By Mr. Covode:

Question. How did you come to get leave of absence at a time when the army was about to move?

Answer. I will tell you how that was. I knew perfectly well that the army could not move for three or four days-for two or three days at least; that it could not make the necessary preparations to move sooner. I had got my permission to leave previously to my knowledge that any movement at all was in contemplation. My plan was this, as is often done, to come to Washington and telegraph to my family to come here, and here I would be within telegraph notice of Falmouth, and could go down there at any time, and, to say truly, I did not believe that the army could possibly move for three or four days. I had enough military knowledge for that. We had made no preparations, and I knew that it was safe for me to come to Washington.

I would also remark, in answer to that question, that since this war began I have never yet been absent from any battle in which any portion of my command was concerned. I have always been with them.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. Did you make any statements to the President of the United States in regard to the condition of the army of the Potomac as a whole? Answer. I made this remark to the President, as I now remember distinctly. The President was speaking of a particular portion of the army, and I told him that my belief was that that particular portion of which he was speaking was the best. I said that they were dispirited, but that I believed a great deal of their dejection arose from their communication with the other soldiers of the army who had been engaged in the most bloody part of that fight at Fredericksburg; that I believed they had become dejected by such conversations.

Question. You went to the President feeling it to be your duty to make a communication to some one in relation to the condition of things in the Potomac army?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Did you or not make that communication?

Answer. I did, pretty much of the spirit to which I have already testified. That is to say, the communication I presume you refer to is with regard to the dejection and dispirited condition of the army. Everything else I have testified distinctly to. With regard to the condition of the army, I have already testified that my memory does not serve me as to the terms I used, or even the particular illustrations I used. But I know so perfectly weil my object in going there that I put that down as indicating what I said. Question. Then state in substance what you stated to the President. Answer. I have already stated in regard to a movement across the river talked of. I intimated as well as I could the dispirited condition of the army. Does that answer your question? because otherwise I do not know as I understand you.

Question. What I have been trying to get at, by my last half dozen questions, is this: you went to the President for the purpose of making a communication to him?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. I want you to tell us in substance-you say you cannot repeat the words the communication which you did make to the President

Answer. One portion I have given in detail already; and that was in regard to the point of the river where it was proposed to cross. Do you wish that over again?

Question. No, sir.

Answer. I have also to remark that the particular illustrations, or even the words, that I used to convey to the President my opinion of the dispirited condition of the army I have forgotten. I can merely say, in general terms, that I endeavored to convey to him, without reflecting upon General Burnside, if possible, that opinion. I wish I could remember the words; but my memory is exceedingly treacherous about conversations. It is very rarely that I can remember them; I can only remember their general scope. Question. Then you state that the substance of your statement to the President was that you considered the army to be in a dispirited condition? Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. You have also stated to the committee that you told the President that the point you looked at for crossing, indicated by General Burnside, was reported unfavorably upon by the officers examining it, and you thought the report was unfavorably received by General Burnside?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Did you make any other statements to the President in relation to General Burnside, and, if so, what?

Answer. No other, except that General Burnside possessed my warmest esteem.

Question. With what superior officers, if any, had you conversed in relation to this matter, before leaving the army to come to Washington?

Answer. I do not know that I told anybody in particular what I was going to tell the President, if I saw him. In fact, I myself scarcely knew, for that was a matter for the time, place, and circumstances to determine. But in general terms I did mention, I think, to General Franklin and to General Smith, that when I was off on leave of abseuce I thought I should see somebody in Washington on this matter. I do not know whether I said I would see the President or not. Perhaps I may have said that if they advised me to go to see the President I would go. But I am pretty certain that I told General Franklin and General Smith that while I was in Washington, if I had a chance, I would see some of the prominent members of Congress and others, and have some conversation with them in regard to the army. That would be an ordinary thing, for officers, very often, when they come up to the city, if they meet a member of Congress, have a conversation in regard to the state of the army.

Question. Was it understood between you and the officers you have named what statements you should make to persous in authority, that you might converse with in Washington?

