would be paradoxical indeed to say, that it was by the resistance, and not the attack, that danger was produced. bills, at present the subject of discussion, were brought forward in a time of peace, merely as a speculative improvement of the constitution, he would not have the least hesitation in rejecting them. He was by no means inclined to depreciate the benefits which resulted to the people from their ancient privilege of assembling, deliberating, and expressing their sentiments on any public measure. He knew that even legislators sometimes stood in need of certain checks and correctives, and that the voice of the people might and had been known to operate as a salutary control. Gentlemen had gone but a very little way, indeed, in argument on the measure, when they showed only that it was a restriction. All government was a restriction laid on, not because it was agreeable, but because it was necessary; so that when gentlemen objected to these bills, that they would operate as a restraint, they only left the question where they found it; for, by a parity of reasoning, they might dispose of all kind of social restriction whatsoever, and argue back to a dissolution of the very elements of government. The sole question was, whether, when a measure, though not good in itself, was productive of good by preventing evil, it should or should not be adopted? No restraint was good in the abstract; yet it sometimes happened (and it was a part of the allotment of humanity), that men were obliged to recur to a lesser evil for prevention of a greater: it was in fact, impossible for a free constitution to escape unhurt from an attack made upon it under colour of its own principles: it must necessarily either fall under the attack, or be injured by that which was applied as its safeguard. Restrictions on monarchical governments were not very sensibly felt; but when any part of a community employed for its destruction a portion of rights and power enjoyed by all, there was great danger; and they would only have to choose between two difficulties, namely, whether they would endure the utmost evil that unresisted, unrestrained power might bring, or lay restrictions on the whole, in order to prevent its ruin by the abuse of a part.

in the kingdom; in his opinion, the grand grievance lay in the conduct of his majesty's ministers. They had given rise to these societies; they had created Jacobins; they had diffused discontent. His sentiments he would not state in his own words, but in those of a distinguished character who had given a just account of the origin of the discontent in the days of Charles 1st. Mr. Lambton then read the following quotation from a speech delivered in the House in 1640 by sir Benjamin Rudyard: "His majesty is wiser than those that have advised him, and therefore he cannot but see and feel their subverting destructive counsels, which speak louder than I can speak of them: for they ring a doleful deadly knell over the whole kingdom. His majesty best knows who they are for us let the matter bolt out the men; their actions discover them. They are men that talk largely of the king's service; have done none but their own, and that's too evident. They speak highly of the king's power, but they have made it a miserable power, that produceth nothing but weakness both to the king and kingdom. They have exhausted the king's revenue to the bottom, and beyond. They have spent vast sums of money wastefully, fruitlessly, and dangerously; so that more money, without other counsels, will be but a swift undoing. They have always peremptorily pursued one ob stinate pernicious course; first, they bring things to an extremity, then they make that extremity of their own making the reason of their next action, seven times worse than the former; and there we are at this instant. They have almost spoiled the best instituted government in the world, for sovereignty in a king, liberty to the subject: the proportionable temper of both which, makes the happiest state for power, for riches, and for duration." Mr. William Grant said, that supposing the assertions made use of by gentlemen on the other side to be well grounded and true; that is to say, supposing it were true, that the measures in agitation trenched, in some degree, on the constitution, it by no means followed, that they ought not, in any possible case, to be adopted. If, in case of an invasion, measures of a similar nature were deemed expedient, it would not be less unreasonable than in the present case to attribute to them the same consequences. It

See Vol. 2, p. 645.

It was one of the conditions of his state here, that man hardly ever had it in his power to make choice between goods;

very seldom indeed to choose between good and evil; but when put into the trying situation of choosing between two evils, it was then that his reason and his fortitude were called forth into exertion, and his choice either depressed or elevated him above the ordinary level of his nature. In the present case, the necessity of choosing was rendered more unpleasant when, by resorting to the remedy which wisdom pointed out, they incurred the danger of offending those who were so very warmly attached to the constitution, as to view every thing that approached it with jealousy, and who, in the fervour of their attachment to that object, would incur the danger of ruin to the whole of it, rather than suffer a temporary encroachment upon a part; still more unpleasant was it rendered, if, as had been observed, pains were taken to misrepresent the intention of those who attempted it. Yet, under those difficulties, would it be right to abstain wholly from the attempt? Should they be deterred, under such circumstances, from the adoption of that which they thought right?

