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their children, to be patented when they should come of age

After some desultory conversation, an attempt was made to postpone the bill to to-morrow; but it failed: Yeas 18, nays 27.

The question being then taken, the amendment of Mr. BUCHANAN was agreed to, as follows:

YEAS-Messrs. Bayard, Brown, Calhoun, Clay, Clay ton, Crittenden, Ewing of Illinois, Hendricks, Hubbard, Kent, Knight, Lyon, Nicholas, Norvell, Prentiss, Rives, Robbins, Robinson, Sevier, Southard, Strange, Swift, Tallmadge, Tomlinson, Walker, Wall, Webster, White-28.

NAYS-Messrs. Benton, Black, Fulton, Grundy, King of Alabama, King of Georgia, Linn, Moore, Morris, Niles, Page, Preston, Ruggles, Tipton, Wright-15.

On motion of Mr. WALKER, the bill was then further amended, so as to allow no one to enter a tract in his own name until he is 21 years old.

Mr. CLAY then renewed the motion formerly made and withdrawn by Mr. MORRIS, to strike out the 4th section of the bill, including the whole pre-emption clause, and demanded the yeas and nays; which were

ordered.

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The Senate proceeded to the reconsideration of the unfavorable report of the Committee of Claims on the claim of Joseph Nourse.

Mr. CRITTENDEN briefly advocated the claim, stating that it rested on extra services of the claimant, he having, for a number of years, performed the duties of a disbursing officer, in addition to his regular employ: ment; and that the claim had been allowed by a judicial tribunal.

Messrs. LINN and PRESTON explained the grounds on which the unfavorable report had been made; Mr. P. stating that the committee thought there ought to be a general law regulating cases of this kind, and that the committee were embarrassed by the fact that a decision unfavorable to the claim had been made by a co-ordinate branch of the Government, in such a way as to be imperious if not binding on Congress.

Mr. HUBBARD opposed the claim; and the report, on his call, having been read,

On motion of Mr. LINN, it was ordered to lie on the table.

PUBLIC LANDS.

The bill to prohibit the sales of the public lands, except to actual settlers, and in limited quantities, was taken up as the special order, the question being on Mr. CLAY's motion to strike out the 4th section, which contains the pre-emption principle.

Mr. KING, of Georgia, said that he perfectly agreed, with some of the friends of the bill who had addressed the Senate, that this clause did not essentially differ in principle from the other provisions of the bill. If the clause were more objectionable, it was in the extent and not in the character of its operation. The whole bill, he said

[SENATE.

was one to encourage a system of fraudulent speculation, partiality, perfidy, and plunder, in which those who had the least conscience would make the most money. He had waded through all the various amendments made and proposed, and thought he now understood the character and objects of the bill as amended; and, if it were to pass in the present, or any form likely to be proposed, he cared but little about the details; and perhaps the worse its provisions the better it might ultimately prove for the country. Thus being opposed to the whole objects of the bill, Mr. K. said he would take the occasion to make some remarks upon the general subject, before the question should be taken on the fourth section of the bill.

It was not likely (at least he hoped not) that we should have, strictly, a party vote upon this question. It was one of those measures, of which we had had too many in our country, which proposes bounties and advantages to some sections of the country at the expense of the remainder. That such legislation should be popular with those who expected to be benefited by it, was not at all surprising. But that those whose constituents were to be despoiled by the unjust and unequal operation of the measure, should quietly submit to it, ought not to be expected. Yet it is a melancholy truth, said he, in the history of human affairs, that such are the hidden cheateries by which the machinery of legislation is frequently made to transfer the labor of one class of citizens into the pockets of another, that it often happens that the most partial, unjust, and unequal legislation is precisely that which obtains the most positive popularity, and does most credit to those who may happen to propose it. The reason, he said, was obvious. These partial benefits were plain and palpable. They were felt by the favored, and perceived by every one, whilst the injury and injustice to the great mass of the community were more widely diffused; and, being somewhat of a negative character, are not so easily perceived or estimated. But (said Mr. K.) I doubt very much whether either the ignorance or the apathy of a majority of the people of the United States, and particularly of the old States, will be sufficient to protect this measure against that discontent which the gross injustice of it is so well calculated to engender.

