in 1868 the court of criminal appeals, in Texas, decided a criminal case involving the boundary line, and as to whether it was in the middle of the river or along the south bank, and in that case the court decided that it was in the middle of the river and that the jurisdiction of Texas extended thereto.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to get some decisions before you and have you apply the facts in this case to the principles of law. I am reading from Judicial and Statutory Definitions, Words and Phrases, volume 4, on page 3118. They are all brief, and I would like to get them into the record:

"Good faith,' as used in Rev. Code Miss. 1871, ch. 17, art. 4, § 1557, which provides for the payment of defendants, in actions of ejectment, of the value of their improvements on the land, and that no defendant shall be entitled to such compensation unless he shall claim the premises under some deed or contract of purchase made or acquired in good faith, means nothing more than an honest belief on the part of the purchaser that he was the true owner. It does not mean that the purchaser must have made every possible research to discover whether or no his title was valid. It is used in contradistinction to bad faith. Canal Bank v. Hudson, 4 Sup. Ct. 303, 311, 111 U. S. 66, 28 L. Ed. 354."

Now, another citation:

"Good faith, such as is required in the creation or acquisition of color of title, is a freedom from a design to defraud the person having the better title, and the knowledge of an adverse claim to or lien upon property does not, of itself, indicate bad faith in a purchaser, and is not even evidence of it, unless accompanied by some improper means to defeat such claim or lien. Searl v. School Dist. No. 2, 10 Sup. Ct. 374, 377, 133 U. S. 553, 33 L. Ed. 740." Now, another:

"Good faith in the acquirement of title within the meaning of the statute in reference to the title by adverse possession, does not require ignorance of adverse claims or defects in the title. Notice, actual or constructive, is of no consequence. There may be good faith notwithstanding actual notice of existing claims or liens or knowledge of legal defects, which prevent the title of which there is color from being absolute. Thus one who obtains a deed to property without fraud, supposing that it conveys good title may acquire title by possession and payment of taxes, although he took the deed with knowledge of an adverse claim. Keppel v. Dreier, 58 N. E. 386, 388, 187 Ill. 298."

Here is another:

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By the term 'good faith' as used in the rule that good faith in the claimant is an indispensible element in the law of adverse possession, it must not be understood that it involves an inquiry into the party's belief in the character or strength of his title, or whether in fact he has any title. What is meant by the term is simply good faith in claiming possession of title; or in other words, a real intention to claim the land as his own, distinct and hostile to the title of the owner. Newell on Ejectment, p. 788. But the court held that, to say that good faith is an essential element, and then to limit to mere intent to claim title, is to eliminate it altogether, as the intent to claim title may exist entirely independent of any element of good faith, as the term has universally been understood. Lampman v. Van Alstyne, 69 N. W. 171, 174, 94 Wis. 417."

Here is another:

"The words 'good faith,' as used in the statute of limitations of 1839, providing that title of land shall vest in one in possession who has paid taxes for seven years under claim and color of title acquired in good faith, should

be construed in their practical common-sense meaning. The statute was intended to protect a purchaser of land who bought and paid his money under the belief that he was acquiring title. The fact that a purchaser may err in judgment or do an act that another, under like circumstances, might not do, is not enough to impeach the good faith of the transaction, when the purchase is made with an honest purpose, though the real title is not acquired. Winters v. Haines, 48 111, 585, 588."

Another reference on the same page:

“The requirement that the defeated party in ejectment must have made improvements on the premises while claiming under some deed or contract of purchase made in good faith in order to be entitled to the value of the improvements, means merely that the party must have an honest belief that he is the true owner. The expression 'some deed or contract' of itself negatives the idea that it is the true title which he must have and plainly indicates that what the law calls color of title' will be sufficient. Indeed, if he were the purchaser of the true title, there would be no occasion for him to invoke the protection of the statute, since he could never be dispossessed, and hence could never be compelled to make claim for improvements. Hicks v. Blakeman, 21 South, 7, 8; 74 Miss. 459."

Mr. SUMMERS. In other words, Mr. Chairman, the circumstances fit the case largely.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to get these citations before Mr. Dyar, so he may apply the facts to them. I just have one or two more.

Now, on page 3121 of the same volume, Words and Phrases:

"Good faith,' as the term is used in the rule of law that a tresspasser on the land of another who takes property therefrom shall be liable only for the actual damage if the property taken was taken in good faith, means that the talking is without culpable negligence or a willful disregard of the rights of others, and in the honest and reasonable belief that it was rightful. The term has been employed in the authorities upon this subject to characterize the acts of one who, while legally a wrongdoer, acted in the honest belief that his conduct was rightful. Whitney v. Huntington, 33 N. W. 561, 563; 37 Minn. 197.” I also want to read from Words and Phrases, volume 8, Appendix A to Z. Mr. RAKER. What page, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Page 7775.

