, and on her industries, the magnitude and complexity of the consequences, not only for Florida but for other coastal States as well, are readily apparent.

The Attorney General of the United States, in an original suit in equity, sought a decree declaring the rights of the United States to the area "lying seaward of the ordinary low-water mark on the coast. of California and outside of the inland waters of the States, extending seaward three nautical miles and bounded on the north and south, respectively, by the northern and southern boundaries of the State of California"; and enjoining California and all persons claiming under it from continuing to trespass thereon (United States v. California, 67, Sup. Ct. 1658, 1660 (1947)). Although the opinion quotes: the complaint as claiming "lands, minerals, and other things of value underlying the Pacific Ocean," the decision goes a step further, at 1668, and grants to the Federal Government paramount rights in and power over "the three-mile marginal belt” adding that "full dominion over the resources of the soil under that water area, including oil," is "an incident" thereto. The decision, in other words, embraces the ocean and its products, rather than merely the lands and minerals underlying it.

The Court held that California "is not the owner" (id. at 1668) of the marginal area claimed by it, extending three statute miles seaward from the low-water mark on the California coast line. Conversely, however, although this would seem to be an inevitable sequitor,. the decision does not explicity determine the tidelands to be the property of the United States except by the implication to be drawn from these words (ibid.):

the Federal Government rather than the State has paramount rights in and power over that belt (the tidelands area) an incident to which is full dominion over the resources of the soil under that water area, including oil. As a practical matter California and all persons claiming under it are enjoined from continuing to trespass upon the area in question in violation of the rights of the United States.

Wishful thinking has impelled some general expressions among Florida lawyers to the effect that Florida has a claim to her tidelands superior to that denied California. Careful analysis of the opinion and of the history of Florida tidelands, however, fails to reveal dis