this where the claim was prima facie just, and ought to have been allowed. Id.

8. CALIFORNIA PROBATE ACT HAD NO RETROSPECTIVE APPLICATION.-The statute of California for the settlement of the estates of deceased persons has no application to the estates of persons who died previous to the organization of the State government. Hardy v. Harbin, 536.

ESTOPPEL.

1. ESTOPPEL, WHAT CONSTITUTES.-What constitutes an estoppel in pais. Wythe v. Smith, 17.

2. SAME, WHEN NOT A DEFENSE.-Equitable estoppels in pais cannot be set up as a defense to an action at law to recover the possession of real property. Id.

3. ESTOPPEL, PLEA OF STRICKEN OUT.—A plea of estoppel by conduct, not showing that the defendant was ignorant of the truth of the matter or could not have conveniently ascertained the same; nor that the defendant had acted upon the matter claimed as an estoppel, stricken out on motion of plaintiff. Wythe v. City of Salem, 88.

EVIDENCE.

1. TRANSCRIPT FROM TREASURY BOOKS.-The transcript of the books and proceedings of the Treasury Department, provided for in section 886 of the revised statutes, in relation to the accounts of persons accountable for public money, is prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein, so far as the same are authorized by law. U. S. v. Eggleston, 199.

FIVE PER CENT. NET EARNINGS.

See CENTRAL PACIFIC RAILROAD.

FRAUD.

1. PURCHASERS OF LANDS UNDER FINAL DECREES OF CONFIRMATION cannot be disturbed upon charges of fraud in the prosecution of the claims confirmed and a vague allegation of notice of such fraud. Such purchasers have a right to rest in confidence upon the decrees. U. S. v. Flint, 42. See EQUITY, 1-3.

FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES.

See EQUITY, 23.

FREIGHT.

1. WAGES.-When a voyage is broken up or lost by the act or fault of the master or owner, the seamen are nevertheless entitled to their wages for the full voyage or the time which it would probably require to complete it. Ocean Spray, 105.

2. SAME.-The rule, freight is the mother of wages, does not apply to a fishing or sealing voyage, and appears to be abolished altogether by section 4525 of revised statutes.

ld.

HABEAS CORPUS.

1. JURISDICTION OF MURDER. After a State has been admitted into the Union, the fact that within its boundaries land, the fee of which is in the United States, is set apart as an Indian reservation, is not enough, of itself, to give a United States court jurisdiction to try a person for a

murder committed within the limits of such reservation. Ex parte Sloan, 331.

2. JURISDICTION.-The court has jurisdiction to inquire into the legality of the imprisonment of a person held under his own sentence. Re Greathouse, 487.

3. AMNESTY PROCLAMATION.—The proclamation of the President of December 8, 1863, extends to persons who at its date had been convicted and sentenced for the offenses described in it. The proclamation embraces not only rebels in arms or in a situation to injure the goverement, but also such as are already arrested and incarcerated. It is the duty of the court to construe the proclamation like any other public act or law, and to apply to it the well settled rules of interpretation, irrespective of any opinion, or even knowledge, of the private but unexpressed intentions of its author. A prisoner confined under a legal sentence can voluntarily accept a conditional pardon. Id.

HOMESTEAD.

1. HOMESTEAD.-The homestead of the bankrupt never comes within the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court, and a creditor may enforce his lien thereon while the bankruptcy proceedings are pending. Re Sennett, 251. 2. IDEM-REPORT OF ASSIGNEE.-The assignee should include the home. stead in his report of exempt property. Id.

HUSBAND AND WIFE.

1. WIFE'S ESTATE IN DONATION.-The wife's share of the donation made by the act of September 27, 1850 (9 Stat. 496), was not her separate estate, and the act of January 20, 1852, which undertook to declare it so, so far as prior settlements are concerned, was void. Wythe v. Smith, 17. 2. HUSBAND'S INTEREST IN THE WIFE'S DONATION.-By virtue of the marriage the husband took an estate for the life of himself and wife in the latter's half of the donation claim, and it was not in the power of the Territorial legislature to divest him of this estate, although it might exempt it from execution. Id.

3. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-COVERTURE.-The Oregon statute of limitations upon actions to recover real property does not run against a woman to whom the right to sue accrues during coverture, until the removal of such disability; and this, whether the action concerns her separate property or otherwise. ld.

INDIANS AND INDIAN TERRITORY.

