Question. Will you give us a brief description of that battle, and state its result?

Answer. I believe they brought their whole force disposable at the time on the field in succession to attack us, and endeavor to capture our positions. The battle was desperately contested, and frequently trembled in the balance. The last attack was made with all their forces, and was nearly successful; but we won from the fact that we had kept our reserves in hand for such an attack. On that point I can speak positively. On the left wing where I was, General Porter had the general command, and as the commander of the reserve artillery I was near him, excepting at such times when, from severe cannonading or from information received, I proceeded to the different points of attack, to examine, to direct the artillery there, to bring up the artillery if necessary, or to detach artillery to those corps which required re-enforcements of that arm, and which is one of the principal duties to be performed by the reserve artillery. From the time the first severe attack was made, the demands upon General Porter for re-enforcements were constant, and in some cases importunate, as I could judge from the effect produced, and what General Porter said to me at the time; I advised him to be careful and not to withhold too long, but to send no re-enforcements until it became absolutely necessary. I was convinced, from my own observations at those points of the field to which I had to go, that the struggle would be desperate, and that the victory would remain with the side that held the best reserves at the close. That is an ordinary maxim in military affairs, which General Porter seemed to understand.

A little before sunset it was apparent that the attack for which we had been looking was being made. We were so hard pushed that the ammunition trains of the batteries that were out of ammunition, and all other material that was not required on the plain, were sent off to clear in case we were obliged to have a struggle at the last point. General Porter took charge of all the reserve infantry that he had, and requested me to do the same with the artillery. I gathered up some thirty or forty guns, all that were disposable, brought them up at a gallop, got them into position as rapidly as possible, and finally succeeded in breaking the lines of the enemy. I followed him up as long as possible, until it was so dark that it was impossible to move the guns. I speak more particularly of the attack on our left.

I was on the right at different times during the day. But as matters developed themselves, and it became apparent that the enemy's main attack was to be upon our left, I collected the principal part of the disposable batteries in the rear of the left, but in such position that I could have ready access to the right wing should they be called for in that direction.

Question. Our victory, finally, was pretty decisive, was it not?

Answer. I was pretty certain that we had driven the enemy, and that they had done their best at that time. I cannot say that our victory was so very decisive. But I have had reason since to believe that they considered themselves pretty well whipped at that time.

Question. Which side had the largest force in that battle?

Answer. I do not know. I understood that Jackson's force had been broken down and left behind; could not be brought on the field; but remained in the swamp resting that day. I understood that the attack took place a day sooner than the enemy intended; and that he had overmarched his troops in order to have a day for rest. How true that is I do not know. Both armies, I think, were exhausted.

Question. After that fight you went to Harrison's Landing?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. And I suppose you came with the army around to Aquia ? Answer. Yes, sir; I left Harrison's Landing and went to Aquia, where I reported to General Burnside at Falmouth. I arrived there too late, however,

to go on in person to General Pope's command. The most of the reserve artillery went; a portion of it did not go; but remained there with General Burnside, not getting there in time to go with General Porter's corps.

Question. Can you tell why General Pope was not re-enforced earlier than he was?

Answer. I do not know.

Question. You were not at Alexandria?

Answer. No, sir; the reserve artillery and all of our corps were landed at Aquia. I was left at Aquia to organize the artillery as fast as it landed. One kind of transports was required for the guns; another kind for the horses and for the men. And when the artillery was landed it would, perhaps, turn out that the troops for those batteries having landed before would be gone. I was left to send on the batteries as rapidly as they could be prepared, without regard to the troops to which they belonged. What took place at Alexandria I do not know, except from reports and rumors.

WASHINGTON, March 11, 1863.

Major General JOSEPH HOOKER sworn and examined.

By the chairman :

Question. To what do you attribute the failure of the peninsula campaign? Answer. I do not hesitate to say that it is to be attributed to the want of generalship on the part of our commander.

Question. Were you consulted upon the subject of the line of the peninsula in preference to the one direct to Richmond?

Answer. I never was consulted on the subject.

Question. What was the condition of things at Yorktown when our troops first landed on the peninsula, as regards the strength of the place and the relative strength of the opposing forces?

Answer. I did not go down for some three weeks after General McClellan went down. He went with the army from Alexandria, and the return vessels stopped at Budd's Ferry, where I was, and took my division down. General McClellan took down about 90,000 men, and when I joined him I took 11,000 down to him. I did not see the returns, but that was the understanding there. Franklin afterwads joined with his division. At the time that General McClellan landed with this large army there were somewhere between 8,000 and 15,000 at Yorktown. I have heard it estimated as low as 8,000 and as high as 15,000. Question. What course would you have advised at the time of the landing on the peninsula under the circumstances?

