 But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others.  Executive Orders: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Legislative and Budget ... - Stran 144avtor: United States. Congress. House. Committee on Rules. Subcommittee on Legislative and Budget Process - 2000 - 161 straniCelotni ogled - O knjigi
 | David H. Rosenbloom, Howard E. McCurdy - 2006 - 252 strani
...administrative decision making. As James Madison perceptively explained in Federalist Paper number 51, "The great security against a gradual concentration...the several powers in the same department, consists of giving to those who administer each department, the necessary constitutional means, and personal... | |
 | Andrew E. Taslitz - 2006 - 377 strani
...boundaries" [among] ... the three branches of government. "The great security," wrote James Madison, against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department consists in giving those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist... | |
 | R. A. W. Rhodes, Sarah A. Binder, Bert A. Rockman - 2006 - 852 strani
...51, the design of government "consists in giving to those who administer each department [ie branch] the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others" (Hamilton, Madison, Jay, and Fairfield 1787/1937, 337). Ambition is checked, in Madison's vision, through... | |
 | Kenneth D. Wald, Allison Calhoun-Brown - 2007 - 470 strani
...The great hope for the preservation of liberty was to equip each branch of the new government with "the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others." Then, in a phrase that nicely encapsulated the Federalist philosophy of humankind, he reiterated the... | |
 | Scott J. Hammond, Kevin R. Hardwick, Howard Leslie Lubert - 2007 - 1236 strani
...of the legislature in this particular, their independence in even other would be merely nominal. But onwealths, and putting themselves under government,...established, settled, known law, received and allowed by The provision for defence must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of... | |
 | Ian Shapiro, Sonu Bedi - 2007 - 296 strani
...undertake a full development of this important idea I will hazard a few general observations . . . the great security against a gradual concentration...personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. The provision for defense must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of... | |
 | Michael Warren - 2007 - 235 strani
...^Federalist 'Paper 'No. 47. ^Federalist Paper No. 48. 182He continued in Federalist Paper No. 5: But the great security against a gradual concentration...personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. The provision for defense must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of... | |
 | Andrew Busch - 2007 - 346 strani
...number 51, holds that the greatest security against constitutional usurpation and concentration of power "consists in giving to those who administer each department...constitutional means and personal motives to resist the encroachments of the others." • Hamilton in Federalist 66 defends the impeachment and removal... | |
 | Edward A. Purcell - 2007 - 311 strani
...theory of factions, Madison maintained that the "double security" required a structure that would give "to those who administer each department the necessary...and personal motives to resist encroachments of the other." Human beings were not "angels" but self-seekers, and government off1cials consequently would... | |
 | Vincent Ostrom - 2008 - 320 strani
...emoluments annexed to their offices" (Federalist 51, par. 3). Those who administer each department must have "the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others" (Federalist 5 1 , par. 3) if the system of government is to be governed in accordance with the decision... | |
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