During Sunday and Monday, the 14th and 15th, the batteries remained in the following positions, commencing along the Bowling Green road, on the right: Captains Leppien and Thompson were to the west of the avenue leading to the brick house; then Captain Cooper's, with one section of Amsden's battery (two of his axles having been broken by the recoil of the pieces), Reynolds' and Gerrish's, Captain Cooper relieving Captain Wolcott on Sunday afternoon, who was directed to report to his own, the Sixth Corps. Lieutenant Stewart continued to hold his former important position, and during the day Captain Hall had three guns behind the rise formerly held by Gerrish's battery. He had suffered so severely in men and horses that he could only make half his battery effective. Ransom and Simpson were held in reserve. There was no general engagement on either of these days, and the batteries only opened on our left when the enemy attempted to get some of their guns in position to our left and front, or gathered in considerable numbers at any of the advanced picket posts.

About noon on Sunday they planted a Whitworth gun in the bend of the Massaponax, which annoyed us considerably, throwing its bolts over the whole of the plain. It was so well posted as to be entirely screened from our batteries across the river, and at such a distance, and so hid by trees, as to be hardly discernible by the naked eye. After considerable difficulty, we succeeded in getting the range, which was found to be 2,700 yards, with Hall's three guns, and soon silenced it. It did not reopen from that point.

Soon after 8 o'clock on Monday night, in accordance with your orders, I commenced withdrawing the batteries along our line, beginning with Lieutenant Stewart's, which was the most exposed, being within 200 yards of the enemy's pickets. This and all the others were got off without any disturbance, and before 11 o'clock they were safely on this side of the river, without, so far as I can learn, leaving even a serviceable harness-strap behind. With hardly an exception, the officers and men executed this delicate movement to perfection.

Stewart's battery, being most exposed, deserves especial praise for the noiselessness with which they brought off their guns and caissons. I take great pleasure in stating that all the batteries of this corps behaved exceedingly well under fire, and regret exceedingly that I am obliged to say that Lieutenants Edgell and Amsden withdrew their batteries without permission, being out of ammunition, and the latter having two axles broken. Having done such good service, and suffered severely (especially the former), this cannot be attributed to cowardice, but shows a great way of forethought and proper management in not providing a fresh supply before their chests were exhausted, besides being directly contrary to orders.

To Captain Wolcott and his battery I am indebted for much very valuable service during the time he was temporarily serving with this corps. Hall's Second Maine Battery suffered the most severely, having one limber chest blown up and a gun carriage smashed. The captain, with his officers and men, merit especial praise for their excellent service in a most exposed position, and for bringing off their left piece, after all but one of the horses were killed, under a heavy fire of the enemy's infantry. All the harness from the dead horses was also removed.

The behavior of Captains Ransom's and Cooper's batteries, and the accuracy of their fire, under the very able direction of these officers, elicited much praise. Lieutenant Stewart showed himself, as at all times, the thorough soldier.

To Captain Reynolds, acting chief of artillery of the First Division

after Captain Gerrish was wounded, I am indebted for much valuable aid. All the reports of the battery commanders speak in praise of the behavior of those under their command.

I remain, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
C. S. WAINWRIGHT,

Colonel and Chief of Artillery, First Corps

Major-General REYNOLDS,

Commanding First Army Corps.

No. 210.

Report of Brig. Gen. Abner Doubleday, U. S. Army, commanding First Division.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION, FIRST ARMY CORPS,

December 22, 1862.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report that on Friday, December 12, at 1.30 p. m., I crossed, with my division, the two bridges over the Rappahannock, about 1 miles below Fredericksburg, preceded by the divis ions of Generals Meade and Gibbon.

To expedite the crossing, the Fourth Brigade and division artillery passed by the lower, while the three remaining brigades crossed by the upper bridge. Upon reaching the other side of the river, we found the ground very much blocked up by Smith's corps, which had not yet taken position. I left Colonel Gavin, of the Seventh Indiana Volunteers, with the Second Brigade, as a guard at the bridges, by order of General Reynolds, and then continued on with the other troops, our corps gaining ground to the left (facing down the river) as Smith's corps advanced to the front. We halted for the remainder of the day and during the night a little to the left of Bernard's house, about three-fourths of a mile from the crossing. Generals Meade and Gibbon were in front of me in two deployed lines. My troops were held in reserve in their rear, the brigades being in their numerical order from right to left, in columns of regiments, at intervals of 100 paces, our right supported by Smith's corps, our left resting upon the river. My artillery at first had been detached to answer the enemy's batteries, which had opened fire from the crests of the hills parallel to the river, but was soon relieved and directed to report to me, with the exception of Reynolds' battery, First New York Regiment, which remained absent until next morning. The other two batteries I placed in position behind the right and left brigades, in columns of sections. While thus posted we were shelled by the enemy's long-range guns, killing 1 man of the Seventh Wisconsin Volunteers, but otherwise doing little damage.

