town. I then partially decided to withdraw the whole command, which was a still more perilous operation. It commenced raining, which, to some extent, was an assistance to us, but a very bad thing in the moving of troops. I thought over the matter for about two hours; and about 1 o'clock I sent over an order to withdraw the whole force, which was successfully accomplished.

There had been a great deal of division of opinion among the corps commanders as to the place of crossing. But, after all the discussion upon the subject, the decision to cross over here I understood was well received by all of them.

While on his way here General Hooker, on the morning of the 20th of November, wrote me a note, which I received on the 21st, in which he sug gested that he should cross his force over the Rappahannock at the ford nearest to him, (Richards's Ford,) and move rapidly down to Saxton's Station and take position there. He stated that he had three days' provisions, and thought he could beat any force of the enemy in front of him. I replied to him that I was always very glad to take the advice of my general officers, and should always be loth to make a move without consulting them; but I could not approve of the move he had suggested, because, in the first place, he would have to march some thirty-six miles to get to Saxton's Station; it was then raining, and he would have to ford two rivers, which might rise and cut him off from the main body of the command, and as I had no means of crossing at Fredericksburg I would be prevented from sending him supplies and assistance; and, although he might reach Saxton's Station, and beat any force of the enemy he might meet at that time, yet it would be a very hazardous movement to throw a column like that beyond the reach of its proper support. This reply I sent to General Hooker by an aide-de-camp. He thanked me; said he had only made it as a suggestion, and the weather, as it was then raining, of course rendered it impossible to make the movement he had suggested.

Question. What causes do you assign for the failure of your attack here? Answer. It was found to be impossible to get the men up to the works. The enemy's fire was too hot for them. The whole command fought most gallantly. The enemy themselves say they never saw our men fight so hard as on that day.

Question. Were the enemy's works very strong?

Answer. Their works are not strong works, but they occupy very strong positions. It is possible that the points of attack were wrongly ordered; if such is the case, I can only say that I did to the best of my ability. It is also possible that we would have done better to have crossed at Skinker's Neck. But, for what I supposed to be good reasons, I felt we had better cross here; that we would have a more decisive engagement here, and that if we succeeded in defeating the enemy here, we could break up the whole of their army here, which I think is now the most desirable thing, not even second to the taking of Richmond; for if this army was broken up, though they might defend Richmond for a while, they could not make a very protracted defence there.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. Do I understand you to say that it was your understanding that General Halleck and General Meigs, while at your headquarters in Warrenton and before you commenced the movement of your army, sent orders to Washington for the pontoons to be immediately forwarded to Falmouth? Answer. That was my understanding, certainly.

Question. In your judgment, could the pontoons have been forwarded in time for you to have crossed the Rappahannock when you expected, if all possible efforts had been made by those who were charged with that duty?

Answer. Yes, sir; if they had received their orders in time.

Question Did the non-arrival of the pontoons, at the time you expected, prevent your crossing when you expected to cross, and interfere with the success of your plan?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Since you have assumed the command of the army of the Potomac, have all its movements been made by you according to your own judgment, or have some of them been directed by the general-in-chief, the Secretary of War, or the President of the United States?

Answer. They have all been made in accordance with my own judgment. In some cases I have submitted my views, which have been approved. Question. Who did you understand was responsible for the forwarding of the pontoons to Falmouth?

Answer. I understood that General Halleck was to give the necessary orders, and then the officers who should receive those orders were the ones responsible for the pontoons coming here. I could have carried out that part of the plan through officers of my cwn. But having just taken the command of an army with which I was but little acquainted, it was evident that it was as much as I could attend to, with the assistance of all my officers, to change its position from Warrenton to Fredericksburg. And I felt, indeed I expected, that all the parts of the plan which were to be executed in Washington would be attended to by the officers at that place, under the direction of the different departments to which those parts of the plan appertained.

Question. Did you or not understand that you yourself were to be responsible for seeing that those orders were carried out?

Answer. I did not. I never imagined for a moment that I had to carry out anything that required to be done in Washington. General Meigs told me distinctly several days ago, in Washington, that he never saw my plan of operations until I showed it to him on that day.

Question. Do I understand you to say, in your statement, that you expected General Franklin to carry the point at the extreme left of the ridge in rear of the town, and thereby enable our troops to storm and carry their fortifications?

Answer. I did expect him to carry that point, which being done would have placed our forces in rear of their extreme left, and which, I thought at the time, would shake their forces on the ridge to such an extent that the postion in front could be easily stormed and carried.

