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Question. What instructions, if any, were given to General McClellan in regard to the conduct of the campaign in Maryland?

Answer. The day the President gave General McClellan directions to take command of the forces in the field we had a long conversation in regard to the campaign in Maryland. It was agreed between us that the troops, should move up the Potomac, and, if possible, separate that portion of General Lee's army which had crossed the Potomac from the remainder on the Virginia side. There were no definite instructions, further than that understanding between us, as to the general plan of the campaign. I submit herewith copies of despatches to and from General McClellan after he left Washington to take command of operations in Maryland to the time that he was relieved from command. (Appendix D.) These papers comprise all the despatches sent to and received from General McClellan, so far as I know, except a letter dated October 13, addressed to him by the President, and which was shown to me just as the President was about to despatch it to General McClellan, and General McClellan's reply, dated October 17. The reception of that letter is acknowledged by General McClellan in a despatch dated "near Harper's Ferry, 8.30 a. m., October 16, 1862."

Question. To what do you attribute the disastrous result of General Pope's campaign?

Answer. I think our troops were not sufficiently concentrated so as to be all brought into action on the field of battle; and there was great delay in getting re-enforcements from the army of the Potomac to General Pope's assistance. Question. To what is that delay attributable?

Answer. Partly, I think, 'to accidents, and partly to a want of energy in the troops, or their officers, in getting forward to General Pope's assistance. I could not say that that was due to any particular individual. It may have resulted from the officers generally not feeling the absolute necessity of great haste in re-enforcing General Pope. The troops, after they started from the Peninsula, were considerably delayed by heavy storms that came on at that time.

Question. Had the army of the Peninsula been brought to co-operate with the army of Virginia with the utmost energy that circumstances would have permitted, in your judgment as a military man, would it not have resulted in our victory instead of our defeat?

Answer. I thought so at the time, and still think so.

DOCUMENTS APPENDED TO THE TESTIMONY OF GENERAL HENRY W. HALLECK.

APPENDIX A.

[Memorandum for the Secretary of War.]

WASHINGTON, D. C., July 27, 1862.

In accordance with the directions of the President, I left here on the afternoon of the 24th, and reached the camp of General McClellan on the afternoon of the 25th.

I stated to the general that the object of my visit was to ascertain from him his views and wishes in regard to future operations. He said that he proposed to cross the James river at that point, attack Petersburg, and cut off the enemy's communication by that route south, making no further demonstration, for the present, against Richmond. I stated to him very frankly my views in regard to the danger and impracticability of the plan, to most of which he finally agreed.

I then told him that it seemed to me a military necessity to concentrate his forces with those of General Pope on some point where they could, at the

same time, cover Washington and operate against Richmond, unless he felt strong enough to attack the latter place with a strong probability of success, with the re-enforcements which could be given to him.

He expressed the opinion that with thirty thousand re-enforcements he could attack Richmond with a "good chance of success." I replied that I was authorized by the President to promise only twenty thousand, and that if he could not take Richmond with that number, we must devise some plan for withdrawing his troops from their present position to some point where they could unite with those of General Pope, without exposing Washington. He thought there would be no serious difficulty in withdrawing his forces for that purpose, but the movement, he said, would have a demoralizing influence on his own troops, and suggested the propriety of their holding their present position till sufficient re-enforcements could be collected. I told him that I had no authority to consider that proposition, and that he must decide between advising the withdrawal of his forces to some point to be agreed upon, to meet General Pope, or to advance on Richmond with the re-enforcements which the President had offered; that I was not sufficiently advised in regard to the position of our forces and those of the enemy to say how many additional troops could be given to him with safety, but that the President had decided that question by fixing his re-enforcements at twenty thousand, and I could promise no addition to that number.

I inferred from his remarks that, under these circumstances, he would prefer to withdraw and unite with General Pope; but I advised him to consult his officers and give me a final answer in the morning. He did so, and the next morning informed me that he would attack Richmond with the reenforcements promised. He would not say that he thought the probabilities of success were in his favor, but that there was "a chance," and he was "willing to try it."