Mr. K. said that, as the basis of all just remark upon this subject, it should be constantly recollected, as it had been repeated, that the public domain was a public fund; as much so as the public money in the Treasury of the United States. It should, therefore, be administered and distributed among the people with as much equality as was consistent with a fair administration of the laws. It had been truly said that a large portion of this public domain had been purchased with the common blood and the common treasure of the people of the old thirteen States. In obedience to this feeling, and in answer to the petitions of their fellow-citizens of the other States of the confederacy, the people of these States, who had the exclusive right and jurisdiction over this property, had generously surrendered it for the common benefit of the whole. Another large portion of this property, he said, and much the largest undisposed of, had actually been purchased with money from the common Treasury; money which had been collected by actual taxation upon the consumption of the people, and which, it must be admitted, had borne most heavily on the people of the old States. One would suppose, when we looked at the history of this property, when we saw from what source it had been derived, and with whose labor and money it had been purchased, that it would be considered sufficiently generous, in all conscience, to allow to the new members of the confederacy an equal participation in this great national partnership fund, when they did not, as members, bring a dollar into the concern.

SENATE.]

Public Lands.

[JAN. 31, 1837.

some equivocal provision; mantle the bill in some obscurity; afford some temporary refuge for reason, whilst fancy may be called in to promise some distant hope of a possible advantage to the old States, to compensate them, to some extent, for the enormous sacrifices which you propose to force upon them. Do not, said he, insult us with this plain project of taking money from the pockets of one class of citizens and putting it into those

of another.

Sir, continued Mr. K., the people of Georgia, that greatly wronged, much abused, and much injured State, yielding to the claims of their fellow-citizens of the other States, with whom, in a common cause, they had marched through the perils of the Revolution, generously surrendered to the United States (with reservations too insignificant to notice, when compared to the value of the whole) two of the finest States in the Union.

This equality he did not complain of, and no one complained of it, but it had never been considered as suffi cient; and, accordingly, millions upon millions had been lavished upon them, from time to time, in one form or other. When we consider the choice selections they had been permitted to make; the twelve or thirteen millions of acres of land alone that had been given to them were probably worth one hundred and fifty millions of dollars, or a sum nearly double what had ever come into the Treasury from the entire sales of the public land since the commencement of the Government. Well, one would suppose that those enormous bounties, at the expense of their fellow-citizens of the old States, would satisfy the most voracious appetite. But not so. For their advantage, solely, the public land had been put down, and kept down, at one tenth of its value, as compared with lands of equal quality in the old States of the Union. This fact had just been admitted by one of the This territory, if disposed of to the best advantage, friends of the bill. The result was precisely what might would have freed the State from taxation to the end of have been expected. The annals of time furnished no time. Though millions of it had been squandered upon instance, either parallel or approximate, of equal rapid-squatters, relinquished to speculators by the relief law, ity in growth, wealth, population, and prosperity, to and otherwise prodigally disposed of, the past and future that exhibited by the junior members of the confedera- receipts from it would likely be near one hundred milcy. On the other hand, history furnished few examples, lions of dollars. And yet the people of Georgia, to under free government, of such premature old age, de- whom this immense property once exclusively belonged, crepitude, and decay, as that which was exhibited by are hereafter to be virtually deprived of all participation some of the old States of this Union. Costly dwellings in it, as a common interest to the confederacy. Her citwere seen mouldering into ruins, and plantations that izens are to be deprived of the poor privilege of buying should still be valuable were left to wash into ruts and it at the price fixed by the Government, to which it was gullies, and grow up in briers. Sir, said he, it is enough gratuitously given. The honest planter, with a growing to make the heart of any patriot from one of the old family of sons, with prudent foresight, looking forward States bleed to travel through this favored region, and to the period when your unnatural combinations and lecompare its condition with the impoverished home he gislative plunder may render his impoverished State an has left. But how could it be otherwise, with this unfit habitation for man, cannot provide for them a few heavy bounty, furnished at the common charge for the sections of land in a more favored State, without submitexclusive benefit of a small portion of the States? ting to ceremonies and restrictions which, to an honest man, will render the privilege worse than a mockery. He must stand by, said Mr. K., and see this property tied up by narrow, contracted, partial legislation, into a

drain the resources and consummate the ruin of the State whose generosity furnished the means of perpetrating the injustice. Sir, said he, when the people of Georgia send me here to plunder them, and not to protect them, I may think of the proposition, but not before.

