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should be allowed till after the party is taken and brought to his trial (a).

F. V. Lee.-I am informed, that since his discharge the prisoner is not to be found. Here, theprosecutor has preferred his indictment, and has done all that he could do; and for the discharge of the prisoner he is in no way to blame.

Mr. Justice TAUNTON.-I think that, as the bill has been preferred and found, I may, under the word "prosecuted" in the section you refer to, order the expenses. But, if the witnesses had merely appeared here according to their recognizances,and no bill had been preferred, I think that I should have had no authority.

F. V. Lee, for the prosecution.

Expenses allowed.

[Attorney-Bagshawe.]

(a) See the case of Rex v. Hunter, ante, Vol. 3, p. 591.

See the stat. 7 Geo. 4, c. 64, ss.

22 to 30, respecting the allowance
of expenses and rewards, set forth
Carr. Supp. p. 106 et seq.

1833.

REX

บ. ROBEY.

REX v. EVANS.

FALSE
pretence.
The indictment charged that B. E.
on &c., at &c., a certain counterfeit letter in writing, in the
name of one John Roe, as a true letter of the proper hand-
writing of the said John Roe, falsely, fraudulently, and de-
ceitfully, to one John Brooks did deliver, and also did
then and there falsely pretend to the said John Brooks,
that he had brought the same from the said John Roe for

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tering a forged request for the delivery of goods, which is a felony under sect. 10 of the stat. 1 Will. 4, c. 66.

VOL. V.

1833.

REX

v.

EVANS.

the articles specified therein; and by which false and counterfeit letter it was mentioned, that the said John Roe desired the said John Brooks to supply the bearer thereof with four yards of Irish linen and a waistcoat; and which said false and counterfeit letter is as follows, that is to say:

"Mr. Brooks-Please to let the bearer, William Turton, have for J. Roe four yards of Irish linen and a waist

coat.

"John Roe."

"Jan. 6, 1833. By means of which counterfeit letter and of the said false pretences, the said B. E. did obtain &c.

Mr. Justice TAUNTON.-This is a forged request for the delivery of goods. This case comes within the 10th sect. of the stat. 11 Geo. 4 &1 Will. 4, c. 66 (a). It is clearly an uttering of a forged request for the delivery of goods.

W. J. Alexander, for the prosecution.-I submit that it is still a false pretence within the stat. 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 29, s. 53.

Mr. Justice TAUNTON.-No; it is uttering a forged re

(a) By which it is enacted, "that if any person shall forge or alter, or shall offer, utter, dispose of, or put off, knowing the same to be forged or altered, any deed, bond, or writing obligatory, or any court roll, or copy of any court roll relating to any copyhold or customary estate, or any acquittance or receipt either for money or goods, or any accountable receipt either for money or goods, or for any note, bill, or other security for payment of money, or any warrant, order,

or request for the delivery or transfer of goods, or for the delivery of any note, bill, or other security for payment of money, with intent to defraud any person whatsoever, every such offender shall be guilty of felony, and, being convicted thereof, shall be liable, at the discretion of the Court, to be transported beyond the seas for life, or for any term not less than seven years, or to be imprisoned for any term not exceeding four years or less than two years."

quest for the delivery of goods. It is a felony, and not a misdemeanor. The prisoner must be acquitted.

1833.

REX

V.

Verdict-Not guilty.

EVANS.

W. J. Alexander, for the prosecution.

F. V. Lee, for the prisoner.

REX v. HAUGHTON.

ARSON. The prisoner was charged with setting fire to an "outhouse;" and in another count with setting fire to a "stable," the property of Joseph Owen. In other counts, the outhouse and stable were stated to be the property of John Sparrow.

It appeared that the place burnt had been an oven to bake bricks, and that the prosecutor had made a door-way (with a door) into it, and had put boards and turf over the vent-hole at the top. It also appeared that two poles had been fixed across it at about half its height, on which boards had been laid, so as to make a loft floor. In this

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put to it.
this place the
prosecutor kept
a cow; adjoin-

ing to it, but

not under the

same roof, was a lean-to, in

which another person kept a

horse. Neither

the prosecutor

nor the person

of whom he

rented this building had

place, the prosecutor kept a cow; and adjoining to it, but not under the same roof, was a lean-to, in which a person named Cope kept a horse; but this latter building any house or was not injured by the fire.