Answer. There was no such understanding All these things were of my own volition. I do not know that I ever mentioned, in the course of the desultory conversation, what I intended to say. I do not believe I did. I wish, in what I say, to particularly insist that there was no combination of any kind in the world; that, if any wrong has been done, I am the one who has done it, and nobody else is responsible for it. Whenever I made any remark to General Franklin on the subject, whatever it was, he never replied to it, so far as I know; never expressed assent or dissent, but treated it as I suppose any other man of sense would. He did not consider himself bound to know what I would do in my individual capacity. And the same with General Smith. I received no advice or consent from either of them.

Question. They knew you proposed to make those representations in case you came to Washington?

Answer. I do not know that they knew I intended to make them to the President. I should be very loth to say that.

Question. But to some one?

Answer. They knew that I would speak to members of Congress about it-those in the confidence of the government. I thought the matter was of so much importance that it was a thing where advice and experience generally would be of a great deal of use.

Question. You say you thought the matter of so much importance-to what particular point do you allude?

Answer. I refer to the condition of the army at that time. I thought that was a fact that was not clearly understood by the public at large. I thought this thing had grown very rapidly since the army had come over from Fredericksburg, and I was convinced the public at large had no apprehension of it. I would have cut my hand off rather than to have this thing get into the papers. I thought it was a thing that belonged to the army, and should be kept as still as possible, and told to men only in confidence. Question. At what point was this proposed place of crossing?

Answer. I do not know where the exact point was, for General Burnside never indicated it; but it was somewhere in the neighborhood of Muddy creek; a little above.

Question. When you went to make the examination you looked at some particular point, did you not?

Answer. I had but a short time to make my examination in. I rode first down the river by the road, and then followed up the river from below Muddy creek, past Muddy creek. I looked at different points as I came along, to see if I could distinguish any place that was fit for crossing. I do not have in my mind now any clear impression of any particular point that I noticed. I looked at them all as I went by.

Question. Was it a matter of conversation among officers of the army, at the time you then left for Washington, that General Burnside was thinking of making a movement?

Answer. I do not know how general it was.

Question. I mean among the higher officers; among those with whom you associated and often came in contact?

I

Answer. There was an idea that General Burnside contemplated cannot even say that. I must honestly say that those persons with whom I conversed, as a general thing, disbelieved in the fact of his crossing at all. Although it was talked about as a thing that might happen, yet it had so many elements of doubt about it, that I do not believe anybody had any conviction that it would be. That is as near as I can come to it.

Question. How do you know that General Burnside told General Franklin, the morning you left, that he intended to give up the movement he had been contemplating?

Answer. Because afterwards, in conversing socially with General Franklin, in some incidental way it came up. I do not even know what led to it. It may have been two days, three days, or a week after; I do not know which. It came out in a very incidental way.

Question. What makes you suppose that the President thought you came to him to injure General Burnside, and to suggest some other person for the command of the army of the Potomac ?

Answer. That is more than I can state, why it was. I presume it was from the delicate position in which I found myself; unable to express my own ideas properly as I wanted to. I might have said something to give him that impression; and I think an impression of that kind would be very natural until explained away-exceedingly natural. I was not, on a little reflection, surprised at the President at first taking up such an opinion as that, because it appeared to me natural that one, in the opening of such a conversation, should take up such an idea before I had full time to explain

my object. I do not remember any particular words that I used, or anything that I can fasten upon at this present time, that should have led the President to suppose that. It was merely, probably, from the general tenor of the conversation when I first opened it.

Question. For what time was your leave of absence, and by whom was it granted?

Answer. It was granted by General Franklin, who commanded the grand division I was in. He was the legal authority to do that. The exact length of time I do not remember; but it was understood that, if there was even a suspicion of a movement, I was to remain in Washington, or be right at hand, ready to come down at once.

Question. Your leave of absence was for a definite time; it was not until you were notified to come back?

Answer. It was for a definite time-perhaps for five days. But the understanding, of course, was, that I was not to avail myself of the whole of it, in case any movement was to be made. I was to be here, so that, if I was wanted, I could be reached. Once before I had got a leave of absence from General Burnside; but it was understood that I was to be in Washington. My leave was for a definite period, but it so happened that I stayed away only two days and a half; because I got a telegram to go down, and I did go down, and the next day crossed over to Fredericksburg.