Mr. K. had hoped, at least, that these manifold bounties, and this contrast so melancholy, and the truth of which all must acknowledge, would have softened the hearts and stayed the hands of those who seemed deter-bundle of bribes and bounties, calculated and intended to mined on the destruction of the old States: but not so; they were still unsatisfied. Emboldened by their own strength, derived from the munificence of those they despoil, and by the weakness of the latter, occasioned by the same cause, and with the aid of a few unnatural allies, they now boldly come forward and claim, for their exclusive benefit, the whole of this immense national fund. Nay, said he, a great deal more than this; for he would infinitely prefer an entire surrender of the whole of the national domain, and get rid of the expense, and these eternal torments and importunities, than to see this bill passed upon the people of the old States. If the law should be honestly enforced, the proceeds of the sales would not pay the expenses or our land machinery; certainly not, if we included the Indian treaties, Indian wars, and Indian annuities, which were all fairly chargeble to this account. Thus losing the whole of this immense property, the old States would be farther burdened with the expense of parcelling it out to others. If the law should be evaded, the sales would be something larger, but the profits on speculations would be an ex clusive bounty to crime, and a premium to ingenious and fraudulent speculation.

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And yet we are told, said Mr. K., that we must this measure because it is an administration measure. its present form he did not believe it was so. He knew the pre-emption clause was not, as all knew that nothing was more abhorred by the Executive than that unjust and odious feature in the bill. But, said Mr. K., however this may be, do not talk to me of administration measures, whilst you have got your fingers in my pockets, or the pockets of my constituents. Take them out, sir, and then we can better reason the matter. Insert

What were the reasons urged for this partial and oppressive measure? Interest was sufficient to address to some; party, perhaps, to others; but what were the rea sons addressed to those members from the old States who were disposed to stand up for the rights of their constituents? Why, they were the great and threatening evils of a redundant Treasury. It was strange this measure had not been urged with such zeal, for these reasons, when there was some necessity for it. Where was this surplus now, or from whence was it to be derived during the present year? Gentlemen had shown commendable caution in making, or rather in not making, calculations on this subject. No one had descended to the use of figures but the Senator from Mississippi; and he, Mr. K. thought, contrary to his wont, upon grave matters, had been a little flighty upon this subject. The Senator had estimated a future annual surplus of 20 millions of dollars, and that, without this measure, 80 or 100 millions of acres of the public lands would pass into the hands of speculators in the next four years. And what was the basis of his estimate? Why, he had taken the proceeds of the last year, (about 25 millions,) and made them the basis of his estimate for the next four years. The Senator might just as well have anticipated in 1813, that because Napoleon Bonaparte invaded Russia with an effective army of 400,000 fighting men, he would be enabled to make the same effort annually for the remainder of his life. It is certainly, said Mr. K., a logical

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mode of reasoning, to say that what happens one year may, under the same circumstances, happen the next; but single instances are not always followed by their like; and there are extraordinary causes operating in finance and speculation, as there are in war, and almost every thing else.

[SENATE.

valuable commodities. It is the deceptive balance of the borrower to the lender. If, said he, you be a man of fortune, and I be without fortune, yet, if I borrow all your money I will have plenty of money and you will be destitute, though the richer man of the two. And if it be necessary for you to send the money you loan to me from Alabama to Georgia, my note, sent to you in exchange for it, produces precisely the same effect upon the exchanges between the two States as if I had consigned to you the value in valuable commodities.