C. Phillips, for the prisoner.-I submit that this indictment must fail. This was a building for burning bricks, which has latterly been used as a cow-house, but never as a stable. It is not a stable, as it was only used for cows; indeed, the witness calls it a cow-house.

The prosecutor being recalled, said, that the building was about one hundred yards from any dwelling-house, and that the owner of the nearest dwelling-house had no

farm-yard near it, nor did any wall connect it with any dwell

ing-house, the

nearest dwelling being one hundred yards off,

and not belong

ing to either the
prosecutor or
his landlord:-
Held, that the
building was

neither a stable

nor an out

house; and that

if a person set

it on fire (the

lean-to not being burnt), he was not indictable for arson.

1833.

REX

V.

HAUGHTON.

interest in it; and that no dwelling-house or farm-yard of either himself or Mr. Sparrow was near it; and that there was no wall to connect it with any dwelling-house.

C. Phillips.-This is not an outhouse.—It is not within the curtilage. The next point is, whether it is a stable.

Mr. Justice TAUNTON.-I think that it is not properly described as a stable.-The question is, whether it is an outhouse?

C. Phillips.-On that point, I would refer to the case of Elsmore v. St. Briavel's (a). That case shews, that where a house was built for a particular purpose, but was used for other purposes, it could not be described as a building of the kind that it was used for. There, though the house had been used as a barn, and had never been used for any thing else, yet, being three stories high, and built as a dwelling-house, it was held not sufficient to describe it as a barn. The building, in the present case, was a brick oven, used as a cow-house. I also submit that this is not an outhouse, as it is not attached to any dwellinghouse, or within the curtilage of any dwelling-house.

Greaves, on the same side.-I will call your Lordship's attention to the common law, and then to the acts of Parliament, and I think I shall shew that the legal meaning of the term "outhouse" has never been altered. Mr. Serjt. Russell (b) says, in treating of the common law respecting the burning of a house-" It may be briefly observed, that the term 'house' extends not only to the dwelling-house, but to all outhouses which are parcel thereof, though not adjoining thereto, or under the same roof (of which kind of outhouses mention has been made in a former part of this work);" and he then refers to the

(a) 8 B. & C. 461; and 2 M. & R. 514. (b) Russ. Cr. & Misd. 488.

cases of such outhouses within the curtilage, in which,
till very recently, a burglary might have been committed.
The first act of Parliament which notices outhouses is
the riot act, 1 Geo. 1, stat. 2, c. 5, in which the words are,
"barn, stable, or other outhouse;" the word "outhouse'
is also contained in the stat. 9 Geo. 1, c. 22, with respect
to arson: and by Breeme's case (a) it appears that that
statute created no new offence with respect to the burning
of outhouses; and this also appears from the judgment of'
Lord Ellenborough, in the case of Hyles v. The Hundred
of Shrewsbury (b). I, therefore, submit, that where any
term has obtained a precise and definite meaning at common
law, and it is used in an act of Parliament, it will be taken
to have the same meaning that it had at common law; and
for this I would refer to Bac. Abr. tit. Statute (H. 4), and
the cases of Moore v. Hussey (c), and Smith v. Harmon (d).
In the stat. 43 Geo. 3, c. 55, the term "outhouse" is
again used; and it is repeated in the stat. 7 & 8 Geo. 4,
c. 30. If this were an outhouse, almost every building, of
whatever nature and however applied, would be within
the statute: and a very strong argument is to be drawn
from the statute itself, that outhouses within the curtilage
were the only outhouses meant to be included in this
term "outhouse;" because, if it were otherwise, the words
❝stable, coach-house, office, shop, hop-oast, barn, or gran-
ary," need not have been used. The question then is, whe-
ther this was an outhouse within the meaning of this act of
Parliament. It is proved that there was no house near
this building; and the term "outhouse" evidently refers
to some building that has a relation to the house-a
building outside the house, but having a relation to it;
and it is clear, that the converting of a building to a
particular use does not, for this purpose, alter its nature.
That was decided in the case of Elsmore v. St. Briavel's,
where it was held that a place having been used as a barn,

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1833.

REX

V.

HAUGHTON.

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