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Question. When was it first known that the enemy had defensive works at Williamsburg?

Answer. I never knew it until I came up to Whittaker's the night preceding the battle.

Question. Were the enemy pursued from Williamsburg?

Answer. The enemy were not pursued by any of the forces under my command any farther than the city of Williamsburg.

Question. Do you know whether they were pursued by any of the other forces?

Answer. My knowledge upon that subject is not definite enough to enable me to testify.

Question. Do you know why there was not an immediate and general pursuit of the enemy after that battle!

Answer. I do not.

Question. In your judgment, as a military man, should or should not there have been an immediate pursuit?

Answer. My opinion, as a military man, is that the most vigorous and immediate pursuit should have been made after the battle of Williamsburg.

Question. In your judgment, if an immediate and vigorous pursuit had been made, what would have been the result?

Answer. If an immediate and vigorous pursuit of the enemy had been made, I think we should have overtaken portions of his troops, and have been able to capture such baggage as he took with him. I think also it would have hastened our arrival in the neighborhood of Richmond, and we should have been able to attack the enemy before he had made the preparations for defence and obtained the re-enforcements which our delays gave him the opportunity of doing.

Question. Will you now proceed with your narrative from this point? Answer. On the morning of the 10th of May my corps marched from Williamsburg and camped at Burnt Ordinary. The roads in many places being very bad, my march was necessarily very slow. Still my corps might have arrived at Bottom's Bridge, across the Chickahominy, earlier than it did. But I do not know how much the other portions of the army were necessarily retarded. On the 23d of May I received an order from the commanding general to move my divisions across the Chickahominy river, and take position at points beyond Bottom's Bridge, as indicated in the order. Casey's division was the first to cross the Chickahominy, and Couch's was the second. I crossed myself the day before, the 22d, and reconnoitred on the other side. I sent out repeated and continual reconnoitring parties daily from the 23d until the 30th of May, inclusive, the day previous to the battle of Seven Pines. The first encampments that I occupied with my two divisions after crossing the Chickahominy were stretched along the road branching from the Williamsburg road to White Oak Swamp Bridge. The nearest of them was about a mile from Savage's Station. On the 24th of May I received orders from General McClellan, through General Marcy, his chief of staff, to move forward and seize the nearest strong point to Seven Pines and fortify it. In connexion with that order I will read a telegram I received the next day from General McClellan himself.

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

"May 25, 1862.

"Your telegram to General Marcy just received. General Marcy's instructions of last night were for you to select the nearest strong position to Seven Pines, which I infer you have done, and hope that the picket or advanced guard at the Seven Pines itself are strong enough to keep off small parties of the enemy. Your position and arrangements seem to be fully in accordance with my wishes. "General E. D. Keyes,

"Commanding 4th Corps."

The position which I had occupied, and which is the subject of this telegram, was about half way between Savage's Station and the fork of the road called Seven Pines. I laid out rifle-pits and intrenchments to the right and left of the Williamsburg road, and set the troops to work, and in a very short time I made the position a very strong one. It was a position which I myself selected in accordance with the general instructions I had received from General McClellan. And I thought then, and I have always thought since, that it was the position where I should have awaited the attack of the enemy. On the morning of the 25th of May I received a communication dated from "Headquarters Army of the Potomac, Camp near Coal Harbor." It was dated May 24, at 10.30 p. m. I will read from that communication. "The general commanding directs that you advance your corps to-morrow morning to the Seven Pines and hold that position. General Heintzelman has been ordered up to occupy your present position." In that same communication I was ordered to send my baggage, wagons, &c., to the east side of the Chickahominy. I was also, in the same communication, ordered to select the nearest strong natural position that could be found at the Seven Pines, and not to go much beyond that until further orders. In the same communication I am informed that: "General Heintzelman will be ordered to take the general command of all the troops upon the Richmond side of the river for the present, and you will please obey any instructions you may receive from him." It was my intention, after I had selected the point I have referred to, that is, half way between Savage's Station and Seven Pines, to send forward one or two brigades to Seven Pines and a few pieces of artillery, and to devote all the remaining force I had to fortify the main position I had selected. But I was afterwards overruled in the arrangements I made. On the 28th of May I received this communication :

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"HEADQUARTERS LEFT WING,

"Camp two miles from Bottom's Bridge, May 28, 1862. 'GENERAL: The brigadier general desires you to order Brigadier General Casey to move forward his division to the clearing by two houses and a woodpile, about three-quarters of a mile in advance of his present position, and to fortify it. He also desires you to move General Couch's division forward to the Seven Pines. These movements to be made at 6 a. m. to-morrow morning. He wishes you to direct General Casey to complete the approaches to the bridge he is building over the Chickahominy river.

