Question. How long before the battle of Gaines's Mill did you receive that information?

Answer. The day before, I think.

Question. What was the strength of your right wing just prior to the battle of Gaines's Mill?

Answer. At that time there were three divisions, the strength of which was probably less than 35,000 men. That is a mere estimate on my part, for I do not now remember what the strength was.

Question. As soon as you had reasonable cause to believe that the enemy proposed to attack you in force, should not the two wings of your army have been united to repel the attack? And was this done? And if not, why not?

Answer. The right wing was drawn in to the immediate vicinity of the bridges as soon as was practicable under the circumstances, after we knew definitely of Jackson's approach. The intentions of the enemy were difficult to divine. He appeared in force on both banks of the Chickahominy, and made several sharp attacks on the right bank as well as on the left. So that I do not think more troops could wisely have been sent to the support of Porter, at Gaines's farm, than were actually sent.

Question. Whatever might have been the intentions of the enemy, as an attack was to be made by him, would it not have been better to have placed both wings of our army on the same side of the Chickahominy prior to the battle of Gaines's Mill?

Answer. I do not think that they ought to have been brought to the same side of the river before they actually were.

Question. What advantage was gained by leaving the right wing of our army to be attacked by a greatly superior force?

Answer. It prevented the enemy from getting on our flank and rear; and, in my opinion, enabled us to withdraw the army and its materiel.

Question. Will you explain what was done by the right wing of our army at the time, or about the time, the left was engaged with the enemy, which saved our flank from attack, and enabled the army and its materiel to be withdrawn?

Answer. By desperate fighting they inflicted so great a loss upon the enemy as to check his movement on the left bank of the river, and gave us time to get our materiel out of the way.

Question. Could not the enemy have been held in check, with less loss and exposure to us, if our whole army had been placed on the right bank of the Chickahominy before the battle of Gaines's Mill, and his attempt to cross resisted?

Answer. No; I think it was better as it was.

Question. What portion of the left wing, if any, was sent to General Porter during the battle of Gaines's Mill, and at what time was it sent? And was any portion of it ordered to his assistance and then recalled? And if so, why was it recalled?

Answer. Slocum's division was ordered over. I cannot give the hours without consulting papers.

Question. Was it recalled after it started to go over?

Answer. I have no recollection of Slocum being stopped. If there was anything of that kind, it must have been at a very early period of the day. I think two brigades of General Sumner's command crossed over in the afternoon. Two brigades of General Keyes's command came up late in the day, but I do not think they crossed the river.

Question. Did you suppose the enemy to be your superior in strength before the battle of Gaines's Mill?

Answer. My recollection is that I did.

Question. And did you suppose at that time that you would be obliged to retreat?

Answer. It was a contingency I thought of. But my impression is, that up to the time of the battle of Gaines's Mill I still hoped that we should be able to hold our own.

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Question. If the enemy was your superior in numbers, was that not the strongest reason for not fighting him, except you were concentrated? case he himself divided, placing a part of his force on one side of the Chickahominy and a part on the other, as he did, would not that furnish you, though inferior, a chance to defeat him in detail?

Answer. We had great difficulty in ascertaining the intentions of the enemy. I do not see that, under the circumstances at the time, we could have done differently from what we did do.

Question. When the enemy had concentrated their force on the left bank of the Chickahominy, would it or not have been possible for you, by a concentration of your force on the right bank of the river, to have marched directly upon Richmond with the main body of your army and captured that place, leaving such force as might be deemed advisable to check his passage of the river?

Answer. I think not; I think the enemy had force enough still on the right bank to have prevented such a movement. It was our impression at the time distinctly.

Question Our whole force was withdrawn to the right bank of the Chickahominy on the night of the battle of Gaines's Mill, was it not?

Answer. Yes, during the night. I think the last troops left about daybreak, or shortly after.

Question, And when did the retreat to the James river commence ?
Answer. I think the trains commenced moving that night.

Question. Were you with the right or left wing of the army during the battle of Gaines's Mill?

Answer. I was on the right bank of the river, at Dr. Trent's house, as the most central position.

Question. Will you give us a concise statement of the retreat of the army to the James river, including the battles of Savage's Station, Glendale, and Malvern Hill?