What, then, said Mr. K., are the probable causes to which we are to attribute the extraordinary results in the sales of the public lands in the year 1836, and the year preceding? If the causes are of a permanent nature, the results may be relied upon as the basis of future estimates; if they be only temporary, have ceased to exist, or are rapidly passing away, all reasoning on such prem-dustry, we have sent about forty millions in notes, bonds, ises is more delusive than demonstrative.

Mr. K. then proceeded to enumerate some of these causes. In 1834 it was settled that the charter of the Bank of the United States would not be renewed. The removal of this institution (of which he did not wish to be understood as complaining) had encouraged in the country hopes of great profits by banking, and we had accordingly been inundated with an uncontrolled, unregulated flood of paper money, issuing from the sluices of five hundred new banks, with additional supplies from the old ones; and in the last four years the currency of the country, including specie, according to the most probable computation, had a little more than doubled. Was this a permanent state of things? Did we expect that our currency was to double every four years?

Well, continued Mr. K., what was the natural consequence of this sudden and extraordinary inflation of the currency? It was a spirit of speculation and over-trading, which reached public lands as well as private lands, and private lots, and every species of property that was a subject of bargain and sale. This spirit had extended to unbroken forests, as well as towns, cities, and villages. It embraced the poor pine lands of Maine, as well as "Jackson city," on the Potomac; a city which, in the spirit of the times, after the lots had been disposed of, was commenced and finished in a single day. These wild speculations, extending to every thing, were the inevitable consequence of this great redundancy of the currency: for money was unlike most other commodities in the extent of the demand for it. There was no certain limitation on the demand except that which was found in a limitation of the supply. So general was the disposition to make money without labor, that men would always be found to adventure in speculation when they could procure money with facility.

The

Mr. K. said that this redundancy of the currency had, moreover, been sustained, by concurrent causes, (some of them not dependent on the markets of this country,) for an unusual length of time, without a reaction. In the first place, said he, it has so happened that the increased demand for our principal exports has gradually increased in value for the last three or four years. value of our exports each year, for that period, has been an advance on that of the year preceding. As a general rule, with the advantage of such progressive increase in the value of exportation, it is impossible to create a demand for the exportation of specie whilst such increase continues. But, unfortunately, this has not been the only means by which we have increased the debits of our foreign account. Look at our foreign account for the year 1836-one hundred and seventy-four millions of imports, and one hundred and twenty-two millions of exports; leaving a balance of fifty-two millions against us, deducting only our portion of the profits of trade. These profi's could not be safely put down at more than twelve or fifteen millions, leaving a probable clear balance against us of forty millions of dollars. And yet, he said, the exchanges had continued in our favor, indicating a favorable balance. Sir, said he, what sort of a balance is this? It is not a balance on the exchange of

By just such means have we indicated a favorable balance against Europe. Instead of the produce of in

stocks, and State securities, and, the exchange being in our favor, we have imported the return in specie. So that we have not only borrowed forty millions to sustain our currency in the single year of 1836, but we have borrowed that amount in specie to aid in sustaining a paper issue. What was the result of all this? Why, the result of the extravagant speculations growing out of a redundant currency, and that redundant currency, sustained and kept up by the means adverted to, had been a large surplus treasure deposited in the deposite banks. The interest of these banks required that they should make the most of the deposite; and, to do this, they would naturally prefer loaning to speculators in the public lands, as they were certain of a return of the deposite. To this large deposite, Mr. K. thought, might be attributed, perhaps, the whole increase in the sales in 1836 over the sales of 1835, which increase was about $10,000,000.

Now, continued Mr. K., these are the principal causes, I apprehend, of the extraordinary results in the proceeds of the sales in 1835-'6. Are they permanent? Can their continuance be relied on as the basis of future estimates? If not, these calculations of twenty five millions a year from this source, hereafter, are mere delusions, and cannot safely be taken as the bas's of impor tant legislation. Let us look, then, at the last cause first: the surplus revenue in the deposi'e banks, amounting to forty or fifty millions during 1836, is now sinking under the operation of the deposite law, and, in the course of the year, will entirely disappear. This great cause is, then, rapidly passing away. Next, as to the condition of the currency, generally-the primary cause of speculation. Is it to be sustained by causes heretofore operating? Can it be propped up any longer by borrowing from Europe? On the contrary, we find the resource of borrowing entirely cut off, and the moneyed interests in Europe have taken steps to stop the exportation of specie to this country. And such is the state of the money market in Europe, that it is likely all stocks sent there on pledge will be returned for redemption, and all loans falling due will be pressed for payment. The most favorable view of this branch of the subject is, that the principal of our European loan cannot be increased; and even if our whole credit there be continued as a loan, the interest hereafter must be added to the other side of the account; and the rise in exchanges will probably soon call for an exportation of specie.