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The remainder of that note is immaterial. It was signed by Chauncey McKeever, as chief of staff to General Heintzelman.

I thought the arrangement thus ordered a very bad one, and I expressed my objections several times, and I received this note from General Heintzelman.

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"GENERAL: The brigadier general commanding instructs me to say that he moves forward a brigade of General Kearney's division this morning to a position not over two miles from the Seven Pines. In case of an attack General Kearney's division could re-enforce you in half an hour. A company of General Couch's division was relieved as soon as the guard for these headquarters arrived. The position occupied by your corps was selected by General Barnard and Lieutenant Comstock, of the engineers, and instructions to occupy it came from Major

General McClellan. The major general commanding has also directed that the third corps shall not be moved forward, unless to prevent yours from being driven back by the enemy.

"I am, &c.,

"Brigadier General E. D. KEyes,

"CHAUNCEY MCKEEVER,

"Chief of Staff.

"Commanding 4th Corps."

I had understood that the engineers had examined the position about Seven Pines, and the wood-pile in advance of it. But I had no other evidence, except the note I have just read, that they had positively recommended that position to be occupied by me in force. I objected to the position strongly and repeatedly. As the testimony will show, I did not move forward with my force and occupy the position at Seven Pines and the wood-pile, in force, until the morning of the 29th of May.

The weather generally was very unfavorable about that time and the roads very muddy. The men of my corps having been continually in the front were very much fatigued. But I ordered them immediately to set all the disposable force to work to fortify the position. As there was a great deal of scouting to be done, and a great deal of picket and guard duty required of the men, the amount of labor which they were able to perform was comparatively small. The whole time they had was the part of the 29th left, after moving their positions, and the 30th to work on their intrenchments, which consisted of rifle-pits and a small pentangular redoubt, and some slashings that were cut.

The 11th Maine regiment of Casey's division built a bridge whilst I was across the Chickahominy at a place not far from the old Grapevine Bridge, and it was over that bridge that Sumner's corps was able to come to the assistance on the day of the battle of Seven Pines. The labor performed by my troops was very great, and they were taxed excessively.

During the two days in which I occupied the position of Seven Pines and in front of it, I took every means in my power to ascertain the force and position of the enemy. I telegraphed General Marcy as follows on the 28th, at 8 a. m.: "General Negley reports all quiet in front. Evidence of moving heard during the night; the noise of wagons, shouts of teamsters, and successive words of command from different commanders."

That was corroborated from various other sources, and I communicated it to headquarters. On the morning of the 30th, at 8 a. m., I telegraphed General McClellan as follows:

"I expect to send a report to-day on the failure of General Casey's division. One great cause was the rawness of the troops. At my final survey of my position last night I passed one hundred yards beyond the point where Major Kelly fell in the morning. I saw many rebel pickets. At the same time the enemy remained in line of battle on my right, and was found by two scouting parties on the left. The enemy is found all around a semicircle, described with a radius of two miles from my headquarters as a centre."

During the five or six days preceding the battle of Seven Pines, I made very frequent communications to headquarters in reference to the movements of the enemy, and the exposed position occupied by me. I wrote to General Williams in these words on the 26th at 10.20 a. m.:

"I am now within about two miles in an air line from New Bridge, and less than three by the road. I am in view of the enemy's pickets in all directions on the railroad and the right towards Chickahominy. I have also been out towards the head of White Oak Swamp, where the enemy are seen. He is getting waspish, and it appears to me we have pushed him as much as he will bear to be. So I will strengthen my advance in front and around Seven Pines, and

this point, and await further orders. The examination of the country below and down from this point to the old Grapevine Bridge on the Chickahominy, is pretty well done."

In a postscript I say:

"As the enemy may soon fall upon me I learn that there may be a line of support to me via the side of the old Grapevine Bridge. General Negley is there, and has thoroughly examined the position."

On the 29th of May I wrote to General McClellan a note, of which the following is an extract:

"Inasmuch as my position is so far advanced I should like to know what force, in an emergency, I could call upon, with its position."

On the same day I wrote to General Marcy that I had seen the enemy in line of battle on that day and the day before on my right. The following is an extract from that note:

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"The position now held by my corps is far advanced. I think I can hold it. At the same time I confess the difficulty of so doing, if attacked by a large force, would be much greater than that of defending the position left by Couch this morning. It is my opinion that other troops should be advanced nearer to me than any I know of now, as the roads are in the most wretched condition." On the 30th of May, at 2 p. m., I wrote to General Heintzelman :

"I am just in from an examination of the road leading to the front of my position. In the front the enemy is astir. He drove in Casey's outer line of pickets, killing and wounding some of our people, and leaving some dead. We drove back the enemy, 400 strong, and now occupy our position of last night. As Casey's left flank is threatened I have ordered Couch to send a brigade to support the left. I regard this a matter of pickets, but shall be glad when I learn that General Sumner is across so as to strengthen my right."

