at the permanent headquarters of the Ninth Corps, in the grove about a mile in the rear of our main line, had comfortably bestowed himself with General Grant in company, and sent two aides de camp to General Burnside to transmit all necessary information. Not being able to see anything that was going forward, and not hearing any report, General Meade became somewhat impatient. He was not in an amiable mood, and at fifteen minutes past four o'clock, he telegraphed to General Burnside to know what was the cause of the delay. General Burnside was too busy in remedying the failure already incurred to reply immediately-expected, indeed, that before the despatch could be sent the explosion would take place. General Meade ill-naturedly telegraphed the operator to know where General Burnside was. At half past four, the commanding general became still more impatient, and was on the point of ordering an immediate assault upon the enemy's works, without reference to the mine. Five minutes later, he did order the assault.

At precisely sixteen minutes before five o'clock, the mine exploded. Then ensued a scene which beggars description. The ground heaved and trembled. A terrific sound, like the noise of great thunders, burst forth upon the morning air. Huge masses of earth, mingled with cannon, caissons, camp equipage, and human bodies, were thrown up. It seemed like a mountain reversed, enveloped in clouds of smoke, sand and dust, upheaved by the explosion of four tons of powder. A moment more, and all that was left of a six gun battery and its garrison of two hundred men and more, was a great crater, two hundred feet long, fifty wide, and twenty-five deep, with the debris of the material of what had been one of the strongest of. the enemy's works. The effect upon the rebel forces in the immediate vicinity was wonderful. Some seemed paralyzed with astonishment and fear. Others fled from their works as though they thought that the entire line was mined, and that all would be involved in a common destruction.

Now was the time for action. Forward went General Led

lic's column, with Colonel Marshall's brigade in advance. The parapets were surmounted, the abatis was quickly removed, and the division prepared to pass over the intervening ground and charge through the still smoking ruins to gain the crest beyond. But here the leading brigade made a temporary halt. It was said at the time, that our men suspected a counter mine, and were themselves shocked by the terrible scene which they had witnessed. It was, however, but momentary. The men at once recovered, pushed forward, and in less than a quarter of an hour the entire division was out of its entrenchments, and was advancing gallantly towards the enemy's line. The ground was somewhat difficult to cross over, but the troops pushed steadily on with soldierly bearing, overcoming all the obstacles before them. They reached the edge of the crater, passed down into the chasm, and attempted to make their way through the yielding sand, the broken clay and the masses of rubbish that were scattered everywhere about. The enemy's lines on either side and beyond were found to be very complex, intricate and involved. Many of the enemy's men were lying among the ruins, half buried, and vainly trying to free themselves. They called for mercy and for help. The soldiers stopped to take prisoners, to dig out guns and other materiel. Their division commander was not with them. Of the brigade commanders, General Bartlett, disabled by the loss of a leg in a previous battle in the peninsular campaign, but otherwise a most efficient, brave and meritorious officer, could not move with great facility, and Colonel Marshall was hardly equal to the management of a large command. There was no responsible head. The ranks were broken, the regimental organizations could not be preserved, the troops were becoming confused, the officers stopped to form anew the disordered lines. The 2d Pennsylvania heavy artillery endeavored to extricate itself, and did eventually succeed in advancing a hundred yards beyond the crater, but, finding itself without support, withdrew.

Precious time was passing. The enemy was recovering from his surprise. Our artillery, which had opened along our entire

line immediately after the explosion of the mine, began to receive a spirited response. The enemy's men went back to their guns. They gathered on the crest, and soon brought to bear upon our troops a fire in front from the Cemetery hill and an enfilading and cross fire from their guns in battery. Our own artillery could not altogether silence or overcome this fire in flank. Our men in the crater were checked, felt the enemy's fire, sought cover, began to intrench. The movement up and down the enemy's lines had been disapproved and the advance movement could not now be made except with extreme difficulty.

