These are the only two cases to which I attach any importance.

Question. Viewed in the light of all the facts that you now have any knowledge of, what would have been, in your opinion, the effect, had General Franklin made the attack with the force and vigor with which you deem he should have made it?

Answer. I think the height at Hamilton's house would have been carried. We then would have held the road by which the communications of the enemy were kept up, and would have had free access to the open ground in rear of the line of heights, which would have caused the enemy on the heights, immediately opposite the town, to be very much shaken, even if it did not cause them to evacuate the place. It would have made the work opposite the city much easier. These things are distinctly laid down in my written order. I stated in my written order to them what would be the effect.

Question. Did General Franklin have on hand at the time a sufficient force with which to make the attack with the number of men contemplated by your order, and at the same time have the attacking force properly supported?

Answer. I will answer that question in this manner: I ordered two of General Hooker's largest divisions to go to General Franklin's bridges and remain there as supports to his command, with the view of having those divisions hold the bridges, together with the artillery that was in position above them. Independent of those two divisions, which I think amounted to nearly 18,000 men, General Franklin had over 40,000 men of his own grand division. One of my aides, whom I sent to General Franklin's position, returned to me at about one o'clock, and told me that the attacking column to him seemed to be very weak; that there was a large portion of the forces remaining in position opposite the bridges. Those forces turned out to be the whole of Smith's corps, and a portion, if not the whole, of Sickles's division. I then sent word by this aide to General Franklin to make a vigorous attack at once with his whole force, and he sent me word that he would attack with every man that he could spare after protecting the bridges. I soon after went down to General Sumner's headquarters with the view of ascertaining how they were progressing. I received reports there that the columns of attack were failing, and I sent over some orders of the same nature that I sent to General Franklin.

Question. Do you know whether General Franklin obeyed your second order?

Answer. I know that no considerable portion of Smith's corps was under musketry fire, or formed any portion of the column of attack. That corps amounted to something over 20,000 men.

Question. And do you deem that it should have taken part in the attack? Answer. I would simply say that if I had been there I would have put them in. At Roanoke, Newbern, and Antietam I put into the fight every man I had.

Question. What, in your opinion, would have been the result of the battle of Fredericksburg had the attack under General Franklin been made with the proper vigor, and had it been made with the force which should have been used for that purpose, considering the number of men at his disposal?

Answer. I am of the opinion that had General Franklin used all his disposable force, the result of the action of that day would have been favorable to us. In answer to a former question I have said that I did not consider the two acts of General Hooker and General Franklin, to which I referred, as wilful disobedience of orders, or wilful acts of bad faith. I am almost certain that neither one of them had as much confidence in the success of he move as they ought to have had, to have been entirely efficient, and it is

possible that a lack of confidence in me affected them to some extent. I would like to add here that I think a mistake was made in sending General Hooker to report to me at Warrenton, after it was well known by the authorities that General Hooker came very near receiving, instead of me, the command of the army of the Potomac.

Question. You think it was a mistake when the question of who should command that army had been between you and General Hooker, and had been decided in your favor?

Answer. Yes, sir; that it was a mistake to place him junior in command

to me.

Question. Did your second proposed movement have any advantages over your first proposed movement, after the battle of Fredericksburg?

Answer. No, sir; it was not so good. But I could not make the other for the enemy knew all about it. Their pickets used to talk about the matter across the river.

[Addition made April 3, 1863.]

I sent Captain Lydig to General Franklin at 10 o'clock to ascertain the condition of his forces. Captain Lydig says in his statement:

"I found General Franklin in a grove of trees in the centre of his command; and on delivering my message I was informed by him that Meade was very hotly engaged, and that his men were by that time pretty generally engaged. He also added, I think, that Birney had orders to support them. I then inquired if any of General Smith's corps were engaged, and was told they were not. I returned to headquarters-passing Captain Cutts, who arrived as I left General Franklin-and reported the information I received to General Burnside, who seemed at the time annoyed at the smallness of the force engaged, and expressed his surprise that none of General Smith's troops had been put into the fight. It was about 12 o'clock when I arrived with my report at headquarters.

