1833.

REX

v.

COOPER.

made a statement to the turnkey of Reading Gaol. The turnkey had held out no inducement to him to confess, and had not given him any caution not to confess.

Carrington, for the prisoners, objected that this statement was not receivable after what had been said to the prisoner Cooper by Mr. Simeon.

Mr. Justice J. PARKE.-I think that I ought not to receive the evidence after what Mr. Simeon said to the prisoner, more especially as the turnkey did not give any caution to the prisoner (a).

The statement was not received.

It was proved, by a king's evidence named Maskell, that the prisoner Wicks had desired him to tell the prisoner Cooper to set the place on fire at the straw stack; and that he told Cooper accordingly; but did not inform Cooper that he did so at the desire of the prisoner Wicks.

Mr. Justice J. PARKE.-The prisoner Cooper is charged with setting fire to two barns, &c., as well as to the straw rick, to which the fire seems, in the first instance, to have been applied. However, if a person set fire to a stack, the fire from which is likely to, and which does, communicate to a barn, which is thereby burnt, he is in point of law indictable for setting fire to the barn (b). With respect to an accessory before the fact, it is not necessary that

(a) If a person of inferior authority cautions a prisoner not to confess, after an inducement held out by a person of superior authority, it is important to consider whether a statement made by a prisoner, under such circumstances, would be receivable; as it

seems to be but a fair conclusion, that what was said to the prisoner by a magistrate would be much more likely to operate on his mind than any thing subsequently said to him by a constable.

(b) See the charge of Lord Chief Justice Tindal, ante, p. 266, (n).

there should be any direct communication between the accessory and the principal. It is enough if the accessory direct an intermediate agent to procure another to commit the felony; and it will be sufficient, even though the accessory does not name the person to be procured, but merely directs the agent to employ some person.

Verdict--Guilty.

Talfourd, Serjt., Curwood, and Shepherd, for the pro

secution.

Carrington, for the prisoners.

1833.

REX

v.

Cooper.

[Attornies-Newbery, and Neale.]

WORCESTER ASSIZES.

BEFORE MR. JUSTICE J. PARKE.

REX v. BOUlton.

LARCENY. The prisoner was charged with stealing

a bible, a hymn book, and a pair of brass sconces, the property of John Bennett and others.

It appeared that the bible and hymn book were presented to the society of Wesleyan Methodists at Feckenham, from which chapel they had been stolen. It further appeared, that the books had been bound at the expense of the society; and it was stated by Mr. Bennett, that he was one of the trustees of the chapel, who had bought the sconces, and was also a member of the society, which consisted of about sixty-two members. No trust

March 4th.

A bible had been given to a

society of Wesleyans, and it had been bound

at the expense

B. stated that he was one of the trustees of the

of the society.

chapel, and also

a member of the

society. No trust

deed was produced:-Held,

that in an in

dictment for

stealing the bi

ble, the property was rightly laid in B. and others.

1833.

REX v.

BOULTON.

Shutt, for the prosecution, cited the case of Rex v. Hutchinson (a).

Mr. Justice J. PARKE.-I think, as Mr. Bennett is one of the society, the property in the books is well laid in him and others.

Shutt, for the prosecution.
Carrington, for the prisoner.

REX v. RICHARD ENOCH and MARY PULLEY.

1833.

March 6th.

a child has is born, this is not sufficiently

breathed before

killing of such

child murder.

There must be an independent the child, or the considered as

MURDER. The first count of the indictment charged If the two prisoners with the wilful murder of the female bas- it tard child of the prisoner Mary Pulley, by stabbing it in life to make the the head with a fork. The second count charged that they killed the child with their hands. The third count charged, that, before the child was completely born, the prisoners stabbed it with a fork, and that it was born, and then died of the stab. The fourth count was similar to the third, except that it charged the child to have been killed by the hands of the prisoners, and not with a fork. A puncture was found in the child's skull; but, when the injury that had caused it was inflicted did not appear: some questions were asked as to whether the child had breathed.

Mr. Justice J. PARKE.-The child might breathe before it was born; but its having breathed is not sufficiently life to make the killing of the child murder.

Godson. The wound might have been given before the child was born, and the child might have lived afterwards.

Mr. Justice J. PARKE.-Yes, but there must have been an independent circulation in the child, or the child cannot be considered as alive for this purpose.

It was proposed to give in evidence a declaration of the female prisoner; the witness called to prove it, whose name was Abigail Commander, said "I was placed by the constable with the prisoner Mary Pulley, while he went to the inquest. I was placed with her to prevent her from laying violent hands on herself, and to prevent her from going away. I told her to the effect, that she had better tell the truth or it would lie upon her, and the man would go free."

child cannot be

alive for this purpose.

A man and woman being

apprehended on

a charge of mur

der, another wo

man, who had the female prisoner in custody, told her that she "had better tell the truth,

or it would lie upon her, and

the man would go free."Held, that a declaration of the female prisoner, made to this

woman after

wards was not

receivable in evidence.

1833.

REX

v.

ENOCH.

Curwood, for the prisoner Mary Pulley.-I submit that any thing the prisoner said after this cannot be received in evidence; a confession ought to be perfectly voluntary. Here there was an allurement held out to her to make a statement; and a statement after that cannot be considered as made voluntarily.

Whateley. This is in effect an inducement to make the prisoner criminate herself; because, in attempting to charge another person, she may shew her own connexion with a felonious transaction.

Godson, contra.-It has never been held that a prisoner's being induced to free himself from the charge, is a ground for rejecting what he has said.

Mr. Justice J. PARKE, (having conferred with Mr. Justice TAUNTON).—I have conferred with my learned brother on this point; and as this declaration of the female prisoner can only be legitimately received in evidence to affect her and no one else, we think that it is not receivable, as it was made after an inducement held out by a person who had her in custody. If it were to be used at all, it could only be used to criminate her; and then it would be evidence obtained to criminate her by means of an inducement.