Answer. What I subsequently did will, I think, convey an answer to that question. I attacked, with my single division, a line of works at Williamsburg stronger than the line across the peninsula at Yorktown. At Yorktown, long after I joined, I never could understand why I was required to send one half of my number on duty, day and night, to dig, so as to invest that place. I could only conclude that a siege had been determined upon somewhere in the programme before ever having felt to see whether we had an enemy in front or not. And a great many others felt so too. From my examination of the works at Yorktown, and reaching away beyond the position that I occupied, I felt that their lines could be pierced without any considerable loss by the corps with which I was on duty-Heintzelman's corps. We could have gone right through, and gone to the rear of the enemy. They would run the moment we got to their rear, and we could have picked up the prisoners. Right there at Yorktown

the enemy had expended a great deal of labor. But I would have marched right through the redoubts, which were a part of the cordon they had, and got on the road between Yorktown and Richmond, and thus compelled the enemy to fight me on my ground, and not have fought them on theirs.

Question. Suppose that General McClellan had thrown his army between Yorktown and Williamsburg with as much rapidity as he could, what would have probably been the effect?

Answer. It would have resulted in the capture and destruction of the enemy's

army.

Question. Do you know any reason why that could not have been done?
Answer. I do not.

Question. You were there when the enemy retreated from Yorktown?
Answer. I was within a mile and a half of there.

Question. Will you state, briefly and succinctly, what took place upon their retreat?

Answer. The troops ordered out in the first instance to pursue them were some dragoons and some light batteries under General Stoneman. I received orders to support General Stoneman, and left my camp between one and two o'clock in the afternoon for that purpose. I do not know at what time General Stoneman left. I followed in his rear. After I had proceeded out about five miles I met Governor Sprague, who informed me that General Stoneman had fallen upon the rear of the enemy. I rode up to where General Stoneman was, and found that he was held in check on the Yorktown road about a mile and a half this (Yorktown) side of the cordon of reboubts running across the peninsula. near Williamsburg. I rode forward to ascertain how I could put in my infantry. General Stoneman told me that the enemy was about a mile in his front, where they held some redoubts. It turned out afterwards to be Fort Magruder. We were then where the enemy could throw shells over our heads from the fort. After examining the ground, I heard that Smith's division had filed into the Yorktown road in advance of mine. I immediately returned and joined my division, and found that it had been halted, in order to enable Smith's division to pass. We were detained there in that way between three and four hours. As soon as I ascertained this to be the case, I requested General Heintzelman to allow me to take a different road to go up to the place occupied by the enemy. General Smith's division then occupied almost the entire road between the point where they had filed into the Yorktown road, and where General Stoneman was, and there was no chance for me to get my division through by that road. I learned from a contraband that by going two or three miles further I could get up to the same position the enemy held, coming in on his right flank. To this the general assented. I started upon this route just about dark, and marched that night until eleven o'clock. By that time the roads had become so muddy-it was raining very hard-the mud was knee deep, and my men had become so fatigued, that I halted right in the road, intending to renew the march at the dawn of day in the morning. We were then about two miles and a half from Fort Magruder. We resumed our march at daybreak, and about half-past six o'clock came up to the advanced outposts of the enemy, which was perhaps a half a mile from Fort Magruder. I could see from the position where I was three or four redoubts on this line of the enemy's works. I could also see the line of telegraph poles on the Yorktown road which led to where General Stoneman was. I ordered two regiments to advance as skirmishers on the work which commanded the Yorktown road-to skirmish up to the work. And I despatched two regiments with instructions to break down any barrier and destroy any force that might be between me and the position. that General Stoneman occupied. As soon as my skirmishers had driven the enemy into Fort Magruder, I ordered two batteries forward and opened on the work at once. The two regiments that had been sent to the Yorktown road

passed down the road, found no enemy on it, found no barrier, and reported to General Hancock, who was about a mile and a quarter from Fort Magruder, that there was nothing to prevent the troops there advancing. Those regiments then returned. As early as nine o'clock in the day my skirmishers had advanced so near Fort Magruder, and there held their position, that they could not work their artillery. If a man showed his hand or head above the work he got a ball in it. When this was done, I sent word to the commanding officer on the Yorktown road that there was nothing to prevent his advancing his troops and taking position alongside of mine. The place to where I sent was about a mile and a half from me. I supposed then that General Heintzel

man

was there; but it turned out that he had left, and General Sumner was in command with a large force, certainly not less than 30,000 men. He could have advanced through the line of defences across the peninsula, at Williamsburg, without losing ten men. The enemy could not fire, for I had him in a vice. I wanted him to advance, and until three o'clock of that day I expected he would advance and march through the line held by the enemy, and go to picking up prisoners. During this time my own troops were engaged with not less than three or four times my number. General Kearny, who was the last of all the army to leave Yorktown-except Porter's division, which was left to garrison Yorktown-was the first to come to my assistance. If General Sumner had advanced the rebellion would have been buried there. He did not advance at all.