See ALASKA, 3-6; JURISDICTION, 7.

INDICTMENT.

1. WHAT SUFFICIENT IN AN INDICTMENT.-An indictment under section 2 of the act of July 17, 1862, need not use the phrase "levying war" specifically; it is sufficient to follow the language of the act. U. S. v. Greathouse, 456.

See CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.

INJUNCTION.

1. WASTE INJUNCTION TO RESTRAIN.-The technical distinction between waste and a mere trespass has been long disregarded by courts of

equity, and the rule now is, that wherever a trespass is attended with irreparable mischief or a multiplicity of suits or vexatious litigation, an injunction will be allowed the same as if it were a case of waste. Chapman v. Toy Long, 28.

2. INJUNCTION TO RESTRAIN THE WORKING OF MINING CLAIM.-An injunetion will be allowed to restrain the working of a placer gold mine located by the complainants under the United States Mining Acts, while in the possession of persons not qualified to take and hold such lands. Id. 3. INJUNCTION. Neither will an injunction be allowed in such case upon the petition of the assignee to restrain the person in possession of such vessel from removing it beyond the jurisdiction of the court; the remedy is replevin. Re Oregon Iron Works, 169.

4. POSSESSION OF REAL PROPERTY GIVES USE OF SAME-Where the title to real property is in dispute between two claimants, and one of them takes possession of the property, he will not be injoined from its occupation and the erection of buildings thereon before the title is judicially determined Le Roy v. Wright, 530.

5. COURTS OF EQUITY WILL NOT INTERFERE.-Courts of equity will not ordinarily interfere to injoin the commission of a threatened trespass to real property, unless the trespass be one going to the destruction of the substance of the estate, such as the extracting of ores, the cutting down of timber, the digging of coals and the like. The jurisdiction of the court, in such cases, is asserted for the preversation of the property pending proceedings at law for the determination of the title. Id. See EQUITY, 11; REMOVAL OF CAUSES, 5.

INSANITY.

1. DERANGEMENT ON ONE SUBJECT CONSISTENT WITH CAPACITY TO ACT ON OTHER SUBJECTS.-The law recognizes the fact that there may be derangement of the mind as to particular subjects, and yet capacity to act on other subjects. In determining, therefore, the ability of a person alleged to be insane to execute any particular act, the inquiry should first be what degree of mental capacity is essential to the proper execution of the act in question, and then whether the party possessed at the time such capacity. Hall v. Unger, 672.

2. MENTAL CAPACITY TO EXECUTE POWER OF ATTORNEY.-For a valid execution of a power of attorney to convey land, it is essential that the party executing the power should at the time possess sufficient mind and menory to understand the nature of the business he is engaged in, to know the character and location of the property, and the object and effect of the act he is doing; in other words, it is essential that he should recollect that he is the owner of the property mentioned, the place where such property is situated, and that the instrument conferred authority for the sale of the same. Id.

3. PRESUMPTION OF LAW AS TO SANITY-BURDEN OF PROOF.-The law presumes that every adult man is sane, and possessed of the absolute right to sell and dispose of his property in whatever way he may choose-his will, in every case, standing as the reason of his conduct. Whoever denies his sanity must establish the position; the burden of proof rests upon the party who alleges the mental derangement. If the validity of a particular act is assailed, the assailant must establish that at the time the act was done the insanity existed. Id.

4. PRESUMPTION OF LAW WHERE HABITUAL INSANITY IS SHOWN.-The fact of the existence of a prior or subsequent lunacy, except where it is habitual, does not suffice to change the burden of proof. The case is, however, otherwise, where such habitual insanity is shown to have existed; then the presumption is that the party was insane at the time, and the burden of proof rests with those who allege the party's competency. Id.

5. INSANITY INFERRED FROM CIRCUMSTANCES.-In considering whether a particular act assailed for the alleged insanity of the party was valid or not, regard must be had, in the absence of direct testimony on the point to all the attending circumstances, the reasonableness of the act in itself, and its approval by the family and relations of the party. Id.

6. DUTY OF OFFICER TAKING ACKNOWLEDGMENT.—It is the duty of an officer authorized to take the acknowledgment of an instrument to satisy himself, before he signs his certificate, of the competency of the party to execute the instrument, and the presumption of capacity is therefore strengthened by the attestation of the officer. ld.

INSURANCE.