Answer. As soon as the retreat-the movement to the James river-was determined upon, I gave orders for improving the crossings of White Oak swamp, and sent some staff-officers with an escort of cavalry to the James river to bring me back the best information about the roads. The trains were put in motion, I think, on the night of the 28th of June, or, it may have been, on the morning of the 29th; and as the great trouble was to handle that immense mass of wagons, I tried to get them out of the way the first thing. We had only one road practicable for the trains and troops to go on after leaving White Oak swamp. As soon as the wagons were well out of the way, Sumner, Franklin, and Heintzelman were ordered to take a position near Savage's Station, and to hold it until night. In the meantime the commands of Keyes and Porter were pushed across the White Oak swamp, in order to gain possession of the roads coming in from Richmond between the White Oak swamp and the James river, and cover the further movement of the trains. Sumner and Franklin were attacked at Savage's Station, and after a severe contest, repulsed the enemy. After night they crossed the White Oak swamp. I think the whole command got over by daybreak in the morning. The trains were kept moving day and night. The troops were placed in position from White Oak swamp to the vicinity of Malvern Hill to cover the movement. They were attacked in the afternoon at several points along the line-at White Oak swamp mainly by artillery. But at Nelson's farm the most serious attack by the enemy in force was made, and the fighting there continued until after dark. The divisions that were most warmly engaged were those of Hooker, Kearney, and McCall; while, still further on the left, a pretty serious attack was made by the Wise Legion, I think-General Wise's

command. The enemy were again repulsed at all points. During the night the army was concentrated upon Malvern Hill. A portion of the trains were at Haxall's, and the rest at Harrison's Bar. Early in the morning the troops were placed in position at Malvern Hill, and they were attacked early in the afternoon. The most serious effort of the enemy was about the left of our position, no attack being made on our right, where I was most apprehensive of it. I determined, even after a signal repulse of the enemy, to withdraw from Malvern Hill and go to Harrison's Bar, mainly for two reasons: the first was, that the position was rather too extensive a one for the number of men; the second was, the necessity of getting below City Point, the channel being so narrow at City Point, so near that bank of the river, that it was the opinion of the naval officers that we could not count upon getting our supplies that far up. The night after Malvern the movement was continued upon Harrison's Bar, which was a very favorable position for the gunboats, the ground on either bank being completely swept by their fire; steps were taken at once to strengthen the position. Some little time after we reached Harrison's Bar we occupied a point on the other side, which was intrenched, and gave us a secure debouche on the south bank of the river.

Question. On or about the 28th of June, after the battle of Gaines's Mills, was it not thought necessary to destroy the baggage of the army, and were not orders given to that effect?

Answer. I have no recollection of any such order being given. A certain amount of property was destroyed at some of the railway stations.

Question. But no order was given for the general destruction of the baggage of the army?

Answer. No. I have not the slighest recollection of any such order.

Question. By whom was the battle of Savage's Station fought? Did you yourself direct the movements of the troops, or were they directed by the corps commanders?

Answer. I had given general orders for the movements of the troops, but the fighting was done under the direct orders of the corps commanders.

Question. By whom were the movements of the troops in fighting directed the day after the battle at Savage's Station?

Answer. I gave the general orders, and each corps was commanded by its own commander.

Question. Who selected the positions and directed the movements of the troops at the battle of Malvern Hill?

Answer. I selected the positions in a general way; that is, I rode over the whole position in the morning, indicating to the different commanders the approximate positions they were to occupy. There were parts of the position nearer our right that were, I think, selected by General Barnard and General Humphrey. More or less change was made by every corps commander from the general position that I had selected.

Question. At what hour in the morning were you on the field at the time of the battle of Malvern Hill, and at what time did you leave?

Answer. I was on the ground very shortly after daylight, and, I presumed, occupied some four hours in riding over the position. I was again on the ground in the afternoon-I should think somewhere about 2 or half-past 2 o'clock—and was over the whole position again at that time.

Question. Had the fighting commenced in the morning before you left?
Answer. No, sir; no enemy in sight.

Question. At what point or points were you from the time you left the field until you returned?

Answer. I was at headquarters, near Haxall's house.

Question. Were you down to the river, or on board the gunboats during any part of that day, between the time you left the field and your return to it?

Answer. I do not remember; it is possible I may have been, as my camp was directly on the river.

Question. How far was the gunboat from Haxall's?

Answer. There were generally some gunboats in the immediate vicinity of Haxall's.

Question. How far was that from where the heaviest fighting was during the day?

Answer. From Haxall's to the point where the heaviest fighting was, I suppose was two miles and a half or three miles. There were parts of our line that were within a half a mile, probably, or less than that, of the headquarters.

Question. Had the fighting ceased when you went back to the field in the afternoon, or was it still in progress?

Answer. Still in progress. The most serious fighting was after I went upon the ground the second time.

Question. To what points on the field did you go on your return?

