« PrejšnjaNaprej »
able cause, the Commissioner of the General Land Office may, in his discretion, allow the settler twelve months from the date of filing in which to commence his residence on said land under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe." Right of election to make proof.
Act of August 24, 1912 (37 Stat., 455). That the failure of a homestead entryman to give notice of election of making his proof as required by the act of June sixth, nineteen hundred and twelve, being an act to amend sections [twenty-] two hundred and ninety-one and [twenty-] two hundred and ninety-seven of the Revised Statutes of the United States, relating to homesteads, shall not in anywise prejudice his rights to proceed in accordance with the law under which such entry was made. Settlement rights, time for filing.
Act of May 14, 1880, sec. 3 (21 Stat., 140). SEC. 3. That any settler who has settled, or who shall hereafter settle, on any of the public lands of the United States, whether surveyed or unsurveyed,
with the intention of claiming the same under the homestead laws, shall be allowed the same time to file his homestead application and perfect his original entry in the United States Land Office as is now allowed to settlers under the preemption laws to put their claims on record, and his right shall relate back to the date of settlement the same as if he settled under the preemption laws. Canceled or relinquished entries reinstated.
Act of March 3, 1911 (36 Stat., 1084). That all homestead entries which have been canceled or relinquished, or are invalid solely because of the erroneous allowance of such entries after the withdrawal of lands for national forest purposes, may be reinstated or allowed to remain intact, but in the case of entries heretofore canceled applications for reinstatement must be filed in the proper local land office prior to July first, nineteen hundred and twelve.
SEC. 2. That in all cases where contests were initiated under the provisions of the act of May fourteenth, eighteen hundred and eighty, prior to the withdrawal of the land for national forest purposes, the qualified successful contestants may exercise their preference right to enter the land within six months after the passage of this act. Second homestead and desert-land entries.
Act of September 5, 1914 (38 Stat., 712). That any person otherwise duly qualified to make entry or entries of public lands under the homestead or desert-land laws, who has heretofore made, or may hereafter make, entry under said laws, and who, through no fault of his own, may have lost, forfeited, or abandoned the same, or who may hereafter lose, forfeit, or abandon same, shall be entitled to the benefits of the homestead or desertland laws as though such former entry or entries had never been made: Provided, That such applicant shall show to the satisfaction of the Secretary of the Interior that the prior entry or entries were made in good faith, were lost, forfeited, or abandoned because of
matters beyond his control, and that he has not speculated in his right nor committed a fraud or attempted fraud in connection with such prior entry or entries.
See also act of June 5, 1900, section 2 (31 Stat., 267); act of May 22, 1902, section 2 (32 Stat., 203); act of February 8, 1908 (35 Stat., 6); act of February 3, 1911 (36 Stat., 896). Limitation to 320 acres under all land laws, excepting mineral laws.
Act August 30, 1890 (26 Stat., 391).
Act March 3, 1891, section 17 (26 Stat., 1095).
Act May 17, 1900 (31 Stat., 179).
Additional homestead entries.
Act March 2, 1889, section 6 (25 Stat., 854).
Act April 28, 1904, sections 2 and 3 (33 Stat., 527). Enlarged homesteads in certain States.
Act February 19, 1909 (35 Stat., 639).
Act June 17, 1910 (36 Stat., 531). Contests and cancellation of claim. Preference right. Act May 14, 1880, section 2 (21 Stat., 140), as amended by act July 26, 1892 (27
Stat., 270). Act March 3, 1911, section 2 (36 Stat., 1084). Commutation provisions.
Act June 3, 1896, section 2 (29 Stat., 197).
Act May 29, 1908, sections 9 and 10 (35 Stat., 465). Homestead by married woman.
Act June 6, 1900 (31 Stat., 683). Settlers who become insane.
Act June 8, 1880 (21 Stat., 166).
Leaves of absence.
Act March 2, 1889 (25 Stat., 864), and various acts of local application. Final-proof notices.
Act March 3, 1879 (20 Stat., 472).
Act March 2, 1889, section 7 (25 Stat., 854). Distinction between offered and unoffered lands abolished.
Act May 18, 1898 (30 Stat., 418). Relinquishments.
