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corps has been sent to Western Virginia, and, I think, ten new regiments to General Dix.

As soon as your plans are fully agreed on, other troops will be sent to you. H. W. HALLECK,

Major General GEORGE B. McClellan,
Near Sharpsburg, Maryland.

General-in-Chief.

[Sent 1.15 p. m.]

WAR DEPARTMENT,

Washington, D. C., September 27, 1862.

Make requisition for contrabands on Brigadier General Wadsworth, military governor of Washington, who will be directed to send them as you may require. Please send report of your recent battles as soon as possible.

Major General MCCLELLAN,

Headquarters Army of the Potomac.

[11.50 a. m.-
.-27.]

H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF POTOMAC,
September 27, 1862-10 a. m.

Your despatch of 1.15 p. m. to-day is just received, upon my return from Harper's Ferry. I have made a requisition for two thousand contrabands on Brigadier General Wadsworth, as directed. My preliminary report of the recent battles is very nearly ready; the delay has been with the corps commanders, who have not all yet furnished the number of killed, wounded and missing in those actions in their respective commands, nor the number of cannon, colors, and provisions taken by them. Not a day, hardly an hour, has elapsed since the recent battles that I have not called again and again for these reports, and been again and again assured that they would be promptly furnished. The corps commanders have encountered the same delays and disappointments in getting prompt and accurate returns from their subordinates. I have been unwilling to report approximately the number of prisoners, cannon, and colors captured, fearing lest, when the returns were made, such report might prove an exaggerated one.

I trust to be able to furnish you a correct report very speedily.
GEO. B. MCCLELLAN,
Major General.

Major General HALLECK.

[Received 7 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF POTOMAC,
September 27, 1862-10 a. m.

All the information in my possession goes to prove that the main body of the enemy is concentrated not far from Martinsburg, with some troops at Charlestown; not many in Winchester. Their movements of late have been an extension toward our right and beyond it. They are receiving re-enforcements at Winchester, mainly, I think, of conscripts, perhaps entirely so. This army is not now in condition to undertake another campaign, nor to bring on another battle unless great advantages are offered by some mistake of the enemy, or

pressing military exigencies render it necessary. We are greatly deficient in officers. Many of the old regiments are reduced to mere skeletons. The new regiments need instruction. Not a day should be lost in filling the old regiments, our main dependence, and in supplying vacancies among the officers by promotion.

My present purpose is to hold the army about as it now is, rendering Harper's Ferry secure, and watching the river closely, intending to attack the enemy should he attempt to cross to this side. Our possession of Harper's Ferry gives us the great advantage of a secure debouche, but we cannot avail ourselves of it until the railroad bridge is finished, because we cannot otherwise supply a greater number of troops than we now have on the Virginia side at that point. When the river rises, so that the enemy cannot cross in force, I purpose concentrating the army somewhere near Harper's Ferry, and then acting according to circumstances, viz: moving on Winchester, if, from the position and attitude of the enemy, we are likely to gain a great advantage by doing so, or else devoting a reasonable time to the organization of the army and instruction of the new troops preparatory to an advance on whatever line may be determined.

In any event, I regard it as absolutely necessary to send new regiments at once to the old corps for purposes of instruction, and that the old regiments be filled at once.

I have no fears as to an attack on Washington by the line of Manassas. Holding Harper's Ferry, as I do, they will not run the risk of an attack on their flank and rear, while they have the garrison at Washington in their front. I rather apprehend a renewal of the attempt on Maryland, should the river remain low for a great length of time, and should they receive a considerable addition to their force. I would be glad to have Peck's division rejoin as soon as possible.

I am surprised that Sigel's men have been sent to Western Virginia without my knowledge. The last I heard from you on the subject was that they were of my disposition.

In the last battle the enemy was undoubtedly superior to us in numbers, and it was only by very hard fighting that we gained the advantages we did. As it was, the result was at one period very doubtful, and we had all we could do to win the day.

If the enemy receives considerable re-enforcements, and we move, it is possible I may have too much on my hands in the next battle.

My own view of the proper policy to be pursued is to retain in Washington merely the force necessary to garrison it, and to send everything else available to re-enforce this army. The railroads give us the means of promptly reenforcing Washington, should it be necessary. If I am re-enforced, as I ask, and am allowed to take my own course, I will hold myself responsible for the safety of Washington.

Several persons, recently from Richmond, say that there are no troops there except conscripts, and they few in number.

I hope to be able to give you details as to late battles by this evening.
I am about starting again for Harper's Ferry.

Major General HALLECK,

GEO. B. MCCLELLAN,

Major General, Commanding.

General-in-Chief.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, September 28, 1862. GENERAL: The reduced condition of the old regiments, and the futility of dependence upon the recruiting service for the replenishing of their ranks, points to the necessity of earnest endeavor to collect all the absent officers and men belonging to these organizations. I am aware that this subject has already occupied the attention of the War Department; but I am now more especially attending to the class of absentees employed on extra duty in the hospital and other staff departments of the army, who are the most valuable of the absentees, (for many absent men are runaways,) and who can be sent to their regiments now without difficulty, inasmuch as their places can be readily supplied from new troops. I am now getting together stragglers and convalescents from hospitals; and if I could get extra-duty men also, a very considerable addition would be made to the diminished ranks of the old regiments.