On the morning of the 13th, Colonel Gavin reported to me with his brigade, and the whole line advanced farther down the river. General Meade now received orders to storm the enemy's position along the heights, which run parallel to the river, supported by General Gibbon. while my division secured the left flank of the army. The railroad runs at the foot of these heights, and parallel to it and the river runs the Bowling Green road. Between this latter road and the water there is a wide open plain, and upon this most of the operations of my division took place. Relieving General Meade's advanced troops with the sharpshooters, three-quarters of a mile from the Bernard house, on the other side of a deep gorge, or ravine, we pressed on for about half a mile, driving in the enemy's skirmishers as we advanced.

Captain Gerrish's New Hampshire battery was now placed on the right of my line, and Lieutenant Stewart's battery (B), Fourth U. S. Artillery, was posted on the left, for the purpose of shelling a piece of wood in advance of us, on the bank of the river, in which a body of rebel infantry and cavalry had taken position, apparently with the intention of disputing our farther progress. The action of the batteries having prepared the way for an infantry attack, I directed General Meredith to take these woods with his brigade. The Seventh Wisconsin Volunteers and the Twenty-fourth Michigan led the advance, preceded by the Second Regiment U. S. Sharpshooters, and carried the wood in gallant style, taking a number of prisoners and horses.

In this affair my attention was particularly directed to the Twentyfourth Michigan Volunteers, a new regiment, for the first time under fire. I was pleased to see the alacrity and courage with which they performed the duty assigned them. The wood proved to be a very strong position, intersected with ravines and covered with a thick undergrowth. They contained masked batteries for eight guns, arranged to sweep the river for a long distance. While the left of my line thus gained a strong point d'appui, Colonel Rogers, with the Third Brigade, changed front forward, advanced rapidly, and took possession of the Bowling Green road, driving back the enemy's sharpshooters and silenc ing a battery not more than 500 or 600 yards in our front. Gerrish's battery was now placed to the right and rear of Rogers' position, near the intersection of a cross-road with the Bowling Green road. Colonel Rogers supported the guns in rear, leaving two companies in the road to protect the cannoneers from the rebel skirmishers.

The enemy now kept up a heavy and continuous fire upon our lines. Colonel Phelps, with the First Brigade, also changed front forward and formed line of battle to the rear of, and parallel to, the road, and to the right of Colonel Rogers' position, leaving three companies in the road to check the enemy's sharpshooters. All these roads we found lined with ditches and embankments, making excellent positions for infantry against infantry, but not against artillery. Colonel Gavin came up about the same time and occupied the road to the right of Colonel Phelps, engaging the skirmishers in his front and acting as a support to Captain Reynolds' battery, on his left. He held this position with his brigade during the whole action, throwing out strong pickets at night and skirmishers during the day to within 150 yards of the enemy's advanced line.

Having made these dispositions, I directed General Meredith to meet some demonstrations against our left flank by forming line in that direc tion at an obtuse angle to the main road, his right connecting with Rogers' brigade, and his left resting on the wood and river. In the mean time Gerrish's battery was contending with two batteries on our extreme left. Stewart's battery was sent to its assistance, and took part on its right. The latter officer soon succeeded in silencing the enemy's fire, blowing up one of their caissons and driving them off. Their guns could have been captured at this period without a doubt, had not a new and startling event occurred on our right, to which our attention was immediately directed. Meade's and Gibbon's attack had failed, and the enemy, with loud yells, were following back the two divisions to our lines. I immediately called in my troops from the left, and altered the position of the artillery to meet this new danger. A portion of Birney's division, however, came up just in time to cover Meade's and Gibbon's retreat and send the enemy flying back to his intrenchments.

The danger over, I immediately ordered the troops to resume their

former position, with the exception of the artillery, the location of which was slightly changed. My line, as I have stated, ran along the Bowling Green road as far as the junction of the cross-road already referred to, and then made an angle to the left. At this angle Stewart's battery was placed. At first it acted in concert with Gerrish's battery, but, about the time of Meade's and Gibbon's retreat, Gerrish's battery left the field to go a short distance to the rear for more ammunition, and Stewart was obliged to fight the batteries both in his front and on his left, the latter having an enfilading fire. Gerrish's battery afterward returned to its position and resumed its fire.

Upon examining the lines of General Meredith, I judged them to be too extended, as the enemy were pressing hard upon my center. I therefore directed General Meredith and Colonel Rogers to leave pickets out, and fall back for the night to a safer position, behind a ditch and embankment running perpendicularly from the Bowling Green road to the wood on the river bank. The troops would thus be safe against a surprise in the night, and would be in easy supporting distance of any part of my line. As the ground temporarily abandoned was very open and commanded by our batteries, I knew the enemy could not establish himself there, and that I could resume possession of it at daylight the next morning.