Question. Where was General McClellan during all this time?

Answer. At Yorktown. About 9 o'clock, or thereabouts, of the morning of the fight, Prince de Joinville, seeing that no re-enforcements would be sent to me, started for Yorktown, and reached there in about an hour. It is reported to me, and I have no doubt that it is so, that he said to General McClellan, "General, you have three old women in the advance. General Hooker is engaged heavily, and they will send him no re-enforcements. It is necessary for you to go to the advance." I think Governor Sprague went down also to urge General McClellan to come up. It was reported to me that General McClellan left Yorktown between 4 and 5 o'clock in the afternoon. Lieutenant Colonel Webb, now the inspector of the fifth corps, was present at the interview between Prince de Joinville and General McClellan. General McClellan showed a great indisposition to go forward, and only left, as I am told, between 4 and 5 o'clock.

Question. You stood your ground?

Answer. Yes, sir. I had a very severe fight, and lost 1,700 men. In consequence of the condition of the roads I could not get up my ammunition. And my men stood their ground with the bayonet, and with such ammunition as they could collect from the cartridge boxes of those who had fallen. I think that was the hardest fight that has been made this war.

Question. The enemy evacuated during the night?

Answer. Yes, sir. When General Kearny came up-he was my senior, but General Heintzelman was under the impression at that time that I ranked Kearny, and he sent him up to report to me-when General Kearny came up, as his brigades came up I put them in position. As soon as that was done, my own troops were withdrawn from the front, and collected together as far as practicable, General Kearny holding the advance. General Kearny then said to me, "I think I rank you." I replied, "Certainly, general, you do." then said he would assume the command, which was very proper. That night his lines of pickets held the advance. During the night the enemy evacuated Williamsburg. I have since learned, from most reliable sources, that when the news of that battle reached Richmond, Jefferson Davis and Governor Letcher moved their families out of Richmond, removed the archives and their libraries; and every citizen who could command a vehicle had his goods piled or Rep. Com. 108-37

wagons, and prepared to abandon the city. They only returned-those who had left-when they found that the pursuit ceased. I might almost say was

abandoned.

Question. Is it your judgment that you could have gone into Richmond then?

Answer. I think we could have moved right on, and got into Richmond by the second day after that battle without another gun being fired.

Question. What was done?

Answer. We moved on in a manner I never did understand, losing time. If there was any necessity for that I never have yet appreciated it. So far as the best information we have goes, the enemy had abandoned the idea of defending Richmond. And it was only when they saw the lassitude and inefficiency of our army that they concluded to make a stand there.

Question. Did you participate in the battle of Fair Oaks or Seven Pines? Answer. At the time that battle was fought my entire division was stationed at what is called Oak Bottom swamp, about five or six miles from where the battle of Saturday, the 31st of May, was fought. About 2 o'clock of that day I received orders to move one-half of my division to the front, the other half to remain and hold the position they then occupied. I started, and upon reaching to within about a mile of what was called Savage's Station, the head of my column became impeded by the fugitives, trains of wagons, and fragments of batteries upon the road, and was prevented from advancing except with their bayonets, and at a charge. From this cause my column could make but little headway, and at the time I left them to ride to the front I doubted if they could advance at all. When I reached there the battle of Fair Oaks for that night was nearly over. About dark my troops came up. We bivouacked on the ground, the firing having been suspended. The next morning about 7 o'clock the firing was renewed. I started with the half of the division I had with me to meet the enemy. The enemy was firing upon Sumner's command, which was occupying the railroad at that time. I made towards the heaviest fire, and came up in fear of the enemy, and in half an hour after my men became engaged. The enemy were utterly routed, throwing away their arms, clothing and haversacks, and broke for the woods in the direction of Richmond. Question. That was the second day of the fight?

Answer. Yes, sir; and that was the end of the fighting at that battle. A part of my troops occupied the camp that had been occupied the day before by General Keyes's corps, and the ground that he had lost that day. On Monday, the day after the battle, I received orders-the directions were very vague-to make a reconnoissance in force through the camp and beyond it. I did so without any resistance, except a little picket firing, and proceeded to perhaps within three and a half or four miles of Richmond, on the Williamsburg road. I was then recalled, and directed to establish my command on the ground that Casey's division had occupied on the first day of the fight at Fair Oaks.

Question. What portion of our army was engaged in that battle?

Answer. Keyes's corps, a little more than one-half of Heintzelman's corps, and a portion of Sumner's corps. If any other troops were engaged I do not know it.

By Mr. Chandler:

Question. At what number would you estimate the actual force engaged on our side?

Answer. I should think that all told there might have been 25,000 men. The telegram directing me to return from my reconnoissance was, in substance, this: "General Hooker will return from his brilliant reconnoissance, we cannot afford to lose his division." All I have to say is, that I had no expection of being lost.

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