Answer. I went over nearly the whole field. I commenced near the left, by a house that was there, and then passed around by the positions of General Sumner and General Heintzelman, to those on the extreme right. My apprehensions were for the extreme right. I felt no concern for the left and centre. Question. Did you remain on the field during the remainder of the battle? Answer. I came back to headquarters just about dark.

Question. The troops were withdrawn that night to Harrison's Bar?
Answer. Yes.

Question. Were they withdrawn in pursuance of a general order, or by direction of the corps commanders?

Answer. In pursuance of a general order.

Question. Was the army withdrawn from the peninsula in accordance with your opinion?

Answer. It was not.

Question. Why did you not approve of it?

Answer. I thought the James river the true line of operations, and that the proper policy to be pursued was to re-enforce the army of the Potomac, and continue the movement on Richmond in that direction.

Question. How many available men did you estimate that you had at Harrison's Bar, and how many more would you have required, in order to make a successful attempt upon Richmond?

Answer. I think I had about 85,000 or 90,000 men at Harrison's Bar, and I would have undertaken another movement in advance with about 20,000 more of re-enforcements. My view was, that pretty much everything that the government could have controlled ought to have been massed on the James river. I did not think the enemy would trouble Washington so long as we had a powful army in the vicinity of Richmond, and did not share the apprehensions for the safety of Washington that were entertained by a great many.

I asked for 50,000 men at first, on the ground that I thought the army should be as strong as possible, and as little as possible left to chances. When General Halleck came down to Harrison's Bar, my recollection is that he stated that 20,000, or something about that number, was all that could be had; and I said that I would try it again with that number. I have no recollection of having asked at a subsequent period for a greater number than 20,000 as a necessary preliminary to a movement.

Question. About how many men were lost in killed, wounded, and missing from your army from the 25th of June until you reached Harrison's Landing. Answer. I think the loss was about 14,000; but I could not tell positively without looking at the returns.

Question. Will you state in what you consider your chances for success would have been greater with the addition of 20,000 men to the number which

you had at Harrison's Landing than they were when you were in front of Richmond, and before Jackson had formed a junction with the rest of the rebel forces?

Answer. I should have counted upon the effect of the battles which had just taken place upon the enemy. We had then strong reason to believe that the enemy's losses had been very much heavier than our own, and that portions of his army were very much demoralized, especially after the battle of Malvern

Hill.

Question. From whom did you receive the order to withdraw the army from the peninsula?

Answer. From General Halleck.

Question. To what point was it ordered?

Answer. To Aquia creek.

Question. To what point did it go?

Answer. A portion landed at Aquia and the rest at Alexandria.

Question. Will you give a concise statement of the assistance rendered by the army under your command to the army of Virginia?

Answer. I think, before the termination of the campaign of the army of Virginia, that it had been joined by the whole of the army of the Potomac, except some cavalry, that had not arrived, and a portion of General Keyes's corps, that was left at Yorktown in garrison, I think that every effort was made to hurry forward the troops, and to give cordial assistance to General Pope.

Question. Do you remember when and where you first received orders to forward troops to General Pope, if you received any?

Answer. The order was for the army of the Potomac to go to Aquia as rapidly as possible, and there they were met by orders from General Halleck to come here or go to Alexandria, as the case may be.

Question. And each corps, as it marched in pursuance of those orders, ceased to be under your command?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Did you receive any orders at Alexandria to forward troops to the assistance of General Pope?

Answer. Yes; troops and supplies, and I sent everything down but my own guard.

Question. What position did you occupy after your arrival at Alexandria and you had forwarded the troops which had been under your command to the assistance of General Pope?

Answer. I was for some little time-one or two days, two or three days perhaps without any position; merely at my camp without any command. On Monday, the 1st of September, I received verbal instructions from General Halleck to take command of the defences of Washington. I was, however, expressly prohibited from, in any way, assuming any control over the troops under General Pope. I think it was on the next day after that that I was instructed verbally, by the President and General Halleck, to go out and meet the army, which was coming in, and to assume command of it when it approached the position that I considered it ought to occupy for defensive purposes, and to post it properly.

Question. How long did you remain in command of the defences of Washington, and what orders did you next receive, and from whom?

Answer. I do not think that order, assigning the command of the defences of Washington, was ever rescinded, or any other one issued in its place. I had only verbal communications with General Halleck before I started on the Antietam campaign, and it was never definitely decided, up to the time that I left, as to whether I was to go or not. I asked the question, two or three times, of General Halleck, whether I was to command the troops in the field? and he said it had not