In regard to the force of the enemy, he expressed the opinion that it was not less than two hundred thousand, and I found that in this estimate most of his officers agreed. His own effective force was, officers and men, about ninety thousand, which, with twenty thousand re-enforcement, would make one hundred and ten.

I had no time or opportunity to investigate the facts upon which these estimates were based, and therefore can give no opinion as to their correct

ness.

His officers, as I understood, were about equally divided in opinion in regard to the policy of withdrawing or of risking an attack on Richmond. H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief.

APPENDIX B.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Berkeley, July 26, 1862.

GENERAL: I have seen to-day nearly a thousand of our sick and wounded just returned from Richmond, and some refugees have also arrived, and a number of surgeons and chaplains taken prisoners at Bull Run. All of these who have enjoyed any opportunities of observation unite in stating that re-enforcements are pouring into Richmond from the south.

Dr. L. H. Stone, United States army, saw at Charlotte from 7,000 to 8,000 troops en route to Richmond. He and others unite in stating that it is quite positive that the troops on James island (Charleston) have arrived in Richmond, and that the southern States are being drained of their garrisons to re-enforce the army in my front.

It is said the troops of Beauregard's old army are also en route hither. This last is not positive, and I hope to learn the truth in regard to it to

morrow.

Three regiments (first South Carolina, first North Carolina, and first Georgia,) reached Richmond yesterday. Supplies are being rapidly pushed in by all routes.

It would appear that Longstreet is in front of Richmond, on this side of the James; D. H. Hill at Fort Darling and vicinity.

Our cavalry pickets on Charles City road were driven in to-day by a heavy force of cavalry and some artillery. Averill started after them with a sufficient force. I have not heard yet the result.

Allow me to urge most strongly that all the troops of Burnside and Hunter, together with all that can be possibly spared from other points, be sent to me at once. I am sure that you will agree with me that the true defence of Washington consists in a rapid and heavy blow given by this army upon Richmond. Can you not possibly draw 15,000, or 20,000 men from the west to re-enforce me temporarily? They can return the moment we gain Richmond. Please give weight to this suggestion. I am sure it merits it.

I have the honor to be, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant
G. B. MCCLELLAN,
Major General United States Army.

Major General H. W. HALLECK,

Commanding United States Army.

APPENDIX C.

[Sent 10 a. m.]

WAR DEPARTMENT,

Washington City, D. C., August 27, 1862.

I can get no satisfactory information from the front, either of the enemy or of our troops. There seems to have been great neglect and carelessness about Manassas. Franklin's corps should march in that direction as soon as possible. A competent officer should be sent out to take direction of affairs in that vicinity.

Major General MCCLELLAN, Alexandria.

H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.

[Received 10.40 a. m.]

ALEXANDRIA, 10.20 a. m., August 27, 1862. Telegram this moment received. I have sent orders to Franklin to prepare to march with his corps at once, and to repair here in person to inform as to his means of transportation. Kearny was yesterday at Rappahannock; Porter at Bealeton, Kelly's, Barnett's, &c. Sumner will commence reaching Falmouth to-day. Williams's Massachusetts cavalry will be mostly at Falmouth to-day. I loaned Burnside my personal escort, (one squadron fourth regulars,) to escort down Rappahannock. I have just sent for Couch's division to come at once.

As fast as I gain any information I will forward it, although you may already have it. GEO. B. MCCLELLAN, Major General.

General HALLECK, General-in-Chief.

[Sent 12 m.]

WAR DEPARTMENT,

Washington, D. C., August 27, 1862.