On the morning of the 31st I had time to write to General Williams. I informed him that there was a great deal of stir among the enemy the day before, and had made dispositions to repel a general attack, and then"The capture of one of General Johnston's aids on our right this morning, and the running of the cars through the night, all indicate that the enemy is turning his attention towards this position."

I wrote again to General Marcy, on the morning of the 31st, in relation to the capture of the aid of General Johnston, and I stated:

"In connexion with the appearance of this young officer on our right, and near our lines, I will state that the general officer of the day, Colonel Hunt, of Casey's division, heard the cars running through the night continually. Yesterday there was much stir among the enemy, and everything on his part indicates an attack on my position, which is only tolerably strong, and my forces too weak to defend it properly. Brigadier General Sumner told me he should, perhaps, cross the Chickahominy last night. If he did so, and takes post nigh the old tavern and this side, I should feel much more secure than I am now." I have thus given an idea of the vigilance exercised, and of the information conveyed by me to General Heintzelman and to General McClellan. It having been reported that we were surprised, I have just given in detail the precautions which I took, not only on the day of battle, but for many days previous. The position which was occupied by General Casey's line, which was the front line, was so near the enemy, and the country was so thickly wooded, that there was no moment in which we might not have been attacked by masses of the enemy, who could have reached our lines in about fifteen minutes from the time that they first showed themselves. On the day of the battle, however, the firing commenced gradually, and all the troops of both my divisions were under arms, and all the artillery horses harnessed, except those belonging to the battery which was inside a little fort built by General Casey. I was on horseback an hour and a half, riding along my lines, before I considered the action serious.

I did not send word to General Heintzelman to send forward re-enforcements until, I think, about I o'clock. I became aware that it was a serious attack, an attack in force, about half-past 12 o'clock. I have reason to believe that my messenger was delayed, and that he did not deliver my message as quickly by a great deal as he ought to have done. In reference to the battle itself I refer to my report of it, (see appendix to General Keyes's testimony,) which is better than anything else I could now state. The report was made by me after a most thorough examination, not only before the battle, but after the battle, in relation to such facts about which I might possibly be mistaken; that is, when I ordered a regiment to a particular point after the battle, I would go to the colonel and ascertain whether he went to the point I had indicated. The only point in my report which I wish to change is, that I think instead of General Heintzelman arriving on the field about 3 o'clock, he arrived there at nearer 4 o'clock than 3 o'clock. I saw some of his troops before I saw him. I did not consider the battle serious until the shot began to fall about me where I stood, and until I could see the masses of the enemy bursting through the woods in front of Casey's line.

Question. What was the strength of your corps at the time of the battle of Seven Pines?

Answer. I have before me the returns of my corps on the 25th of May, in which Casey's division is put down at 6,932 and Couch's division at 8,746. Between the 25th and the day of the battle quite a number of the men were taken sick, and my picket line was so long, and the detachments so numerous, that I am willing to state my impression under oath that I had not more than 12,000 men actually engaged on the 31st of May.

Question. By how many troops belonging to other corps were you supported? Answer. I was supported by the troops of Kearney's division-that is, the brigades of Berry and Jameson. I was not supported by any other troops actually engaged until quite late in the day-that is, after 5 o'clock. that time General Sumner came up on the right. To the exact time of his arrival I do not pretend to testify, as it was considerably distant from where I

was.

Question. At what do you estimate the attacking force of the enemy?
Answer. From 40,000 to 60,000.

Question. Why were you not supported in greater force?

Answer. I am not able to state the reason; I can only state the fact.

Question. Had you been anticipating an attack in that position?

After

Answer. I had been, as the documents which I have spread upon the record will fully show.

Question. In your judgment had you given full information to headquarters that you were expecting that attack?

Answer. I had for several days previous to the battle.

Question. Was there any obstacle in the way to prevent such a disposition of the troops as to enable prompt support to be rendered you?

should

Answer. It was my impression that a portion of Heintzelman's corps have been advanced nearer to where I was than they were. A portion of my corps was engaged at Fair Oaks on the 31st. I was at Fair Oaks in the early part of the action, but after the action became very serious I was not at Fair Oaks at all; but General Couch's division was there. The greatest amount of fighting done at and beyond Fair Oaks was on the 1st of June.

Question. What general commanding?

Answer. General Sumner.

Question. What was the effect upon the enemy of the two days' fighting at Seven Pines and Fair Oaks?

Answer. The effect was to defeat them, and I suppose that it is perfectly legitimate to infer that they were more or less demoralized in consequence of that defeat.

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