In the next place, have we any hope of assistance from an advance in our exports? On the contrary, all accounts concur in sustaining the Secretary of the Treas. ury in his opinion, that in this there will be a very heavy decline. We have, then, none of the extraordinary means of sustaining over-issues, which we have commanded heretofore. Sir, said he, I am no practical merchant, no practical banker, and do not profess to be high authority on these subjects. He wished to create no panics; and had too little confidence in his own judgment to make any positive prophecies. But if he possessed the ordinary faculty of connecting effects with their causes, where the connexion was obvious, he

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thought we had the facts before us, from which we might reasonably apprehend one of the most tremendous explosions that ever afflicted any commercial people. It might be averted or postponed, but no prudent and experienced financier, he thought, would act on the presnmption that it could be entirely avoided, or even postponed to a very distant day.

[JAN. 31, 1837.

gentlemen could not and did not attack it by reasoned calculations, but flourished over it without the use of a single figure.

But, said Mr. K., I can tell gentlemen, for their consolation, that they shall not escape so easily in this matter. They shall come to the point, and submit to an examination of figures: yes, and those, too, figures of arithmetic, and not figures of rhetoric. They shall either shut their eyes, refute or admit, or the only avowed motive by which they justify their votes for this flagrant robbery of the old States shall be taken from them without their consent.

Mr. K. said he would now proceed to show what foundation there was for an alarm about a surplus in 1837, which was the only ground upon which any mem. ber from an old State dare to place his vote to plunder his constituents. He would first attempt to do so by that slighted report of the Secretary of the Treasury, which gentlemen could run over, but could not reason down. He would then look at the account as it would stand, even if the Secretary was as far mistaken as genmen supposed.

What, then, continued he, according to this estimate, will be the cash resources of the Government for the year 1837? The Secretary estimates them at twenty-nine millions-that is, five millons retained in the Treasury of unexpended appropriations, and twenty-four millions as the receipts of the year. From what source is this twenty four millions of income to be derived? Let us examine each item, and see how far the estimate can be attacked in detail. The first item is for customs, sixteen million five hundred thousand dollars. Was that too low? The customs

There was another reason, Mr. K. thought, for a diminished estimate in the sales of the public lands; and that was the very fact upon which high future estimates had been made. He alluded to the great quantity of land lately taken up on speculation. These lands, he said, were doubtless the best selections, and nearest to the settled parts of the country, and the quantity was sufficient to anticipate the demand for actual settlement for twelve or fifteen years. When the spirit of specula- | tion had ceased, these lands must come extensively into competition with the Government, and diminish the Government sales. It was a great mistake to suppose that large land companies or speculators were in the habit of holding up their lands at exorbitant and forbidding prices, that a large and unproductive property might be sold and settled by posterity. They had, generally, neither the power nor inclination to do so. They could not obtain very large profits whilst the Government was in free competition with land of equal quality and at as low prices. Mr. K. mentioned several instances where investments in Alabama, in 1820, on speculations, had yielded only an interest on the investment, and in sonie cases not even that. He also stated that some of his friends had gone to Mississippi during the late land sales, and had purchased the choice selections, from a large supply held by a land company, at a mod-produced more last year; but last year the importations erate advance on the original cost, and had preferred had been swelled by temporary causes, such as the great purchasing of these companies to taking their chances at destruction by the New York fire, a spirit of speculation, the sales. Operating upon a large scale, a small ad- &c., and could not be relied on as the basis of future vance per acre affords a handsome profit, though gen- estimates. The estimate made by the Secretary might erally less than is paid to "land hunters," for selecting be a little too high or too low. It was more than we deand locating in smaller quantities. As much of the mo- rived from the customs in 1834, when the duties were ney with which lands have been purchased on specula-higher than they will be in 1837, and no practical finantion had been borrowed, Mr. K. thought many pur- cier, at the head of the Department, would have conchasers would, from necessity, come into competitionsidered it safe to calculate on a greater revenue from with the Government, at something like Government prices. But, if we restrict the competition of Government, we give a monopoly to previous purchasers, and probably secure to them very heavy speculations. Such inconvenient restrictions on the Government sales must make the fortunes of those who have already invested largely in the public lands. However this might be, he said, the large quantity in the hands of individuals, which had rapidly accumulated there from temporary causes, must come very largely into competition with the Government sales.