Telegrams from General Porter to General Burnside, just received, say that Banks is at Fayetteville; McDowel, Sigel, and Ricketts, near Warrenton; Reno on his right. Porter is marching on Warrenton Junction to reenforce Pope. Nothing said of Heintzelman. Porter reports a general battle imminent. Franklin's corps should move out by forced marches, carrying three or four days' provisions, and to be supplied as far as possible by railroad. Perhaps you may prefer some other road than that to Centreville. Colonel Haupt has just telegraphed about sending out troops, &c. Please see him and give him your directions. There has been some serious neglect to guard the railroad, which should be immediately remedied. H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief.

Major General MCCLELLAN, Alexandria.

[Received 1.25 p. m.]

ALEXANDRIA, August 27, 1862-11.20 a. m.

In view of Burnside's despatch, just received, would it not be advisable to throw the mass of Sumner's corps here to move out with Franklin to Centreville and vicinity? If a decisive battle is fought at Warrenton, a disaster would leave any troops on Lower Rappahannock in a dangerous position. They would do better service in front of Washington.

Major General HALLECK, General-in-Chief.

[Received 1.30. p. m.]

G. B. MCCLELLAN,

Major General.

ALEXANDRIA, Virginia, August 27, 1862-12 m.

I have just learned, through General Woodbury, that it was stated in your office last night that it was very strange that, with 20,000 men here, I did not prevent the raid upon Manassas. This induces me to ask whether your remark in your telegram to-day, that there had been great neglect about Manassas, was intended to apply to me? I cannot suppose it was, knowing, as you do, that I arrived here without information and with no instructions beyond pushing the landing of my troops. The bridge was burned before my arrival; I knew nothing of it 'till this morning.

I ask, as a matter of justice, that you will prevent your staff from making statements which do me such great injustice, at a time when the most cordial co-operation is required.

GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN,

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No remark was made by me, or in my hearing, reflecting on you in relation to Manassas. I did remark to General Woodbury, on receiving news of

the capture of the train, that there must have been great neglect in permitting five hundred of the enemy to make the raid when we had some twenty thousand men in that vicinity, (not vicinity of Alexandria,) and added that many of the forces sent to Pope could not have been very far off. It would have been perfect nonsense to have referred to you, when you had just arrived, and knew nothing of the disposition of the troops. Indeed, I did not blame any particular person, but merely said there must have been neglect somewhere. I think you must have misunderstood General Woodbury, for he could not possibly have drawn such an inference from anything I have said.

Major General MCCLELLAN, Alexandria.

[Time received, 1.40 p. m.]

H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.

ALEXANDRIA, August 27, 1862-12.05 p. m.

My aid has just returned from General Franklin's camp; reports that Generals Franklin, Smith, and Slocum are all in Washington. He gave the order to the next in rank to place the corps in readiness to move at once. I learn that heavy firing has been heard this a. m. at Centreville, and have sent to ascertain the truth. I can find no cavalry to send out on the roads. Are the works finished and ready for defence?

GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN,

Major General HALLECK, General-in-Chief.

Major General Commanding.

[Received 1.50 p. m.]

ALEXANDRIA, August 27, 1862-1.15 p. m. Franklin's artillery has no horses except for four guns without caissons. I can pick up no cavalry. In view of these facts, will it not be well to push Sumner's corps here by water as rapidly as possible, to make immediate arrangements for placing the works in front of Washington in an efficient condition of defence? I have no means of knowing the enemy's force between Pope and ourselves. Can Franklin, without his artillery or cavalry, effect any useful purpose in front? Should not Burnside at once take steps to evacuate Falmouth and Aquia, at the same time covering the retreat of any of Pope's troops who may fall back in that direction? I do not see that we have force enough in hand to form a connexion with Pope, whose exact position we do not know. Are we safe in the direction of the Valley? GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN,

Major General.

General HALLECK, General-in-Chief.

[Sent 1.50 p. m.]

WAR DEPARTMENT,

Washington, D. C., August 27, 1862.

Yes; I think Sumner's corps should come to Alexandria. The enemy has appeared at Leesburg, and the commanding officer at Edwards's Ferry asks

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