Now, here is a case where the same acts may not be good faith for one purpose, and is good faith for another purpose. [Reading:]

"One is not a 'purchaser in good faith,' so as to be protected against the outstanding contract, who has constructive notice of such contract; and this because the law itself imputes, in the case of constructive notice, knowledge to him. But one may honestly believe that he has good title when in fact he has not, and, while this belief will not avail him as against an outstanding contract or title of which he has constructive notice, he will nevertheless be entitled to be protected in his permanent improvements, for the test of good faith as to them is his honest belief that he has good title."

That is a case where the man lost the property he claimed, real property, but was reimbursed for the improvements he placed thereon.

Mr. RAKER. What is the name of the case, Mr. Chairman, and what is the page?

The CHAIRMAN. That is Hunter v. Coe, 97 N. W. 869, 872, 12 N. D. 505. Now, I would like to have your observations upon that, and upon one other proposition. We may have to adjourn in a little while, and I want to give you time to study over it.

On page 3 of the letter of the Assistant Attorney General, you compare this proposed legislation with the oil leasing act, and you say that the relief given by these two acts-you refer to sections 18 and 19.

Mr. DYAR. Eighteen and 18a, I think.

The CHAIRMAN. Eighteen and 18a. You say that the relief given by these two sections only extend to parties who initiated mineral oil claims upon lands withdrawn by those two orders prior to the withdrawal; that is to say, the parties to whom relief went, to whom relief extended, went upon lands undoubtedly open to mineral claims.

Now, I was wondering if that statement is correct, because as I remember the oil leasing act, we gave relief to men who went upon the land after the withrawal, and that section 18 so states. The withdrawal order was made

September 27, 1909. We gave relief under section 18 to anyone who was upon the withdrawn lands prior to July 3, 1910.

Mr. DYAR. Exactly so, and that was

The CHAIRMAN. Now, anyone being upon the lands between the date of the Taft withdrawal, September 27, 1909, and July 3, 1910, got relief under section 18.

Mr. DYAR. Not necessarily.

The CHAIRMAN. And as I understand that, a number of parties who went upon the land after the Taft withdrawal received relief.

Mr. DYAR. Probably the construction implied otherwise-

The CHAIRMAN. And those parties going on there again had actual notice of the withdrawal.

Mr. DYAR. Exactly so.

The CHAIRMAN. That was upheld by the Supreme Court. And on July 3, 1910 that is the reason for the date July 3, 1910-the President on July 2, 1910, after the passage of the Pickett Act, made another withdrawal order, withdrawing the same land under the Pickett Act.

Mr. DYAR. Yes; under the Pickett Act.

The CHAIRMAN. Under the Pickett Act; yes.

Mr. DYAR. And it was the Pickett Act which expressly authorized the PresiIdent to make the withdrawal.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. DYAR. For the former withdrawal, is the original general power which more or less disposed

The CHAIRMAN. But what I am getting at is this, that under the leasing law, we gave relief to parties who went upon the land after the withdrawal, who went on in good faith.

Now, I call your

Mr. RAKER. Which withdrawal?

Mr. DYAR. What is that?

Mr. RAKER. Under which withdrawal; there were two.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the withdrawal order of September 27, 1909.

Mr. DYAR. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. The withdrawal order of July 2, 1910, was merely confirmatory of the first order of President Taft, and was based on the Pickett Act, which I think was passed or became a law June 25, 1910. (36 Stat., 847.) Mr. VAILE. Relating to the particular land?

Mr. DYAR. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, according to his contention, if I understand it clearly, these parties who went upon those withdrawn lands could not have been in good faith, because they had notice of the withdrawal order, and the adverse claims

of the Government, and notice of President Taft's order that it was not open for mineral entry, or exploration.

Now, in the same section 18, we have this provision in the oil leasing act:

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'No claimant for a lease who has been guilty of any fraud or who had knowledge or reasonable grounds to know of any fraud, or who has not acted honestly and in good faith, shall be entitled to any of the benefits of this section." So in that very act we acknowledged the fact that parties who went upon that withdrawn land, after notice, might have acted in good faith, and I question this statement on page 3 of the Assistant Attorney General's letter, that the relief was only given to those who went upon the land before the withdrawal order.