It was now 4.30 p. m. A furious cannonade, apparently from more than forty pieces of artillery, opened upon us, sending an incessant shower of shot, shell, and case shot through our ranks until long after dark; at the same time a triple line of sharpshooters redoubled their efforts against the center, endeavoring to draw Stewart's battery away and to cover the advance of one or more of their batteries, which were now firing canister. Stewart, however, was fully equal to the occasion; nothing could exceed the accuracy of his fire and the sound judgment which regulated the discharges to suit the character of the attack. He blew up another of the enemy's caissons, disabled their pieces, and strewed the earth with slain. Captain Reynolds' battery had been sent a short distance, previous to the cannonade, to report to General Meredith, on the extreme left, the general having sent word that he was threatened with a charge of cavalry in that vicinity. Captain Reynolds found himself at once engaged with several batteries, and he repeatedly obliged them to shift their positions. He must have done good execution, for four dead horses were left on the ground in a single section of rebel artillery. He came in afterward with Meredith's brigade, and resumed his old position.

To fill the gap left by Reynolds' battery, and meet in some measure the overwhelming amount of artillery force in our front, Captain Wolcott, of the First Maryland Battery, was ordered to report to me. guns were posted on my right, and at once opened upon the enemy with excellent effect. He was relieved the next morning by the Second Pennsylvania Battery, under Captain Cooper, who remained with us until we crossed the river.

I have stated that General Meredith and Colonel Rogers were ordered to take up a new position, and leave pickets out to cover the front of their brigades. There was unusual, and, as I deemed, unnecessary, delay in obeying this order on the part of General Meredith, and finding, after two hours had elapsed, that my instructions had not been carried out, I felt it my duty to relieve him of the command. I therefore placed the brigade under Colonel Cutler, of the Sixth Wisconsin Volunteers, the next in command.

The persistent efforts being made to break through my center, and

the advance of the several batteries to within canister range of that point, induced me to strengthen it in every possible way. The Second and Sixth Wisconsin Volunteers were sent there temporarily, in addition to other troops. There was no danger, however, of the center giving way; the men stood as firmly as if rooted to the spot, and, although suffering severely from the canister, they did not yield an inch of ground. It now became very dark, and the enemy's guns gradually ceased to fire.

To meet an attack, should one be made the next morning, General Reynolds sent me Hall's battery (Second Maine), with three 3-inch guns, and the division lately under command of General Gibbon and now under command of General Taylor. I posted this division, which only contained about 2,000 men, as a reserve, behind a rise of ground in our rear. There was a great deal of heavy picket firing during the night, but toward morning all became quiet.

At daylight on the 14th, my troops again resumed possession of the ground to our left, and were formed as before in two lines, obliquely from the angle of the road to the river.

About 11 a. m. a Whitworth gun opened on us from the banks of the Massaponax, near the river, enfilading our lines along the Bowling Green road. Colonel Phelps skillfully evaded the danger by a partial change of front. Hall's battery replied to this gun, firing about 20 rounds, but most of his projectiles appeared to fall short. Considerable bodies of cavalry and infantry made their appearance during the day on the river bank, but no attack took place, probably owing to the fact that our batteries on the opposite side of the Rappahannock River had an enfilading fire upon them.

On the 15th, Colonel Morrow, by direction of General Reynolds, went to the Massaponax, with two companies of his regiment (the Twentyfourth Michigan) deployed as skirmishers. It was a daring and wellexecuted reconnaissance, and resulted in much valuable information. The day passed tranquilly away. About 8 o'clock we received orders to recross the river. General Reynolds himself took charge of the re moval of the artillery, and I issued the necessary orders to the infantry. The retreat was a complete success. The wind was in our favor, deadening the sound of the artillery wheels, and thus preventing the enemy from being cognizant of our movements. It seems the pickets had made an agreement with each other not to fire during the night, and this also favored us. These pickets and their supports were necessarily left out all night. Before daylight, Lieutenant Rogers, of the Sixth Wisconsin Volunteers, acting aide de camp, drew them all in successfully to the last map. They owe their safety, in my opinion, to the judgment aud coolness of this young officer.

Lieutenant-Colonel Williams, of the Nineteenth Indiana, was on picket duty with his regiment on the extreme left, nearly 3 miles from the crossing. His command was the last to cross the river, and was closely pursued by the enemy's cavalry and sharpshooters. A portion of his men were compelled to pass in boats, the pontoon bridges having been cut away. I cannot too highly praise the coolness and good order which marked the retreat of this regiment, and in all probability saved it from destruction.

However deplorable the results of this battle may be considered, I have the satisfaction of knowing that my division drove the enemy before it for 3 miles, and held all the ground it had gained. For the good conduct of the men I feel myself much indebted to Colonels Gavin, Phelps, Cutler, and Rogers, commanding brigades, who set an example of coolness and heroism that never wavered under any emergency.