[The testimony, up to this point, was read over in hearing of the witness.]

By the chairman:

Question. Do I understand you to say that this lack of confidence in the army arose from a want of confidence in General Burnside's military ability? Answer. That is my firm belief.

Question. And do I also understand you to say that that opinion was pretty universal in the army?

Answer. That is the misfortune-that it was almost universal. That was my firm belief from all that I could hear.

Question. Did you communicate that fact to the President in any manner? Answer. As I have already remarked, I thought it would be highly improper for me to come square out and say that. I say, as I have before stated, that I tried to convey to the President, indirectly, this ideathat the troops had no confidence in General Burnside.

Question. You say you believe that was the condition of the army, arising from the cause you have stated?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. And you thought that should be made known to the authorities here?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Why was it more improper to state that direetly than to state it indirectly, or by way of circumlocution?

Answer. That is a point in which I want to make a correction. It struck me just now, as I heard my testimony read over, that I expressed myself in one case a little too strongly. My intention was not so much to let the President understand, directly or indirectly, that the troops had no confidence in General Burnside, as it was that they were dispirited; and then I was in hopes that the President would afterwards inquire and find out the facts for himself. It occurred to me that it would look too much like interference with General Burnside if I was to tell the President that the troops had no confidence in him; it looked to me that it would be improper. I wanted the President to understand that the army was dispirited, and then he could make the inquiries for himself.

Rep. Com. 108-47

Question. How long had the army entertained this opinion of General Burnside's want of capacity?

Answer. I cannot answer that more definitely than in this way: We crossed back from Fredericksburg on the night of Monday, the 15th of December. It was between that time and the 30th of December-about two weeks-that these reports came in to me from my higher officers, who undoubtedly thought they were doing properly in reporting these things to me. Question. Was it superinduced by the failure of the attack upon Fredericksburg?

Answer. That was undoubtedly the provoking cause-the starting point. I do not think it was the total cause.

Question. What other cause?

Answer. There I have to go into suppositions. I have to suppose that troops and officers possess a certain knowledge of character, and that they see a man under certain circumstances and judge of him. I can state nothing more definite than that.

Question. You are a military man. State to the committee whether it is a high military offence for an inferior to interfere with the plans of his superior. Is it so regarded among military men?

Answer. I should say that it depended on the kind of interference. In a very general sense you might call anything an interference. But a direct interference is, for instance, where you do not bring your troops up in time, or you put some actual obstacle in the way of the execution of the orders of your superior. That I should consider a very grave military offence. I will honestly confess that in going to the President, with the intention I had, I do not believe that I was committing any offence at all.

Question. I was merely asking you the question for information. I do not profess to understand your military rules.

Answer. It is hard to answer that question. If I had interfered directly, had gone out into the army and openly proclaimed to everybody that General Burnside was going to cross the river, and that we could not cross, and that if we attempted it it would be a mere slaughter, &c., that would be a direct interference, because it would actually dispirit the soldiers so much that it would amount to an interference.

Question. Do I understand you to say that you considered this expedition which General Burnside had planned was one that could not be executed?

Answer. It was my belief, my military belief, that with the best troops in the world we would have failed at that time. That was my belief. I may be mistaken, of course. That is only a military opinion of mine. I will state one thing in regard to the passage of the river that at this moment may perhaps be pertinent. It is laid down by the very best military writers-not merely theoretical, but practical military writers-that the passage of a river in face of an opposing force never succeeds, except by mere chance; that the instances of success are so rare that the rule is proved by the exceptions; that it is impossible to pass a river except what is called by surprise; that is, at a point so far removed from the main body of the enemy, or do it so suddenly that you have time to get your troops over, and not only get them over, but also in order of battle, so as to be ready to meet an attack; for if the enemy charge upon you before you get in order of battle, the more troops you have over the worse for you.

Question. Was there some hope of surprise in this case, supposing the plan had been properly and promptly executed?

Answer. The point of crossing, to the best of my knowledge, was only about six miles below Fredericksburg, and I do not think that was far enough off to make a surprise, or what is equivalent to a surprise—a sudden