Act May 14, 1880 (21 Stat., 140). General provisions of the homestead laws extended to certain lands in the Yel.
lowstone (now Shoshone) National Forest, etc.
Act March 15, 1906 (34 Stat., 62). Homesteads in former Siletz Indian Reservation.
Act August 15, 1894 (28 Stat., 286, p. 326).
Act March 4, 1911 (36 Stat., 1356). Homestead laws extended to Alaska, with modifications, etc. Act May 14, 1898, section 1 (30 Stat., 409), as amended by act March 3, 1903
(32 Stat., 1028),
Lands in the Black Hills Forest Reservation, settled upon and improved before
September 19, 1898, may be entered under the homestead laws, etc. Sundry civil appropriation act of March 3, 1899 (30 Stat., 1074, p. 1095).
Lands subject to settlement and entry.
Land not susceptible of cultivation or other agricultural use can not be entered under the homestead law; and an affidavit charging such facts is sufficient basis for a hearing. (Davis v. Gibson, 38 L. D., 265.)
Land which is so mountainous, rough, broken, heavily timbered, and of such poor quality that it is impossible of cultivation is not subject to homestead entry. (Winninghoff v. Ryan, 40 L. D., 342.)
One who makes homestead entry of land so heavily timbered that the greater part is not subject to cultivation except at a very great expense for clearing, assumes a burden commensurate with such undertaking to establish his bona fides in making the entry for homestead purposes. (Benjamin Chainey, 42 L. D., 510.)
The fact that land is covered with valuable timber does not exclude it from entry under the homestead law, where of such character that it would be suitable for agricultural use if the timber were removed ; but land of a character not adaptable to any agricultural use is not subject to homestead entry. (Finley v. Ness, 38 L. D., 394; see also Davis v. Gibson, 38 L. D., 265.)
Lands having little or no agricultural value and chiefly valuable as containing the entrance to an extensive and beautiful cavern is not enterable under the homestead laws by one whose acts show that he desires the land for the control of the cavern and not for a bona fide agricultural home. (South Dakota Min. Co. v. McDonald, 30 L. D., 357.) Qualifications of entrymen.
Section 2289 of the Revised Statutes specifically declares that one who is the proprietor of more than 160 acres of land is disqualified to make homestead entry, and the Land Department is therefore without power of invoking the maxim de minimis non curat lex to hold so qualified one who owns more than 160 acres, notwithstanding the excess may be less than 1 acre. (In this case homestead entryman owned 160 acres and a town lot 50 by 142 feet.) (Sorli v. Berg, 40 L. D., 259.)
One who enters into an oral agreement to purchase land and makes part payment of the purchase price is not the proprietor of land within the meaning of the provisions of the homestead law declaring disqualified to make homestead entry one who is the proprietor of more than 160 acres where under the laws of that State such oral agreement and part payment do not constitute such part performance as will take the contract out of the statute of frauds. (Earhart v. Rein, 38 L. D., 613.)
An absolute conveyance of property, although made to defraud creditors, is, as between the parties to the deed, a valid conveyance of the title, and not merely a conveyance in trust; and one vested with title under such conveyance to more than 160 acres is disqualified to make homestead entry. (Martha J. Westfall, 40 L. D., 209.)
On the death of a homesteader leaving widow and heirs the widow takes the homestead right of her husband free from any claim on behalf of the heirs, and is vested with full power to complete the entry for her own benefit or relinquish the same, if she so elects. (Steberg v. Hanelt, 26 L. D., 436.)
On the death of the entryman the right goes to the widow, or in case of her death to the heirs or devisee, who may complete the entry by either residing on the land or cultivating the same for the required period, but need not do both. (Heirs of Stevenson v. Cunningham, 32 L. D., 650; see also Meeboer v. Heirs of Schut, 35 L. D., 335.)
The heirs of a deceased homestead entryman, who during his lifetime failed to comply with the law, may complete the entry by either residing upon or cultivating the land for the full period of five years, if sufficient of the lifetime of the entry remains for that purpose, or may commute upon a showing of residence and cultivation for a period of 14 months, but can not commute upon a showing of cultivation alone. (Wilson v. Heirs of Smith, 37 L. D., 519.)