"P. M. LYDIG, "Captain and Aide-de-Camp."

I next sent Captain Cutts with an order to General Franklin to advance his right and front. Captain Cutts states in his note-book that he carried the order to General Franklin, and the general said to him that it was impossible to advance; upon which he returned to me to show why General Franklin thought it was impossible to advance. When he communicated the reply to me, he says that my reply was, "But he (General Franklin) must advance." I then sent Captain Goddard to General Franklin with an order, which the following statement will explain:

"HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,
"Cincinnati, Ohio, April 3, 1863.

"I was sent on the day of the battle of Fredericksburg to General Franklin on the left, with this order from General Burnside: 'Tell General Franklin, with my compliments, that I wish him to make a vigorous attack with his whole force our right is hard pressed.' This order was given me about half-past one o'clock in the afternoon, and I delivered it to General Franklin, in the presence of General Hardie, before half-past two o'clock.

"R. H. I. GODDARD,
"Captain and Aide-de-Camp."

WASHINGTON, January 28, 1863.

Major General JOHN G. PARKE sworn and examined.

By Mr. Wade:

Question. What is your rank in the army?

Answer. I am major general of volunteers, and captain of the corps of topographical engineers.

Question. What position do you occupy in the army of the Potomac ?
Answer. I am chief of staff of General Burnside.

Question. How long have you been with him?

Answer. I have been with him during the past year, throughout the campaign in North Carolina. When he joined the army of the Potomac I was still with him in command of a division. When he went to Fredericksburg, last summer, he made me chief of staff, and I have been with him in that capacity ever since.

Question. Do you know of any plan of an expedition against the enemy formed by General Burnside, since the former attack upon Fredericksburg?

Answer. Yes, sir. Subsequent to the battle of Fredericksburg, General Burnside made plans and arrangements for another attack upon the enemy. All the materials were brought to bear upon that one purpose, and all things were got in readiness.

Question. State in general terms what that plan was?

Answer. It was to cross the river again at a point below Fredericksburg. There were two or three points of crossing, in reference to which preparations were going on. The real point of crossing the general only knew, though preparations were making in reference to two or three points. The point of crossing, I believe, was below what is called the Seddon House. In connexion with this crossing, which was to be with the main body, a cavalry expedition, under the command of General Averill, was intended to cross the river at the same time at another point. It was intended that that should cross the river above at one of the fords-I believe Kelly's-and passing down west of Lee's army was to cut the railroad between it and Richmond. Further movements were to depend upon circumstances.

Question. What amount of cavalry was expected to go upon that expedition?

Answer. One thousand picked men and a battery of horse artillery. This expedition was fully organized and had started. It had gone some time upon the march when General Burnside received a message from the President, to the effect that he had good reason for saying that he (General Burnside) must not make a movement without letting him know of it. General Burnside immediately postponed all preparations and ordered this cavalry expedition not to proceed further. And then the cavalry expedition was ordered off in the direction of Warrenton, in the hope of intercepting Stuart, who just then made a raid into our lines.

Question. State as nearly as you can when this occurred?

Answer. That is difficult to do. I have not referred to any notes or orders, and I cannot tell exactly. It was long enough after the battle of Fredericsburg for the men to have recovered entirely of their fatigue, and for the furnishing of supplies.

Question. At the time this expedition was planned and sought to be put into execution what was the condition of the army in reference to their morale, efficiency, &c.?

Answer. The army was in a fighting condition, in my opinion; but there was a diversity of opinion upon that point among the general officers.

Question. You have stated the plan and the progress, and also that it was interrupted. Can you tell us what caused that order of the President?

Answer. As soon as General Burnside received this order he stopped everything. The order came upon him like a thunderbolt. He was in doubt how to interpret that despatch, and in doubt as to how it originated, and the cause of it; but as it was an order from the President, the only thing he could do was to stop for the time being, and see for himself from what it originated. He came to Washington. On his return I learned from him that some general officers had been to Washington, seen the President, and made certain statements which brought about this order. That is my understanding of the manner in which this result was brought about. Question. Who were those officers, as you understood?