Into this dilemma, which he confessed was an arduous one, the House were led by the principles of certain societies; principles the growth of France, transplanted into British soil, but which, he was sure, never would find their way into that House. Those principles, so far from being congenial, were hostile to the constitution, and ridiculed it as a system of slavery; held that our government was an usurpation of the rights of the people, the administration of it altogether corrupt; and that, if even the legislature should agree to the favourite project of reform, it was an act of usurpation in them to attempt it. Under the influence of those French principles, the British societies, and their numerous adherents, entertained a gloomy and fanatical aversion to every thing English, threw contempt upon our fleets and armies, despised and maligned the courage of Englishmen, and even affected to doubt it. While every thing that bore a resemblance to English became an object of their aversion, even the American constitution, democratic though in fact it was, was reprobated, because it bore some resemblance to that of Great Britain, and had paid too much regard to property, and too much respect to religion. Nay, the present constitution of France itself, inasmuch as it was supposed to bear some faint resemblance

to the British, fell into utter disgrace with them on that account. Thus the societies felt, and thus they expressed themselves while they were let alone; but no sooner did they find parliament were preparing to repress their presumption and mischievous projects by a coercive law, than they turned short round, changed their tone, and flew into the arms of that constitution which but the day preceding they despised, vilified, and denied the existence of; attributing to its perfections more than ever had been found in any human institution, and extolling its principles of liberty to that romantic and extravagant excess, that it contained within itself that freedom which was to be its own destruction. To that situation, Mr. Grant said, the arguments on the other side were reducible, that if they were founded in reason, nothing was to be done which could be attended with the slightest temporary inconvenience. Perhaps, the gentlemen had some secret to impart, some new mode of legislating, by which every good might be attained without its concomitant evil; every advantage gained without some sacrifice; the constitution be preserved from utter ruin, without weakening it in any of its parts; and in the present case, be left as perfect as it was before, after a law suitable to the demands and necessity of the time should be passed. If the gentlemen were possessed of such a secret, it was unknown to him, and the disclosure of such a novelty in legislation could not fail of being satisfactory to the House.

In many great states it had been found necessary to recur to the most unlimited agency, and to yield to a temporary suspension of all the powers and privileges of the people, for great and important purposes. To this extent, however, he hoped, and was sure, England would never have occasion to recur. It was, however, a principle which had never been disputed, that it was fit to surrender a small portion of freedom for a time, in order to save the remainder of the whole. For his part, he would again repeat, that he did not hold out this as a speculative improvement; on the contrary, he was convinced it was, to a certain degree, an evil in itself, and an infringement on the constitution. Theorists in France had first maintained and acted on the proposition, that all power lay in the people, and that the people could not divest themselves of it; but they had at length arrived at such a

in the happy effects of it, than himself; but lenity must depend on circumstances; and though there were very few, there certainly were some cases where it could not possibly produce any good effect; for the House must keep in mind that, in conciliatory measures, there must always be something to concede. In the contest with America, had lenient measures been adopted in time, it would probably have been attended with the most beneficial and happy consequences to the two countries; and it was under that impression that many persons, to whom the country looked up with the greatest veneration, earnestly recommended it. In the difference which we had with Ireland, lenity and forbearance became advisable; as the concession of a free trade, whatever might be the right, was wisely acceded to, in order to preserve the affections of that nation. What, however, did these societies require? Nothing less than the surrender of our religion, our property, and the whole of our constitution. That they demanded the destruction of the constitution was obvious: he did not misrepresent the fact, when he said so. None who professed the principles of Mr. Paine, and held them out for approbation and practice, could think they had any duty relative to the constitution, but to destroy it, as an usurpation, and a system not only inexpedient, but unlawful.

period of political improvement, as to hold, that when once the people had delegated their authority, no part of it remained behind with them; that to assemble for the redress of grievances, was an unlawful reassumption of their power; and that only an individual had a right to petition. Having never followed their theory in the first proposition, he would not in the second; a legislature might, according to his judgment deviate from its original purposes, while meetings of the people had this salutary effect, that whatever inequality there might be in their elective rights, it was amply counterbalanced by their right to meet and to petition. There was no country in the world, he was convinced, in which the direct sense of the people had greater effect or weight than in Great Britain. He would, therefore, never think of proposing to infringe upon that power, even an atom's length, for any purpose less than the preservation of the bulk of that power. Gentlemen, indeed, had said, that we were not reduced to the hopeless necessity of resorting to any such remedy; it was however, found, that the corresponding society affiliating with France, was disseminating seditious principles, and carrying them as far as they could in effect. Was it not, then, their duty to prevent them? Would gentlemen say, that rather than resort to a mode of prevention, trenching in a small degree on the rights of the people, they would leave these societies at liberty to work the ruin of the constitution?