Mr. K. also briefly alluded to the probable independence and settlement of Texas, at no distant period. If this should occur, there would be a large body of the finest lands in the world, opened at fifty cents per acre. This temptation would carry off thousands of our emigrating population, and reduce the demand for settlement and cultivation. This, he said, was a contingency, to be sure; but every argument at all bearing upon the subject should be noticed, when there was a proposition which virtually gave up this immense property of the people, as a common property, and distributed it in bounties and benefits. Upon the whole, Mr. K. concluded that, when we examined the cauees of the extraordinary amount derived from the public lands during the last two years, and that those causes were passing away, and presenting considerations upon which we should greatly reduce a future estimate, the estimate of the Secretary of the Treasury was much more probable than any other by which it had been attacked; it was the estimate of an experienced and practical financier, and

At any

this source. This item, however, had not been attack-
ed, and might therefore stand admitted. The next item
was two million dollars from the stock of the Bank
of the United States: nobody had questioned this item;
we might get more than this from the bank in 1837,
but at the same time we might not get a cent.
rate, this was not a permanent source of income; it was
a part of our capital. That item not being disputed,
time need not be wasted upon it. The next item was
five hundred thousand dollars for interest, and other
small matters, about which there could be little mistake.
The next item was that of the public lands, five million
dollars, which was the principal subject of attack. On
that item, in addition to what he had said, he would onlyTM
here remark, that it was more than the public lands had
ever brought into the Treasury in one year, except in
the years 1835 and 1836. And if the causes of the ex-
traordinary results in these two years had been shown to
be of a temporary character, no higher estimate could
have been safely relied on.

The account, then, stands thus:
From customs,
Bank stock,

Interest on money from deposite banks, &c.
Sales of public lands,

Reserved in the Treasury of unexpended
appropriations,

$16,500,000 2,000,000

500,000 5,000,000 $24,000,000

5,000,000 $29,000,000

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Public Lands.

$10,000,000

$11,000,000

It will be seen from this that, even if there remain unexpended appropriations in the Treasury, at the end of 1837, to the amount of $14,000,000, that is, a sum as large as remained at the end of 1836, (a very improbable event,) then we shall have only $3,000,000 in money to answer the demand, and will owe still $11,000,000 more than we have money in the Treasury to pay. But if there should remain in the Treasury, at the end of 1857, a much smaller sum, say only $9,000,000, (a result much more probable,) why, then, we should have to call on the States for $2,000,000, and would still owe $9,000,000 to appropriations beside.

The above, Mr. K. said, would be the probable state of the account, provided the estimates of the Secretary were correct, as well in appropriations as receipts. Should we, then, appropriate what was asked by the Government? He saw no disposition to vote less, and particularly by those most in favor of this bill; and on this subject he would only further remark that, for many years past, Congress had uniformly appropriated from two to four millions more than was asked by the Government, and the last year we had appropriated about ten millions more.