Mr. DYAR. As to that, I am entirely clear, and I would like again to reread the provisions of the oil leasing act. I believe that the Secretary-I am so informed-I did not happen to be handling these cases while the withdrawn matters were up, but I believe that the Secretary did give relief to some parties who went on the lands after the first withdrawal and before the second, went on under advice of counsel that the withdrawal was invalid, but I doubt very much

Mr. RAKER. May I inquire, if on advice of counsel that the withdrawal order was void?

Mr. DYAR. Was void; yes, sir; but I am not sure, in my own mind, that the intention of the act was to

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, I understand that in this Red River case the contention will be made that these parties were there honestly and in good faith, acting upon advice of counsel, upon this land in question, and that is the reason I am so anxious to have you give us a pretty full exposition of the department's idea of the phrase "good faith."

Here is one thing that occurred to me. There may be some fallacy in it. Now, these placer oil people claim: They contend that Texas had no claim, they contended that Oklahoma had no claim, they contended that the riparian owners on the Oklahoma side had no claim, and they contended that the riparian owners on the Texas side had no claim south of the median lines.

Mr. VAILE. That would all be the same.

The CHAIRMAN. They claim that the land was public land. Now, they were right in every one of those claims. The thing that they were wrong about in the light of the recent decision of the Supreme Court was in their claim that these were public lands open to entry under the placer mining act. So, if you want to state it that way, they might be four-fifths right in their claim and onefifth wrong.

Mr. DYAR. If you start at the other end and take up the question, assuming that they are public lands, they are wrong altogether, taking that as the first question.

Mr. SUMMERS. Mr. Chairman, how long are we going to continue? It is after 12 now. There is an important bill on the floor.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the wish of the committee?

Mr. VAILE. Mr. Dyar, of course, will want to continue and will perhaps want to have a little time to think over the suggestions that the chairman has made, and I would be in favor, as one member of adjourning now, Mr. Chair

man.

Mr. DYAR. You do not need to do that on my account. I would not have time to go over the original case, and the only thing that I can give is what occurs to me now. I can go ahead if you wish. Just suit yourselves.

Mr. SUMMERS. How would it be to notify the parties interested that we are going on, going to continue the hearings from day to day?

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, we are going to continue until we get through.

Mr. SUMMERS. Every day?

Mr. LARSEN. That would contemplate a hearing to morrow. The House is not going to be in session to-morrow.

Mr. RAKER. The idea occurred to me that a good many members might want to go away to-morrow.

Mr. LARSEN. Speaking for myself, I have a previous engagement that will take me over into Maryland to-morrow, and some other parties have already arranged.

Mr. RAKER. That is the same with me. I did not suppose that we would want to hold a hearing on Saturday, as the House will be adjourned. Mr. LARSEN. I would like to hear the witnesses testify in the case.

STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES D. CARTER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA.

Mr. CARTER. Mr. Chairman, might I have a word here? I do not want to interrupt your procedure, but may I ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. CARTER. How long do you expect to hold hearings on this bill?
The CHAIRMAN. I assume for two or three days.

Mr. CARTER. I introduced a joint resolution touching on this proposition, No. 406, and it was introduced at the suggestion of the State Land Commission of Oklahoma. I am sure that they would be very much interested in this matter and want to be heard before any final action is taken in it by your committee; and I would like to know if the hearings would be continued long eough that they might be able to get here to be heard?

The CHAIRMAN. When can they get here?

Mr. CARTER. This is Friday. They would not be able to get here before Tuesday or Wednesday, probably.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we will be glad to hear them when they get here. The hearings will probably run on into next week.

Mr. CARTER. Well, I will notify them.

The CHAIRMAN. Personally, I can not sit longer than Wednesday.

Mr. CARTER. How many bills are you considering?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we just have two bills, the one introduced by Mr. Sanders and myself. The clerk will give you the bills.

Mr. CARTER. I have the Sanders bill. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, shall we adjourn until when?

Mr. LARSEN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to suggest Monday. I would like

to hear these witnesses, especially on this principle.

Mr. SUMMERS. I have wired one witness that might be here Monday.

Mr. LARSEN. Monday is satisfactory to me.

Mr. VAILE. There are a lot of people coming here from a distance. It may be that they could not wait and would have to go away.

Mr. COLLINS. The hearings will be printed?

The CHAIRMAN. The hearings will be printed.

Mr. RAKER. They will be printed, but they will be printed in a type that you can not read. That is a matter of fact.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any objection to Monday? Without objection, the committee will stand adjourned until Monday.

(Whereupon, at 12.20 o'clock, the committee adjourned until Monday, January 15, 1923.)