In order to carry this into effect, I respectfully suggest that an order be issued fixing a time, say the 15th of October, when all hospital attendants and other extra-duty men shall be relieved and sent to the convalescent camp at Alexandria in depot, from which they can be drawn and sent to their regiments as soon as a sufficient number have accumulated to justify the sending for them. The order should prohibit any officer retaining a soldier of the old regiments without the consent of the War Department, or of the commander of the army or department to which the soldier belongs.

I suggest that every hospital and staff officer be inspected within the month of October, by, if necessary, scores of officers detailed for the purpose to ferret out the old soldiers hidden away therein. Such an inspection would produce more fruit in one week than the recruiting service can in three months.

And, finally, I suggest to the War Department the employment of the deputy provost marshals, throughout the north, more particularly in the arrest of deserters. Convalescent soldiers leave hospitals, and have done so for the past year, and return home habitually. It is the experience of every army commander that not more than a tenth of the soldiers who are left behind, sick, ever rejoin.

A regiment here, which has been employed pretty much during the whole year as depot guard, has had, in the course of the year, some five hundred sick sent to hospitals in the rear. Of these it has received back some fifteen or twenty. The stragglers, too. are numerous in every division of the army; many of these desert.

The States of the north are flooded with deserters, absentees, &c. One corps of this army has 13,000 and odd men present, and 15,000 and odd absent. Of this 15,000, 8,000 probably are at work at home-deserters. They can be secured and returned, and I beg that the fullest exercise of the power of the government may be devoted, if necessary, to the accomplishment of this end. It will have the happiest result in swelling the ranks of the old regiments, and in preventing their future reduction.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. B. MCCLELLAN,

Major General Commanding.

P. S. Since writing the above G. O. No. 140, of September 24, 1862, has come to my notice. The department has, therefore, anticipated my suggestions with regard to the employment of deputy provost marshals.

Brigadier General L. THOMAS,

Adjutant General United States Army.

G. B. McCLELLAN,

By S. W.

Statement showing the number of men comprising the army of the Potomac on the 30th day of September, 1862.

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ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFfice, Washington, D. C., February 27, 1862.

It is hereby certified that the preceding statement is accurately compiled from the morning report of the 30th day of September, 1862, signed by Major General McClellan and his assistant adjutant general, Seth Williams, and now on file in this office.

L. THOMAS, Adjutant General.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
Washington, October 7, 1862.

GENERAL: Your letter of September 28 to the adjutant general is just received by me.

Nearly every measure recommended by you to fill up the old regiments have already been adopted. Some two thousand convalescents have been sent to their regiments within the last four days. Extra duty men will be sent to their regiments as soon as they can be replaced. Teamsters, for example, we are replacing as rapidly as possible by hired men.

Straggling is the great curse of the army, and must be checked by severe measures. Whatever measures you adopt to accomplish that object will be approved. I think myself that shooting them while in the act of straggling from their commands is the only effective remedy that can be applied. If you apply the remedy you will be sustained here.

We are making every possible effort to fill up the old regiments, but not much can be done at present. As soon as volunteering is over we hope to fill them by draft-it is the only means of doing it. I have had an interview with Governor Morgan, of New York, to-day, and he will draft for that purpose in his State. As soon as this is done, volunteer officers will be detailed from the several New York regiments to bring on the drafted men in squads of several hundred for distribution to old companies.

But you cannot delay the operations of the army for these drafts. It must move, and the old regiments must remain in their crippled condition. The convalescents, however, will help a little. The country is becoming very impatient. at the want of activity of your army, and we must push it on. I am satisfied that the enemy are falling back toward Richmond.

We must

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follow them and seek to punish them. There is a decided want of legs in our troops. They have too much immobility, and we must try to remedy the defect. A reduction of baggage and baggage trains will effect something; but the real difficulty is they are not sufficiently exercised in marching-they lie still in camp too long.

After a hard march, one day is time enough to rest; lying still beyond that

time does not rest the men. If we compare the average distances marched per month by our troops for the last year with that of the rebels or with European armies in the field, we will see why our troops march no better. They are not sufficiently exercised to make them good and efficient soldiers.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

Major General MCCLELLAN,

H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.

Commanding, &c.

[Received 4.50 p. m.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

September 28-1 p. m.

Heavy lines of dust were seen last evening extending from Martinsburg towards Winchester, along the turnpike.

Whether this was caused by marching troops or the passage of supply trains, I have not as yet been able to determine.

I shall probably be able to get more information upon the subject to-day. G. B. MCCLELLAN,

Major General H. W. HALLECK.

[Received 11.25 p. m ]

Major General.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
September 28-10.30 p. m.

Several reports have been made to me this evening that the main rebel army is retreating from the vicinity of Martinsburg in the direction of Winchester. I shall send out strong reconnoissances in the morning to test the truth of these reports.

Major General H. W. HALLECK,

G. B. MCCLELLAN, Major General, Commanding.

General-in-Chief.

WAR DEPARTMENT,

Washington, D. C., September 29, 1862.

If the regiments of new troops ordered to Frederick to report to you ought to go direct to Harper's Ferry, or elsewhere, please telegraph to General Banks. Why not march these troops?

H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.

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