Some gentlemen had said, that there were already laws existing to punish sedition. He was aware there were laws to punish it in solitary individuals; but were there laws suited to the present occasion, when sedition was carried on by thousands upon system? He fancied the laws were inadequate to meet them all by single indictments. If, in conformity with the advice of one gentleman on the other side, prosecutions were set on foot, an hon. friend of his would say, "No: multiplied punishments produce multiplied evils." How, then, were they to act? If the existing laws were to be thrown on the shelf, what then? Why, "conciliate," says another gentleman; and thus they were to be made the sport of various and contradictory opinions. For his part, he hoped he did not arrogate too much to himself, when he said, that no man more admired lenity, or more steadily believed [VOL. XXXII.]

When first French politics were imported into England, the opinion was, that the rights of man were paramount to, and must take place of, all other principles; and that the will of the majority was to decide against the dictates of judgment and understanding; that is to say, that however ignorant, unlettered, and void of intellect the majority might be, an inferior number, composed of men of wisdom, learning, and experience, must yield to them: this was the favourite doctrine; it was rebellion to argue against it, because it was the "will of the people." They soon found, however, that the will of the people was in favour of the constitution. They directly altered their system, chose to forget their principle of the right of majority, and it no longer remained a question of will, but of right; that is to say, certain innate, natural rights, belonging to, inherent, and inseparable from man; namely, universal suffrage and annual parliaments: and if there were only one hundred persons in [2 D]

favour of it, and the rest of the nation against it, it was tyranny in the majority to controvert the right. What conciliation then, he asked, could take place, when there was nothing to concede but their whole demand, the annihilation of the constitution? Let the hon. gentleman who had just sat down, and who proposed conciliatory measures open the negociation; and let him see whether he could compromise for less than universal suffrage and annual parliaments.-Was the House quite prepared, for the purposes of conciliation to disregard the will of the people, and impose on all the rest that mode of government, in order to satisfy the few who demanded it? Supposing this effected, had the hon. gentleman no other difficulties to encounter? They might say that they were willing to let the monarchy alone; but it was not matter of choice with them; for their great oracle, Paine, had laid it down, that hereditary monarchy was not lawful; so that if the suffrage of the whole body of the people was for monarchy, there was no security against the attack of any ten men. Nay, Paine had asserted, that, in that point, they had not only no right to bind posterity, but had no right to bind themselves; for so great was the absurdity of monarchy, that even the sovereignty of the people was not competent to effect or give it force.

The only way, then, to conciliate, was, to leave them to destroy the constitution. Could any man point out specific terms of concession in such a case? Did the states of Germany conciliate with the Anabaptists, who claimed universal dominion on the rights of saints, as this body claimed the government of the country on the principles of the rights of man? No. When the descendants of the saints had recourse to arms, they were subdued by the princes, and had since become as peaceable and submissive subjects, as if they had never dreamed of such absurd and extravagant demands. Gentlemen had said, this was not a case of so much urgency as to stop the freedom of action; they could nevertheless not fail to see their danger. That danger had been characterised in the resolutions of both Houses: the evidence, which grounded them, showed that the conduct of those societies tended to the dissolution of society; and the House had their own (the societies) authority that they were pursuing dangerous plans, not only

He

with industry, but with success. would not enter into a nice investigation of the facts, but say, that circumstances of notoriety concurred to point out the danger. Upon the same foundation the committee adopted, he went. If the surrender to be made was equal to the value gained, the situation was truly deplorable. Gentlemen would see, then, the advantages of interference, before the ripened mischief made the point to be gained more precarious, and the sacrifice greater; they who would wait to let it ripen would, if in France in 1792, say thus, "do not interrupt the Jacobins, let them go on till they do some mischief, and then punish them." And the morning of the 10th of August would be the first effort to rebut their wicked machinations.

He would not, he said, so far impose upon the people, as to say that this measure took nothing from them. He would, on the contrary, say, that it took that which he would not take, if he could avoid it; but it by no means merited the terms used by gentlemen on the other side, that it was a surrender of the constitution, and left nothing worth enjoyment; that was a gross mistake. The right to petition was not a part of the constitution; it was nothing in itself, but only a means to obtain an end; an instrument to operate on the legislature. It was surely better to give it up alone, than to give up both it and the constitution together; if the constitution went, it would be folly to suppose the right to petition would remain. Were all the benefits of the constitution lapped up in this one right? No! Estimate it as highly as gentlemen could, it was nothing when put in competition with liberty and constitutional happiness. Let the loss of the constitution and its guard be compared with the loss of the guard alone, and then let them determine on their choice. If he over-rated the danger, gentlemen who thought so should state their estimate of it; that, however, they studiously avoided; and whenever the subject naturally led to that point, they flew off from it to incidental topics. Not one gentleman on the other side had given his opinion on the quantum of the danger. Could the existence of large bodies of men, uniting in a conspiracy, and draw ing in all the incidental bad humours of the state to bear against the constitution, be denied? Could they be laudable, good, or free from dangers? Would a