Question. To what do you attribute his failure to accomplish that? Answer. To the great strength of the position and the accumulation of the enemy's forces there. 1 expected the bridges would be built in two or three hours after they were unloaded, which was about daylight. Instead of that, those on the right were not built until three o'clock in the afternoon, and I had only the means of getting across one division over the bridges on the right. General Franklin's bridges were built about noon, and were held by our troops on the opposite bank. This gave the enemy time to accumulate their forces, which were stretched along the river from Port Royal up to the battle-field, before I was able to order the attack. Whilst the men here were unloading the bridges and putting them into the water, the enemy's sharpshooters opened a very heavy fire from the town, and our batteries opened upon the town with the view of silencing them. In this manner the bridges were built about two-thirds of their length, at which time the bridge-builders were driven off, and had to take shelter under the bank. Repeated efforts were made to get these bridge-builders out to the end of the bridges with the necessary material, but they all failed. It was then reported to me that it was impossible to build the bridges under that fire, and

that the sharpshooters could not be driven out of town by the artillery. We had one hundred and forty-three guns in position, the larger portion of which were playing upon the town. I said to the officers who had reported to me that it was impossible to build the bridges, that they must be built, and that some plan must be devised for getting these sharpshooters out of the way, so that our men could get to work. Upon consulting with General Hunt, chief of artillery, and General Woodbury, of the engineers, it was agreed to fill the boats with our own men, run them quickly across under fire, throw them on the bank, and let them go up into the streets and houses and drive the sharpshooters a way. This plan was successfully carried out, and in fifteen minutes after the first detachment of troops had reached the opposite bank our men began building the bridges, and in half an hour more they were completed.

Question. What was the conduct of the officers and men during the attack?

Answer. With the exception of a single regiment it was excellent.

Question. Will you state, as nearly as you can, the whole number of our troops that were engaged?

Answer. We had about one hundred thousand men on the other side of the river.

Question. What part of that number were actually engaged in battle? Answer. Every single man of them was under artillery fire, and about half of them were at different times formed in columns of attack. Every man was put in column of attack that could be got in.

Question. Have you any knowledge as to the force of the enemy here? Answer. It is estimated at all the way from one hundred thousand to two hundred thousand. I think myself it was less than one hundred thousand. Question. What was the extent of the casualties on our side resulting from all the fighting?

Answer. It will not be far from ten thousand men-killed, wounded, and missing.

Question. What is the present condition of our troops here?

Answer. As far as my knowledge and information goes, it is good.

Question. Do you or not consider your troops demoralized, or the efficiency of your army impaired, except so far as it has been from the loss of so many men?

Answer. I do not. I would add here that, although at the time I ordered the column of attack to be formed on the morning after the battle I thought the enemy's works would be carried, and adhered to that opinion during that day, I afterwards became convinced that that could not have been done, owing to the great strength of the enemy, the time given them for reenforcing, and the belief also of our officers that it could not be done. I accordingly telegraphed to the President of the United States that I withdrew our army because I felt that the enemy's position could not be carried.

WASHINGTON, December 19, 1862.

Major General E. V. SUMNER Ssworn and examined.

By the chairman:

Question. What is your position in the army of the Potomac ?

Answer. I command the right grand division of that army, consisting of the second and ninth corps d'armée.

Question. Of how many men does your grand division consist?
Answer. Before the late action it consisted of about

meu. It is

being increased by new troops as they come up. It was originally intended to be something over

men.

Question. Would it have been better, in your judgment, to have crossed the river and engaged the enemy earlier than you did? And if so, why was it not done?

Answer. When General Burnside was ordered to take command of this army he told me what he proposed to do; that is, to march on Fredericksburg instead of on Culpeper. I thought that was the wisest plan for these reasons: If we had marched on Culpeper, according to the former plan, even if we had been successful, we would have had to fall back for supplies; whereas, by coming on this line, on reaching Fredericksburg I confidently expected to take the heights in rear of it before the army of the enemy could come from Culpeper, and I thought the chance of reaching Richmond was much better than by going the other way. Because if the pontoons had been here on my arrival, and in time for me to have crossed and occupied the heights in rear of Fredericksburg before the enemy could reach them, we should have kept pressing the enemy off from this line of railroad, keeping it in our own possession; and if we could not have preceded them into Richmond, we could have kept so close to them that they would have had no time to build fortifications. These were the reasons why I thought that it was a very judicious measure on the part of General Burnside to change the base of operations instead of advancing on Culpeper, which I believe General McClellan intended to have done.