But it was said the Secretary was in error in his estimate of the proceeds of the public lands. Very well, let us view the matter with that admission. How much was he wrong? It seemed to be a private sentiment with some, that, as the deposites would not be removed entirely till the end of 1837, and money might be made more plenty in the States by distribution, the speculations might continue sufficiently, during 1837, to bring into the Treasury ten millions. There was some reason in this; and for such gentlemen we would put down ten millions, and say the Secretary has erred five millions. What then? Why, we would still owe six millions at the end of 1837. Did any one, except the Senator from Mississippi, ask more than this? If so, give them fifteen millions, and we would still owe one million to appropriations; and even carry the amount to the twenty millions, (a sum to which it could only be carried by a race of the imagination,) and we should, even then, only have four millions in the Treasury unappropriated. This was a sum with which we should never be discontented, and to get rid of which he would never adopt any extraordinary measure. It was a sum we had often had in our Treasury, and which was calculated to do no injury or create any alarm.

The only object, then, which members from the old States would avow to justify this outrage upon their constituen's, was entirely swept from under them by mathematical demonstration. If there were any error in this calculation, let gentlemen show it. There was no danger, however, that gentlemen would even attempt this; for, except by general assertions and sweeping estimates, it was a branch of the subject they seemed anxious to smother. In the very sweeping glance of the only Senator who had touched it, he took scarcely a notice of expenditures, nor did he even notice that we owe fourteen millions to unexpended appropriations. The truth was, he said, that the bill was supported by a strange and unnatural combination. Supposed interest

[SENATE.

was sufficient for some; the influence operating on others he would name, and perhaps did not know; and others were actuated by motives they did not think proper to avow. He said it could not be disguised, and ought not to be denied, that the only object of one influence exerted in favor of this bill was to draw back the money deposited with the States, and indirectly defeat the deposite bill. That this must be the effect of the measure was inevitable, unless the expenses of the Government could be greatly reduced, which no one had suggested was immediately practicable. And why this persevering opposition and untiring antipathy to the deposite bill? No one regretted the necessity for that bill more than he did at the time, and no one who voted against the bill was more opposed to raising money for distribution, or to a policy of distribution. But this was an extraordinary measure, to meet an extraordinary emergency. We found thirty or forty millions in the Treasury more than was required for the purposes of the Government. The question was not so much how it was raised, as what should be done with it. If it had been improperly raised, that was no reason why it should be improperly wasted, or disposed of in a manner to produce the greatest evils. To continue this amount in the deposite banks was acknowledged, even by the opponents of the bill, to be altogether intolerable; the President himself had acknowledged this; and yet the opponents of the bill, though full of objections, had no plan except to allow the money to remain in the deposite banks, where they acknowledged it was ruining the currency, and would ruin the country. The Senator from Missouri [Mr. BENTON] had a plan, to be sure, and that was to raise the expenditures of the Goyernment, and expend the surplus in fortifications, armories, arsenals, &c. The great objection to this plan was that in expending the surplus, merely to get rid of it, we should have laid the foundation of a permanent expenditure, inconsistent with the economical habits of our people, and with the simplicity of our re. publican institutions. The tariff would have been raised in a few years, instead of reduced, and the burdens of the people unnecessarily increased, to keep up a scale of expenditure established by a prodigal expenditure of the surplus. For you might as well undertake, said he, to reduce the natural stature of man without the use of violence, as to undertake to reduce the expenditures of a Government after they are once fixed. England bad tried that. In vain have the retrenching members of her reformed Parliament, in their patriotic efforts, appealed to the expenditures of 1797, (thought then to be an extravagant period,) and showed that the present expenditure is, in some instances, near three times as much for the same service. Each branch of the service has influence or tact enough to preserve itself from encroachment; and every expense is made to appear necessary, because it has become habitual. He was sorry to say that the increase in the expenditures of some branches of our own service taught a similar lesson. These (said Mr. K.) were the objections to the useless expenditure of the surplus, by the General Government. The expenditure of the surplus would only have been the beginning; the end would have been a heavy permanent expenditure.

Again, this plan of extravagant expenditure was no remedy for the evil. The labor could not have been commanded, or the work performed, with any regard to durability or economy, with sufficient rapidity to have made any effectual impression on the surplus for several years; and this plan would have been just equivalent to giving the deposite banks a warrant to keep it for three or four years: for the revenue would have accrued nearly as fast as expended. It would be perceived that fourteen millions remained unexpended, though we ap

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