Upon the death of an entryman those upon whom the statute casts the right to perfect title under the entry are merely required to continue cultivation and improvement of the land, so that failure to cultivate in any given year subjects the entry to contest and possible cancellation. (Hon v. Martinas, 41 L. D., 119.) This case overrules Heirs of Stevenson v. Cunningham, Meeboer v. Heirs of Schut, and Wilson v. Heirs of Smith, supra, so far as in conflict, Squatters on unsurveyed lands.
Settlement may be made under the homestead laws by all persons qualified to make either an original or a second homestead entry,
and in order to make settlement a settler must personally go upon and improve or establish residence on the land he desires. By making settlement in this way, the settler gains the right to enter the land settled upon as against all other persons, but not as against the Government, should the land be withdrawn by it for other purposes. (Par. 4, Suggestions to Homesteaders and Persons Desiring to Make Homestead Entries, approved Apr. 20, 1911.)
The qualifications requisite on the part of a homesteader must exist at the date of entry and if, after settlement and prior to entry, the settler for any reason becomes disqualified, the privilege gained by settlement is lost. (Brown v. Cagle, 30 L. D., 8.)
The widow of a homestead settler who had not prior to his death established bona fide residence on the land must thereafter both reside on and cultivate the land in her own right at least in the presence of a forest withdrawal. (Susan A. Leonard, 40 L. D., 429.) Residence.
The object of the homestead laws is the donation of public lands to persons seeking to establish and maintain agricultural homes thereon, conditioned upon actual occupancy of the same as a home and cultivation and improvement of the land; and mere occasional visits to the claim do not meet the requirements of the law. (Oscar 0. Reeg, 40 L. D., 206.)
The homestead law contemplates that an entry thereunder shall constitute the entryman's home and family homestead to the exclusion of a home elsewhere; and mere personal presence of the entryman upon the land does not meet the requirements of the law as to residence where he maintains a family residence elsewhere. (Benjamin Chainey, 42 L. D., 510.)
The homestead law contemplates a continuous compliance both as to residence and cultivation, beginning with the date of entry. (Hon v. Martinas, 41 L. D., 119.)
The law contemplates that the entryman shall make the land his permanent home to the exclusion of a home elsewhere; and an entry merely for the purposes of a summer home during three or four months of the year while maintaining a home elsewhere the rest of the time is invalid. (George W. Harpst, 36 L. D., 166.)
A homestead entry made with no intention of establishing a permanent bona fide home upon the land, but merely with a view to submitting a showing sufficient to support commutation, must be canceled, notwithstanding the proof shows full technical compliance with respect to inhabitancy of the land for the period ordinarily required in commutation cases. (Gilbert Satrang, 37 L. D., 683, syllabus.)
Credit for constructive residence during official employment will not be allowed to homestead entrymen appointed to office on or after March 1, 1909. Such credit will be given only to entrymen who establish residence on their claims and are thereafter elected to office. (37 L. D., 449.) Commutation-Residence.
The purpose of the homestead law is the donation of the public lands to actual settlers seeking to establish bona fide homes thereon, and the provision respecting commutation in no wise changes that purpose, but merely affords a means of commuting further residence to cash in meritorious cases lawfully initiated and prosecuted to the date of commutation. (Gilbert Satrang, 37 L. D., 683, syllabus.)
Credit for constructive residence during official employment will not be allowed in the commutation of homestead entries. Commutation may be allowed only upon a showing of actual and substantially continuous presence upon the land for the required period. (Ed. Jenkins, 37 L. D., 434.)
The fact that lands may be chiefly valuable for the timber thereon does not exclude them from settlement and entry under the homestead law, but it must clearly appear that the settlement or entry was made in good faith, for the purpose of making the tract a home, and where the entryman in such case submits commutation proof and pays a price to cut short the period of residence required by the homestead law, he invites scrutiny and challenges judgment as to the good faith of his entry. (Patten v. Quackenbush, 35 L. D., 561.)
Commutation proof upon homestead entries showing less than 14 months' residence should not be received, except in cases where statutory authority exists to the contrary. (Charles O. Asp, 41 L. D., 505.) Cultivation.
Cultivation is an essential requisite to compliance with the homestead law, and a hearing may be had on a charge of noncultivation,