On my arrival here, on the 17th of November, a battery of artillery on the other side of the river opened upon us the moment a portion of my troops appeared on the ridge back of Falmouth. I immediately put a battery into position, and, I think, in not to exceed fifteen minutes, they drove every man on the other side from the guns, and they ran off and left four guns on the field. My orders were to advance and hold Falmouth, not to cross. But the temptation was so strong to go over and take those guns the enemy had left that at one time I actually gave the order to cross the ford at all events and seize the guns and occupy the city. But on reflection I concluded I was rather too old a soldier to disobey a direct order; and there was another reason too: I had had little too much experience on the peninsula of the consequence of getting astride of a river to risk it here. For these two reasons I revoked my order that night.

That same night I sent a note to General Burnside, who was some eight or ten miles distant, asking him if I should take Fredericksburg in the morning should I be able to find a practicable ford, which, by the way, I knew when I wrote the note that I could find. The General replied, through his chief of staff, that he did not think it advisable to occupy Fredericksburg until his communications were established, and, on reflection, I myself thought that he was right; that it was prudent and proper to have the bridges ready before we occupied Fredericksburg. I think I could have taken that city and the heights on the other side of it any time within three days after my arrival here if the pontoons had been here, for I do not think there was much force of the enemy here up to that time.

With regard to the delay in making the attack, I do not think that the movement could have been made sooner than it was made. It will be recollected that no preparations had been made at Aquia creek. When we came across here there were no means at Aquia creek for landing anything there. All those things had to be prepared afterwards. The railroad had to be completed before we could get up supplies for this great army. It takes an enormous amount of transportation to supply an army of 100,000 men, and I do not think the general could have made his preparations, done all that it was necessary to do, sooner than he did after the arrival here of the pontoons.

The first proposition ro cross the river was to cross at Skinker's Neck. Rep. Com. 10842

It seemed to me that you could scarcely cross a river in the face of an enemy of equal or superior force, except by surprise. Therefore, after the preparations were made to cross at Skinker's Neck, after a large number of wagons had been sent by the general down there in order to deceive the enemy, I was decidedly in favor of throwing the bridges over here and carrying the town as we did carry it, which was by surprise, as the enemy were marching their troops down below expecting that we were going to cross down there.

I was in favor of crossing the Rappahannock, because I knew that neither our government nor our people would be satisfied to have our army retire from this position, or go into winter quarters, until we knew the force that was on the other side of the river; and the only way in which we could learn that was by going over there and feeling of them. I think it was necessary to have made the attack on that day, or Saturday, and it was necessary, therefore, to attack them in their strong works, and the repulse was what frequently happens in campaigns-the works were stronger than we believed them to be. I knew it was a very hazardous movement, but I did believe we could carry the enemy's works. The attack failed owing to the enemy's fortifications being much more formidable than we had supposed them to be.

Question. Will you describe those fortifications?

Answer. I cannot describe them any further than this: They were tier upon tier for two or three tiers. If we had carried the first tier, we could not have held it, because their next tier was a much more formidable row of fortifications, only a mile distant, and on a higher position still. And no doubt large masses of infantry were between the two crests: and having got on the top of one crest, we would have been compelled to contend with large masses of fresh troops over whom their own batteries could fire. I was ordered by the general commanding to select the corps to make the attack. I selected the corps of General French and General Hancock, two of the most gallant officers in our army, and two corps that had neither of them ever turned their backs to the enemy. They made repeated assaults, but were driven back in spite of all the efforts that could be made by their officers. The principal obstacle that they found was a long stone wall, which was the outwork of the enemy. That wall was some 400 or 500 yards in length, as represented to me, and had been raised and strengthened. The enemy had artillery that enfiladed that wall on both sides; they held their fire until our troops arrived at a certain point, when they rose up and poured a perfect volley over this wall, their artillery enfilading our column at the same time. No troops could stand such a fire as that. I do not think it a reproach to those two divisions that they did not carry that position; they did all that men could do. I had General Howard's division in readiness to support those two, and one strong division of Wilcox's corps-the ninth corps, General Burnside's old corps-detached to keep open communication with General Franklin's right. That division was not under fire during the day. Some of the other divisions of the ninth corps were more or less engaged. General Hooker had a part of his grand division in the town, and one of his corps, under General Humphries, was engaged. They made a gallant attack, but were driven back. The fight was continued on the left, but I was so remote from that that I cannot give any description of it at all.

The general commanding directed me to establish my headquarters at the Lacy House, so that I could superintend the operations of both my corps. I was there, while the general commanding was at the Phillips House during the action. During an action there is a constant running for orders, for re-enforcements, artillery, troops at different points, ammunition, &c.

I consider the crossing of the river, under the circumstances, a very