1. LIMITATION OF TIME TO COMMENCE SUIT ON INSURANCE POLICY.--A condition in a policy of insurance to the effect that no suit for a loss shall be maintained upon it, unless such suit be commenced within twelve months next after the loss, is valid, and will be enforced. Davidson v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 594.

JUDGMENT.

1. LIEN OF JUDGMENT.-At common law a judgment was not a lien upon real property; but after the statute of West, 2, c. 18, allowed the creditor to take a moiety of the debtor's land upon an eligit, and hold the same until the rents and profits satisfied the debt, it was said that a judgment was such a lien; but even then it could only be made effectual by a levy, which took effect by relation from the entry of the judgment. Re Boyd, 262.

2. SAME.—The lien given by section 266 of the Oregon civil code upon the docket of a judgment arises from the docketing and not the judgment, it is a strict legal right, and must stand or fall by the statute which gives it. Id.

3. DOCKET ENTRY.-The docket entry is not a part of the judicial proceeding, which ends with the entry of judgment, and therefore such entry cannot be referred to for the purpose of supplying omissions or explaining ambiguities in the docket; the latter must be complete in itself. But the whole entry of the docket is to be looked to, and not merely a single item of it, and if from the whole the amount and date of the judgment, the parties to it and the court in which it was rendered appear, the entry will be held sufficient. Id.

4. SAME. What should be entered on docket under head, "Amount of Judgment." Id.

5. JUDGMENT, WHEN NOT A LIEN.-A judgment which by its terms cannot be enforced against the property of a party cannot become a lien thereon. Id.

6. THE JURISDICTION OF EVERY Court Open to INQUIRY.-The jurisdiction of any court over either the person or the subject-matter, may be in

quired into whenever any right or benefit is claimed under its proceedings; and want of jurisdiction will render its judgment unavailable for any purpose. Gray v. Larrimore, 638.

7. DISTINCTION MADE IN THIS INQUIRY BETWEEN COURTS OF SUPERIOR AND INFERIOR AUTHORITY.— In making this inquiry the only difference recognized between courts of superior or general authority and courts of inferior or limited authority is, that with reference to the former jurisdiction is presumed until the contrary appears; but with reference to the latter, jurisdiction must be affirmatively shown by parties who claim any right or benefit under their proceedings. Id.

See SERVICE OF PROCESS; PUBLICATION OF SUMMONS.

JURISDICTION.

1. JURISDICTION.-If the bill showed that the decree had been procured by fraud of the grossest character, the court would still be without jurisdiction, for it has no authority to pass upon the propriety of the decree; i. e., to decide upon the validity of the claim, nor to remand the cause to any other forum where that question may be determined. Per HOFFMAN, J. U. S. v. Flint, 42.

2. SUITS IN ADMIRALTY.-A suit in admiralty in a National court to enforce a lien given by the State law is not a judicial proceeding under such law, and therefore the United States is not entitled in such suit to have the res discharged from arrest under section 3753 of the revised statutes. The Revenue Cutter, 136.

3. SUITS TRANSFERRED TO NATIONAL COURTS.-Only suits involving rights depending upon a disputed construction of the Constitution and laws of the United States can be transferred from the State to the National courts, under the clause "arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States," of section two of the act to determine the jurisdiction of the United States courts, passed March 3, 1875. (18 Stat. 470.) Trafton v. Nougues, 178.

4. JURISDICTION OF MINING CLAIMS.-Where the only questions to be litigated in suits to determine the right to mining claims are, as to what are the local laws, rules, regulations and customs by which the rights of the parties are governed, and whether the parties have in fact conformed to such local laws and customs, the courts of the United States have no jurisdiction of the cases under the provisions of the act giving jurisdiction in suits " arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States." Id.

5. PETITIONS For Transfer FROM STATE COURTS.-A petition for the transfer of a suit from a State to a National court, on the ground that it arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States, must state the facts and indicate the questions arising therein which are claimed to give the National court jurisdiction, so that the court can determine for itself from the facts the question of jurisdiction. Id.

6. JURISDICTION OF NATIONAL COURTS.-Where, in an action, the title to land in controversy held under patents issued upon confirmed Mexican grants, depends upon a controverted construction of the patents, the National courts have jurisdiction under the act of Congress of March 3, 1875. Hills v. Houston, 195.

7. JURISDICTION OF MURDER.-After a State has been admitted into the