Answer. General Burnside said the President would not tell him, at that time, who they were, and that he did not know. He had a suspicion that they were some officers who had been absent on "leave of absence" a short time, but that was all. Since that time I have learned from rumor the names of the two general officers who went to see the President upon this matter. I do not know of my own personal knowledge, or from any person who does know, who they were. Rumor pointed to General Newton and

General Cochrane.

Question. Do they both belong to General Franklin's corps?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. You have spoken of the expedition which was planned by General Burnside to make an attack. Was that assented to by all the officers cordially or otherwise?

Answer. I do not think it was submitted to the officers generally The plan was his own, and he determined to act upon his own judgment. Question. You think he did not call a council of war?

Answer. I am inclined to think he did not.

Question. Did you ever hear what objections these generals, who went to the President, urged against this expedition?

Answer. I cannot say that I ever have. It is rumored that the objections were founded on the fact of the enemy being strongly intrenched, and the difficulty of our moving.

Question. Do you know whether those generals communicated with anybody else than the President in relation to the contemplated movement? Answer. I do not.

Question. Where is General Burnside now?

Answer. He left here yesterday morning, on his way home, and I presume he is now in New York.

Question. As a military man, do you know of any objection to the expedition, or why it should have been arrested?

Answer. I do not. Had there been an attack, from the preparations which were made, I have every reason to believe that it would have been successful.

Question. If I understand you, this cavalry expedition was a part and parcel of the whole expedition?

Answer. Yes, sir.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. What was the state of the weather and the condition of the roads at that time?

Answer. The roads were good and the weather fine.

Question. Did they continue so for some time?

Answer. I think so.

Question Can you state what the movement was to be after the crossing had been effected?

Answer. It was to endeavor to turn the flank of Lee's army, and strike the railroad in his rear.

Question. Do you, of your own knowledge, know of any officers connected with the Potomac army who opposed that movement?

Answer. I cannot say that I do.

Question. I understand you that the cavalry movement was not interrupted in consequence of the raid of Stuart, but in obedience to the order of the President.

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. And after it had been interrupted in the movement which it was proposed it should make, it was then sent in pursuit of, or to intercept Stuart?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Would there have been time to execute that plan before the roads became bad, had it not been for this interruption?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. State whether or not there has been any other movement either proposed or undertaken by General Burnside, and if so, what it was? Answer. There was a movement projected, and preparations made for another attack. After the troops got fairly under way this storm set in, rendering the roads and fields so impassable that it was utterly out of the question to move guns or wagons. What was intended as a surprise was delayed for such a length of time that the enemy became fully apprised of the movement, and brought a force to bear upon the very point where the crossing was to have been made; that and the delay, and the state of the roads and weather, rendered it advisable not to make the crossing.

Question. Describe to us more particularly what the proposed movement was?

Answer. It was proposed to cross the river at two points, the United States Ford and Banks's Ford-a portion of the force to cross at the upper ford, which was the United States, and a portion of the force at the lower ford, which was Banks's. The pontoons were moved up to the vicinity between the two fords, whence they could be taken suddenly to either point. Everything was in readiness, but, from information obtained, it was evident that the enemy had moved a force up to the United States Ford, leaving Banks's Ford comparatively unprotected. Thereupon the portion of the force which was intended to cross at the United States Ford was joined to the other forces, and it was the intention to cross the whole at Banks's Ford. Question. Both fords are above Fredericksburgh, are they?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Why was the movement delayed, and why was it not executed within the time it was supposed it could be?

Answer. The preparation of the ground for the planting of cannon, the opening of roads for the movement of the artillery, and the getting of the pontoons to the river, required more time than it was first thought it would. All those preparations had to be gone through with before the command. was moved.

Question. Could you not, by a careful examination beforehand, have determined all those facts with a reasonable certainty?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Why was it not done?

Answer. It was done before the movement was made. We could not undertake to make the movement until all those things were accomplished. Question. It took a longer time to make the preparations than you expected?

Answer. Yes, sir.