 If, therefore, we speak of the Mind as a series of feelings, we are obliged to complete the statement by calling it a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future ; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the Mind, or...  A Century of Intellectual Development - Stran 89avtor: Hector Macpherson - 1907 - 304 straniCelotni ogled - O knjigi
 | Noah Porter - 1873 - 730 strani
...atalement by calling it a frto* of fcttingt which is aware nf ITSELF as past and future ; and we arc reduced to the alternative of believing that the mind...possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox that pometl.ing wliich, ex tiyp'ifh'ti, is but a series of feelings, can be aware of Itself as a series.... | |
 | John Stuart Mill - 1874 - 342 strani
...of the Mind ns a series of feelings, we are obliged to complete the statement by calling it a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future...of accepting the paradox, that something which ex /typolhesi is but a scries of feelings, can be aware of itself as a series. The truth is, that we are... | |
 | Friedrich Ueberweg - 1874 - 580 strani
...feelings witli a background of possibilities of feeling." lie concedes that in adhering to this definition "we are reduced to the alternative of believing that...or of accepting the paradox that something which, is but a series of feelings can be aware of itself as a series." In respect to the belief in the real... | |
 | James Tift Champlin - 1874 - 310 strani
...of the mind as a series of feelings, we are obliged to complete the statement by calling it a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future;...alternative of believing that the mind, or ego, is something-different from any series of feelings, or possibilities of them; or of accepting the paradox,... | |
 | Friedrich Ueberweg - 1874 - 580 strani
...feeling." He concedes that in adhering to this definition " we are reduced to the alternative of bel ieving that the mind, or ego, is something different from...of accepting the paradox that something which, ex hyjwttiesi, is but a series of feelings can be aware of itself as a series." In respeot to the belief... | |
 | Henry Calderwood - 1874 - 328 strani
...3d ed. p. 242. Which alternative is commonly accepted, there can be no doubt. But if it be admitted that ' the Mind or Ego is something different from any series of feelings,' how can the acknowledgment be described as a 'belief? In postulating a belief, we are guilty of the... | |
 | 1887 - 532 strani
...speak of mind as a series of feelings, we are obliged to complete the statement by calling it a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future...or of accepting the paradox that something which ex hypotl1esi is but a series of feelings can be aware of itself as a series.' Mr. Mill consoles himself... | |
 | 1876 - 600 strani
...of the Mind as a series of feelings, we are obliged to complete the statement by calling it a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future...is something different from any series of feelings, and possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox, that something which «j Itypotkesi is but... | |
 | 1876 - 598 strani
...the iiind as a series of feelings, we are obliged to complete the statement by calling it . a scries of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future...is something different from any series of feelings, and possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox, that something which c,c hgpothesi is but a... | |
 | John McClintock - 1876 - 1014 strani
...background of possibilities of feeling.' He concedes that in adhering to this definition *we are re! dnced to the alternative of believing that the mind, or...any series of feelings or possibilities of them, or else of accepting the paradox that something which, ex hypothesi, is bnt a series of feelings can be... | |
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