In the mean time, General Potter was doing all that a brave man could to put his division into the action, where it could accomplish the most decisive results. General Griffin's brigade had been massed between the railroad and the advanced line, and in anticipation of the attack, General Griffin was ordered to deploy a line of skirmishers to the right of the crater. In case General Ledlie moved forward successfully, General Griffin was to advance his skirmishers to the right and follow with the main body about parallel with General Ledlie's line of advance. These directions were carefully followed. General Griffin pressed forward and struck the enemy's line immediately to the right of the crater. He found that the point at which he entered was difficult of penetration. The line was defended by chevaux de frise of pointed stakes, traverses and other appliances, and he was obliged to fight his way along hand to hand. He succeeded, however, in securing about two hundred yards of rifle pits. He advanced even beyond these towards the crest for two hundred yards further, but was there checked. A part of the second brigade under Colonel Z. R. Bliss of the 7th Rhode Island followed the first and, becoming engaged with the enemy, afforded very important aid to General Griffin in his movement. Two regiments passed into the crater, turned to the right and swept down the line for a considerable distance. One of General Potter's regiments even

reached a point within twenty or thirty yards of the enemy's battery on the right.

General Willcox on his part directed his column to the left and his second brigade succeeded in occupying about one hundred yards of the enemy's rifle pits in that direction. The greater part of the division, however, followed General Ledlie's troops and became mingled with them amid the confusion that was beginning to prevail. The result which General Burnside had feared now became manifest. The men began to shelter themselves from the fire of the foe instead of pushing boldly forward and overcoming it. Each division had been accompanied by a regiment equipped as engineers, and their intrenching tools came into requisition for protection against the enemy. General Burnside, following General Meade's directions, had urged upon his division commanders the necessity of making for the crest. But in the crowded state of the crater almost any kind of movement became exceedingly difficult. Still the attempt was made. Some of our men struggled through the melee and climbed the crater's side. They stood upon the further edge. There they encountered a severe and destructive fire of shrapnel and canister from a battery which the enemy had posted on the crest.

Such was the condition of things at forty minutes past five o'clock. General Burnside reported to General Meade, that the enemy's first line and the breach were occupied, and that he should "endeavor to push forward to the crest as rapidly as possible." About the same time General Meade intercepted a despatch from Lieutenant Colonel Loring to General Burnside to the effect, that General Ledlie's troops could not be induced to advance. He immediately directed General Burnside to push forward "all his troops to the crest at once," and to call upon General Ord "to move forward his troops at once." The order was short and peremptory. But how could it be executed? General Ord's command-according to General Meade's own order-was massed in the rear of the Ninth Corps. The crater and the space between that and our lines was

already filled with men. General Ord found that he could do nothing then, while the troops that had already gone forward and the wounded returning choked the passage, through which he was expected to move.

At six o'clock, General Meade sent an order to General Burnside to push his "men forward at all hazards, white and black," and "not to lose time in making formations, but rush for the crest." At the same hour, he ordered General Ord directly to move forward his "corps rapidly to the crest of the hill, independently of General Burnside's troops and make a lodgement there." General Ord made an attempt to obey this order. General Turner, commanding a division then attached to General Ord's corps, at half past six began his movement. His order was to "to follow Potter's division and move out to the right." He gradually drew his troops out of the lines from the rear, got them to the front by the covered way leading to our advanced line, and sent them forward. At seven o'clock the head of his "column reached the point at which our assaulting column had passed through our lines." He received a second order from General Ord to move out to the right. He found it very difficult so to do owing to the peculiarly broken character of the ground to be passed over. He succeeded after much effort in pushing forward his first brigade, which pressed up to the enemy's lines and occupied a position upon General Potter's right. General Turner's design was to move his first brigade down the enemy's lines while the second brigade marched out of the trenches in support. The second brigade was accordingly formed for that purpose, and the third brigade was massed for attack in case any favorable opportunity should offer or the exigency should demand.*

While these movements were making in the rear, General Potter was endeavoring to remedy the disordered state of affairs in the crater. He felt convinced that there were too many men in that exposed situation, and he knew that their

*General Turner's testimony, Attack on Petersburg, pp. 133, 134, 135.